crypto-oracle-attacks
Break weak symmetric crypto in real apps — decrypt or forge encrypted tokens/cookies without the key via padding oracles (CBC), ECB block shuffling, and hash-length-extension of homemade MACs. Load when the app hands you ciphertext you can tamper with and resend: an encrypted cookie/token, a "state"
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas
Instalar
¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/crypto-oracle-attacksEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete76713b36…20029a86
76713b36219e…c37d20029a861 archivo · 2.1 KBEscaneoBajosin hallazgos
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/cryptography/crypto-oracle-attacks@ee0e0c5
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When it applies
An app protects data with symmetric crypto you can poke — an encrypted session cookie, a "remember me"/state token, a signed-with-a-hash parameter — and it lets you submit modified ciphertext and observe a difference (an error vs. success, a padding error, different output). That observable difference is an oracle you can turn into full decrypt/forge, no key needed.
Why it works
Encryption without authentication is malleable: CBC leaks validity through padding errors, ECB
reveals structure and lets you rearrange blocks, and MAC = H(secret‖message) (Merkle–Damgård) can
be extended without knowing the secret. The key never leaks — the mode/construction does the work.
Method
- Fingerprint the token. Decode (base64/hex); measure length. A multiple of 8/16 bytes → a block cipher (CBC/ECB). Flip one byte and resend: a distinct "padding"/"decryption" error = CBC padding oracle; identical ciphertext blocks for identical plaintext = ECB.
- CBC padding oracle — when the server reveals valid vs. invalid padding: recover plaintext byte
by byte, and encrypt arbitrary plaintext (forge a token) by controlling the preceding block.
padbuster <url> <ciphertext> <blocksize> -cookies ..., or a Python oracle loop. This is the classic "decrypt/forge the admin cookie" attack. - ECB weaknesses — identical plaintext blocks → identical ciphertext:
- Cut-and-paste: rearrange whole blocks to splice a privileged value (e.g. move an aligned
role=adminblock into place). - Byte-at-a-time decryption: if your input is prepended to a secret and ECB-encrypted, recover the secret one byte per aligned block.
- Cut-and-paste: rearrange whole blocks to splice a privileged value (e.g. move an aligned
- Hash length extension — a signature of the form
H(secret‖data)(MD5/SHA1/SHA2) with knowndataand secret length: append your own data and compute a valid new MAC with hashpump (hashpump -s <sig> -d <data> -a <append> -k <keylen>), bypassing the "integrity" check. - Weak/predictable tokens — if it turns out not to be real crypto: ECB pattern, a static IV, XOR with a fixed keystream, or a guessable PRNG seed (timestamp) → derive/forge directly.
- Forge and use — mint the token that says what you want (admin, another user) and replay it;
validate the access gained with
reporting-triage-validation.
Gotchas
- Authenticated encryption (AES-GCM, encrypt-then-HMAC) kills these — a padding oracle needs an unauthenticated CBC error signal; if tampering just fails uniformly, move on.
- The oracle can be subtle — a timing difference, a 500 vs 403, or a different redirect counts; diff responses carefully before concluding "not vulnerable".
- Block alignment is everything for ECB cut-and-paste and byte-at-a-time — pad your input to land targets on block boundaries.
- HMAC (not
H(secret‖msg)) is not extendable — length extension only hits raw Merkle–Damgård concatenation MACs.
Verify success
A token you decrypted or forged that the application accepts as another/privileged user (or recovered plaintext of a value you couldn't read), reproduced from a clean session.
References
Vaudenay padding-oracle; padbuster; the Cryptopals set (mechanisms); hashpump.
Related: web-auth-jwt, crypto-rsa-attacks, web-idor.
Archivos de esta versión
- SKILL.md4.0 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | No | No |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | No | No |
| Usa la red | No | No |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
El escaneo no encontró nada que señalar en esta versión.
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 76713b36 | Firmada | – |
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