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mukul975/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directoryActive Directory and Windows

detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory

⁨Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for cr⁩

v1.03 installs+3 in 7 days36.3K StarsApache-2.0synced 12 hours ago

Install

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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
igTjnTpVpd…BZ5W71Dg==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Packageff86a82a…2a175ce2
ff86a82abf46…a7012a175ce28 files · ⁦12.5 KB⁩
ScanMedium3 findings
  • Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
  • Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
  • Links to outside domains
See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory@54a7988

When to Use

  • When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments
  • After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions
  • When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump
  • During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials
  • When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening

Prerequisites

  • Windows Security Event Logs with Event ID 4662 (Object Access) enabled
  • Advanced Audit Policy: Audit Directory Service Access enabled
  • Domain Controller event forwarding to SIEM
  • Knowledge of legitimate domain controller hostnames and IPs
  • Directory Service Access auditing with SACL on domain object

Workflow

  1. Identify Legitimate Replication Sources: Document all domain controllers in the environment by hostname, IP, and computer account. Only these should perform directory replication.
  2. Enable Required Auditing: Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event ID 4662 on domain controllers with specific GUID monitoring for replication rights.
  3. Monitor Replication Rights Access: Track access to three critical GUIDs -- DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c).
  4. Detect Non-DC Replication Requests: Alert when any account NOT associated with a domain controller requests replication rights.
  5. Correlate with Network Traffic: DCSync generates replication traffic (MS-DRSR/RPC) from the attacker's machine to the DC. Monitor for DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC IP addresses.
  6. Investigate Source Context: Examine the process, user account, and machine originating the replication request.
  7. Check for Credential Abuse: After DCSync detection, audit for subsequent use of extracted hashes (pass-the-hash, golden ticket creation).

Key Concepts

Concept Description
T1003.006 OS Credential Dumping: DCSync
DCSync Mimicking domain controller replication to extract credentials
DsGetNCChanges RPC function used to request AD replication data
DS-Replication-Get-Changes AD permission required (GUID: 1131f6aa-...)
DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All Permission including confidential attributes (GUID: 1131f6ad-...)
MS-DRSR Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol
KRBTGT Hash Key target of DCSync enabling Golden Ticket attacks
Event ID 4662 Directory service object access audit event

Tools & Systems

Tool Purpose
Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) Primary DCSync attack tool
Impacket secretsdump.py Python-based DCSync implementation
DSInternals PowerShell module for AD replication
BloodHound Map accounts with replication rights
Splunk / Elastic SIEM correlation of 4662 events
Microsoft Defender for Identity Native DCSync detection
CrowdStrike Falcon EDR-based DCSync detection

Detection Queries

Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662

spl
index=wineventlog EventCode=4662
| where Properties IN ("*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*",
    "*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*",
    "*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*")
| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, ".*\\$$")
| where NOT SubjectUserName IN ("known_svc_account1", "known_svc_account2")
| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer
| where count > 0
| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRights

KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection

kql
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4662
| where Properties has "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"
    or Properties has "1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"
| where SubjectUserName !endswith "$"
| where SubjectUserName !in ("AzureADConnect", "MSOL_*")
| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties
| sort by TimeGenerated desc

Sigma Rule -- DCSync Activity

yaml
title: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request
status: stable
logsource:
    product: windows
    service: security
detection:
    selection:
        EventID: 4662
        Properties|contains:
            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
    filter_dc:
        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
    condition: selection and not filter_dc
level: critical
tags:
    - attack.credential_access
    - attack.t1003.006

Common Scenarios

  1. Mimikatz DCSync: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt to extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation.
  2. Impacket secretsdump: Remote DCSync via secretsdump.py domain/user:password@dc-ip extracting all domain hashes.
  3. Delegated Replication Rights: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.
  4. Azure AD Connect Abuse: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.
  5. DSInternals PowerShell: Using Get-ADReplAccount cmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.

Output Format

text
Hunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Alert Severity: Critical
Source Account: [Account requesting replication]
Source Machine: [Hostname/IP of requestor]
Target DC: [Domain controller receiving request]
Replication Rights: [GUIDs accessed]
Timestamp: [Event time]
Legitimate DC: [Yes/No]
Known Service Account: [Yes/No]
Risk Assessment: [Critical - non-DC replication detected]

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesYesYes
Runs shell commandsYesYes
Uses the networkYesYes
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

  1. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
  2. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
  3. InfoLink · Links to outside domains

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v1.0Nov 13, 202654a7988ff86a82aSigned–

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