crypto-oracle-attacks
Break weak symmetric crypto in real apps — decrypt or forge encrypted tokens/cookies without the key via padding oracles (CBC), ECB block shuffling, and hash-length-extension of homemade MACs. Load when the app hands you ciphertext you can tamper with and resend: an encrypted cookie/token, a "state"
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalações+3 em 7 dias27 EstrelasMITsincronizado há 22 horas
Instalar
Ainda não tem a CLI da NotHoly? Instale primeiro.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/crypto-oracle-attacksGrava em ~/.notholy/skills depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.
AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
Pacote76713b36…20029a86
76713b36219e…c37d20029a861 arquivo · 2.1 KBVarreduraBaixonenhum achado
Fontegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/cryptography/crypto-oracle-attacks@ee0e0c5
Este item ainda não foi escrito no seu idioma, então aparece em English.
Nesta página
When it applies
An app protects data with symmetric crypto you can poke — an encrypted session cookie, a "remember me"/state token, a signed-with-a-hash parameter — and it lets you submit modified ciphertext and observe a difference (an error vs. success, a padding error, different output). That observable difference is an oracle you can turn into full decrypt/forge, no key needed.
Why it works
Encryption without authentication is malleable: CBC leaks validity through padding errors, ECB
reveals structure and lets you rearrange blocks, and MAC = H(secret‖message) (Merkle–Damgård) can
be extended without knowing the secret. The key never leaks — the mode/construction does the work.
Method
- Fingerprint the token. Decode (base64/hex); measure length. A multiple of 8/16 bytes → a block cipher (CBC/ECB). Flip one byte and resend: a distinct "padding"/"decryption" error = CBC padding oracle; identical ciphertext blocks for identical plaintext = ECB.
- CBC padding oracle — when the server reveals valid vs. invalid padding: recover plaintext byte
by byte, and encrypt arbitrary plaintext (forge a token) by controlling the preceding block.
padbuster <url> <ciphertext> <blocksize> -cookies ..., or a Python oracle loop. This is the classic "decrypt/forge the admin cookie" attack. - ECB weaknesses — identical plaintext blocks → identical ciphertext:
- Cut-and-paste: rearrange whole blocks to splice a privileged value (e.g. move an aligned
role=adminblock into place). - Byte-at-a-time decryption: if your input is prepended to a secret and ECB-encrypted, recover the secret one byte per aligned block.
- Cut-and-paste: rearrange whole blocks to splice a privileged value (e.g. move an aligned
- Hash length extension — a signature of the form
H(secret‖data)(MD5/SHA1/SHA2) with knowndataand secret length: append your own data and compute a valid new MAC with hashpump (hashpump -s <sig> -d <data> -a <append> -k <keylen>), bypassing the "integrity" check. - Weak/predictable tokens — if it turns out not to be real crypto: ECB pattern, a static IV, XOR with a fixed keystream, or a guessable PRNG seed (timestamp) → derive/forge directly.
- Forge and use — mint the token that says what you want (admin, another user) and replay it;
validate the access gained with
reporting-triage-validation.
Gotchas
- Authenticated encryption (AES-GCM, encrypt-then-HMAC) kills these — a padding oracle needs an unauthenticated CBC error signal; if tampering just fails uniformly, move on.
- The oracle can be subtle — a timing difference, a 500 vs 403, or a different redirect counts; diff responses carefully before concluding "not vulnerable".
- Block alignment is everything for ECB cut-and-paste and byte-at-a-time — pad your input to land targets on block boundaries.
- HMAC (not
H(secret‖msg)) is not extendable — length extension only hits raw Merkle–Damgård concatenation MACs.
Verify success
A token you decrypted or forged that the application accepts as another/privileged user (or recovered plaintext of a value you couldn't read), reproduced from a clean session.
References
Vaudenay padding-oracle; padbuster; the Cryptopals set (mechanisms); hashpump.
Related: web-auth-jwt, crypto-rsa-attacks, web-idor.
Arquivos desta versão
- SKILL.md4.0 KB
Permissões
| Permissão | Declarada | Encontrada na varredura |
|---|---|---|
| Lê arquivos | Não | Não |
| Grava arquivos | Não | Não |
| Roda comandos no shell | Não | Não |
| Usa a rede | Não | Não |
| Usa conectores | Não | Não |
| Controla um navegador | Não | Não |
Achados da varredura
Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026
A varredura não encontrou nada para apontar nesta versão.
Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.
| Versão | Publicada em | Commit | SHA-256 | Assinatura | Mudança de permissão |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 de nov. de 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 76713b36 | Assinada | – |
Mais de NoorQureshi
Tudo deste publicadorMais em Criptografia e Web3
Ver a categoriaPergunte tudo o que o seu escopo permite.
Crie a conta, adicione créditos e faça a primeira pergunta no chat ou no terminal.
- 1/3
Crie a conta
Individual ou empresa. Dá para virar empresa depois sem perder saldo nem chaves.
Pessoa físicaEmpresa - 2/3
Adicione créditos
No cartão. Você paga por token, sem assinatura.
$5.00recarga mínima - 3/3
Pergunte
No chat, ou instale o CLI e rode notholy login no terminal.
$ notholy login