crypto-oracle-attacks
Break weak symmetric crypto in real apps — decrypt or forge encrypted tokens/cookies without the key via padding oracles (CBC), ECB block shuffling, and hash-length-extension of homemade MACs. Load when the app hands you ciphertext you can tamper with and resend: an encrypted cookie/token, a "state"
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/crypto-oracle-attacksWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package76713b36…20029a86
76713b36219e…c37d20029a861 file · 2.1 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/cryptography/crypto-oracle-attacks@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
An app protects data with symmetric crypto you can poke — an encrypted session cookie, a "remember me"/state token, a signed-with-a-hash parameter — and it lets you submit modified ciphertext and observe a difference (an error vs. success, a padding error, different output). That observable difference is an oracle you can turn into full decrypt/forge, no key needed.
Why it works
Encryption without authentication is malleable: CBC leaks validity through padding errors, ECB
reveals structure and lets you rearrange blocks, and MAC = H(secret‖message) (Merkle–Damgård) can
be extended without knowing the secret. The key never leaks — the mode/construction does the work.
Method
- Fingerprint the token. Decode (base64/hex); measure length. A multiple of 8/16 bytes → a block cipher (CBC/ECB). Flip one byte and resend: a distinct "padding"/"decryption" error = CBC padding oracle; identical ciphertext blocks for identical plaintext = ECB.
- CBC padding oracle — when the server reveals valid vs. invalid padding: recover plaintext byte
by byte, and encrypt arbitrary plaintext (forge a token) by controlling the preceding block.
padbuster <url> <ciphertext> <blocksize> -cookies ..., or a Python oracle loop. This is the classic "decrypt/forge the admin cookie" attack. - ECB weaknesses — identical plaintext blocks → identical ciphertext:
- Cut-and-paste: rearrange whole blocks to splice a privileged value (e.g. move an aligned
role=adminblock into place). - Byte-at-a-time decryption: if your input is prepended to a secret and ECB-encrypted, recover the secret one byte per aligned block.
- Cut-and-paste: rearrange whole blocks to splice a privileged value (e.g. move an aligned
- Hash length extension — a signature of the form
H(secret‖data)(MD5/SHA1/SHA2) with knowndataand secret length: append your own data and compute a valid new MAC with hashpump (hashpump -s <sig> -d <data> -a <append> -k <keylen>), bypassing the "integrity" check. - Weak/predictable tokens — if it turns out not to be real crypto: ECB pattern, a static IV, XOR with a fixed keystream, or a guessable PRNG seed (timestamp) → derive/forge directly.
- Forge and use — mint the token that says what you want (admin, another user) and replay it;
validate the access gained with
reporting-triage-validation.
Gotchas
- Authenticated encryption (AES-GCM, encrypt-then-HMAC) kills these — a padding oracle needs an unauthenticated CBC error signal; if tampering just fails uniformly, move on.
- The oracle can be subtle — a timing difference, a 500 vs 403, or a different redirect counts; diff responses carefully before concluding "not vulnerable".
- Block alignment is everything for ECB cut-and-paste and byte-at-a-time — pad your input to land targets on block boundaries.
- HMAC (not
H(secret‖msg)) is not extendable — length extension only hits raw Merkle–Damgård concatenation MACs.
Verify success
A token you decrypted or forged that the application accepts as another/privileged user (or recovered plaintext of a value you couldn't read), reproduced from a clean session.
References
Vaudenay padding-oracle; padbuster; the Cryptopals set (mechanisms); hashpump.
Related: web-auth-jwt, crypto-rsa-attacks, web-idor.
Files in this version
- SKILL.md4.0 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 76713b36 | Signed | – |
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