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How it works
noorqureshi/crypto-oracle-attacksCrittografia e Web3

crypto-oracle-attacks

⁨Break weak symmetric crypto in real apps — decrypt or forge encrypted tokens/cookies without the key via padding oracles (CBC), ECB block shuffling, and hash-length-extension of homemade MACs. Load when the app hands you ciphertext you can tamper with and resend: an encrypted cookie/token, a "state"⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa

Installa

Non hai ancora la CLI di NotHoly? Installala prima.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/crypto-oracle-attacks

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
4O72WdeeGv…+f1C4ADQ==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchetto76713b36…20029a86
76713b36219e…c37d20029a861 file · ⁦2.1 KB⁩
ScansioneBassonessuna segnalazione
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Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/cryptography/crypto-oracle-attacks@ee0e0c5

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When it applies

An app protects data with symmetric crypto you can poke — an encrypted session cookie, a "remember me"/state token, a signed-with-a-hash parameter — and it lets you submit modified ciphertext and observe a difference (an error vs. success, a padding error, different output). That observable difference is an oracle you can turn into full decrypt/forge, no key needed.

Why it works

Encryption without authentication is malleable: CBC leaks validity through padding errors, ECB reveals structure and lets you rearrange blocks, and MAC = H(secret‖message) (Merkle–Damgård) can be extended without knowing the secret. The key never leaks — the mode/construction does the work.

Method

  1. Fingerprint the token. Decode (base64/hex); measure length. A multiple of 8/16 bytes → a block cipher (CBC/ECB). Flip one byte and resend: a distinct "padding"/"decryption" error = CBC padding oracle; identical ciphertext blocks for identical plaintext = ECB.
  2. CBC padding oracle — when the server reveals valid vs. invalid padding: recover plaintext byte by byte, and encrypt arbitrary plaintext (forge a token) by controlling the preceding block. padbuster <url> <ciphertext> <blocksize> -cookies ..., or a Python oracle loop. This is the classic "decrypt/forge the admin cookie" attack.
  3. ECB weaknesses — identical plaintext blocks → identical ciphertext:
    • Cut-and-paste: rearrange whole blocks to splice a privileged value (e.g. move an aligned role=admin block into place).
    • Byte-at-a-time decryption: if your input is prepended to a secret and ECB-encrypted, recover the secret one byte per aligned block.
  4. Hash length extension — a signature of the form H(secret‖data) (MD5/SHA1/SHA2) with known data and secret length: append your own data and compute a valid new MAC with hashpump (hashpump -s <sig> -d <data> -a <append> -k <keylen>), bypassing the "integrity" check.
  5. Weak/predictable tokens — if it turns out not to be real crypto: ECB pattern, a static IV, XOR with a fixed keystream, or a guessable PRNG seed (timestamp) → derive/forge directly.
  6. Forge and use — mint the token that says what you want (admin, another user) and replay it; validate the access gained with reporting-triage-validation.

Gotchas

  • Authenticated encryption (AES-GCM, encrypt-then-HMAC) kills these — a padding oracle needs an unauthenticated CBC error signal; if tampering just fails uniformly, move on.
  • The oracle can be subtle — a timing difference, a 500 vs 403, or a different redirect counts; diff responses carefully before concluding "not vulnerable".
  • Block alignment is everything for ECB cut-and-paste and byte-at-a-time — pad your input to land targets on block boundaries.
  • HMAC (not H(secret‖msg)) is not extendable — length extension only hits raw Merkle–Damgård concatenation MACs.

Verify success

A token you decrypted or forged that the application accepts as another/privileged user (or recovered plaintext of a value you couldn't read), reproduced from a clean session.

References

Vaudenay padding-oracle; padbuster; the Cryptopals set (mechanisms); hashpump. Related: web-auth-jwt, crypto-rsa-attacks, web-idor.

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellNoNo
Usa la reteNoNo
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c576713b36Firmata–

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