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mukul975/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directoryActive Directory y Windows

detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory

⁨Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for cr⁩

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Instalar

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$ notholy skills install mukul975/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory

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EscaneoMedio3 hallazgos
  • Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
  • Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
  • Enlaces a dominios externos
Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory@54a7988

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

When to Use

  • When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments
  • After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions
  • When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump
  • During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials
  • When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening

Prerequisites

  • Windows Security Event Logs with Event ID 4662 (Object Access) enabled
  • Advanced Audit Policy: Audit Directory Service Access enabled
  • Domain Controller event forwarding to SIEM
  • Knowledge of legitimate domain controller hostnames and IPs
  • Directory Service Access auditing with SACL on domain object

Workflow

  1. Identify Legitimate Replication Sources: Document all domain controllers in the environment by hostname, IP, and computer account. Only these should perform directory replication.
  2. Enable Required Auditing: Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event ID 4662 on domain controllers with specific GUID monitoring for replication rights.
  3. Monitor Replication Rights Access: Track access to three critical GUIDs -- DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c).
  4. Detect Non-DC Replication Requests: Alert when any account NOT associated with a domain controller requests replication rights.
  5. Correlate with Network Traffic: DCSync generates replication traffic (MS-DRSR/RPC) from the attacker's machine to the DC. Monitor for DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC IP addresses.
  6. Investigate Source Context: Examine the process, user account, and machine originating the replication request.
  7. Check for Credential Abuse: After DCSync detection, audit for subsequent use of extracted hashes (pass-the-hash, golden ticket creation).

Key Concepts

Concept Description
T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
DCSync Mimicking domain controller replication to extract credentials
DsGetNCChanges RPC function used to request AD replication data
DS-Replication-Get-Changes AD permission required (GUID: 1131f6aa-...)
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All Permission including confidential attributes (GUID: 1131f6ad-...)
MS-DRSR Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol
KRBTGT Hash Key target of DCSync enabling Golden Ticket attacks
Event ID 4662 Directory service object access audit event

Tools & Systems

Tool Purpose
Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) Primary DCSync attack tool
Impacket secretsdump.py Python-based DCSync implementation
DSInternals PowerShell module for AD replication
BloodHound Map accounts with replication rights
Splunk / Elastic SIEM correlation of 4662 events
Microsoft Defender for Identity Native DCSync detection
CrowdStrike Falcon EDR-based DCSync detection

Detection Queries

Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662

spl
index=wineventlog EventCode=4662
| where Properties IN ("*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*",
    "*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*",
    "*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*")
| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, ".*\\$$")
| where NOT SubjectUserName IN ("known_svc_account1", "known_svc_account2")
| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer
| where count > 0
| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRights

KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection

kql
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4662
| where Properties has "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"
    or Properties has "1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"
| where SubjectUserName !endswith "$"
| where SubjectUserName !in ("AzureADConnect", "MSOL_*")
| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Sigma Rule -- DCSync Activity

yaml
title: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request
status: stable
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4662
        Properties|contains:
            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
    filter_dc:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not filter_dc
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1003.006

Common Scenarios

  1. Mimikatz DCSync: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt to extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation.
  2. Impacket secretsdump: Remote DCSync via secretsdump.py domain/user:password@dc-ip extracting all domain hashes.
  3. Delegated Replication Rights: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.
  4. Azure AD Connect Abuse: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.
  5. DSInternals PowerShell: Using Get-ADReplAccount cmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.

Output Format

text
Hunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Alert Severity: Critical
Source Account: [Account requesting replication]
Source Machine: [Hostname/IP of requestor]
Target DC: [Domain controller receiving request]
Replication Rights: [GUIDs accessed]
Timestamp: [Event time]
Legitimate DC: [Yes/No]
Known Service Account: [Yes/No]
Risk Assessment: [Critical - non-DC replication detected]

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

PermisoDeclaradoHallado en el escaneo
Lee archivosNoNo
Escribe archivosSíSí
Ejecuta comandos de shellSíSí
Usa la redSíSí
Usa conectoresNoNo
Controla un navegadorNoNo

Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
  2. MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
  3. InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v1.013 nov 202654a7988ff86a82aFirmada–

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