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noorqureshi/crypto-oracle-attacksCriptografia e Web3

crypto-oracle-attacks

⁨Break weak symmetric crypto in real apps — decrypt or forge encrypted tokens/cookies without the key via padding oracles (CBC), ECB block shuffling, and hash-length-extension of homemade MACs. Load when the app hands you ciphertext you can tamper with and resend: an encrypted cookie/token, a "state"⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalações+3 em 7 dias27 EstrelasMITsincronizado há 22 horas

Instalar

Ainda não tem a CLI da NotHoly? Instale primeiro.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/crypto-oracle-attacks

Grava em ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.

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4O72WdeeGv…+f1C4ADQ==A CLI confere o SHA-256 e a assinatura antes de gravar qualquer arquivo.
Pacote76713b36…20029a86
76713b36219e…c37d20029a861 arquivo · ⁦2.1 KB⁩
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Fontegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/cryptography/crypto-oracle-attacks@ee0e0c5

Este item ainda não foi escrito no seu idioma, então aparece em English.

When it applies

An app protects data with symmetric crypto you can poke — an encrypted session cookie, a "remember me"/state token, a signed-with-a-hash parameter — and it lets you submit modified ciphertext and observe a difference (an error vs. success, a padding error, different output). That observable difference is an oracle you can turn into full decrypt/forge, no key needed.

Why it works

Encryption without authentication is malleable: CBC leaks validity through padding errors, ECB reveals structure and lets you rearrange blocks, and MAC = H(secret‖message) (Merkle–Damgård) can be extended without knowing the secret. The key never leaks — the mode/construction does the work.

Method

  1. Fingerprint the token. Decode (base64/hex); measure length. A multiple of 8/16 bytes → a block cipher (CBC/ECB). Flip one byte and resend: a distinct "padding"/"decryption" error = CBC padding oracle; identical ciphertext blocks for identical plaintext = ECB.
  2. CBC padding oracle — when the server reveals valid vs. invalid padding: recover plaintext byte by byte, and encrypt arbitrary plaintext (forge a token) by controlling the preceding block. padbuster <url> <ciphertext> <blocksize> -cookies ..., or a Python oracle loop. This is the classic "decrypt/forge the admin cookie" attack.
  3. ECB weaknesses — identical plaintext blocks → identical ciphertext:
    • Cut-and-paste: rearrange whole blocks to splice a privileged value (e.g. move an aligned role=admin block into place).
    • Byte-at-a-time decryption: if your input is prepended to a secret and ECB-encrypted, recover the secret one byte per aligned block.
  4. Hash length extension — a signature of the form H(secret‖data) (MD5/SHA1/SHA2) with known data and secret length: append your own data and compute a valid new MAC with hashpump (hashpump -s <sig> -d <data> -a <append> -k <keylen>), bypassing the "integrity" check.
  5. Weak/predictable tokens — if it turns out not to be real crypto: ECB pattern, a static IV, XOR with a fixed keystream, or a guessable PRNG seed (timestamp) → derive/forge directly.
  6. Forge and use — mint the token that says what you want (admin, another user) and replay it; validate the access gained with reporting-triage-validation.

Gotchas

  • Authenticated encryption (AES-GCM, encrypt-then-HMAC) kills these — a padding oracle needs an unauthenticated CBC error signal; if tampering just fails uniformly, move on.
  • The oracle can be subtle — a timing difference, a 500 vs 403, or a different redirect counts; diff responses carefully before concluding "not vulnerable".
  • Block alignment is everything for ECB cut-and-paste and byte-at-a-time — pad your input to land targets on block boundaries.
  • HMAC (not H(secret‖msg)) is not extendable — length extension only hits raw Merkle–Damgård concatenation MACs.

Verify success

A token you decrypted or forged that the application accepts as another/privileged user (or recovered plaintext of a value you couldn't read), reproduced from a clean session.

References

Vaudenay padding-oracle; padbuster; the Cryptopals set (mechanisms); hashpump. Related: web-auth-jwt, crypto-rsa-attacks, web-idor.

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Permissões

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Achados da varredura

Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026

A varredura não encontrou nada para apontar nesta versão.

Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.

VersãoPublicada emCommitSHA-256AssinaturaMudança de permissão
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 de nov. de 2026ee0e0c576713b36Assinada–

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