detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory
Detect DCSync attacks (MITRE T1003.006) where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes, by auditing Event ID 4662 for the DS-Replication-Get-Changes GUIDs and flagging non-domain-controller accounts issuing DsGetNCChanges RPC calls. Use when hunting for cr
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AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
Pacoteff86a82a…2a175ce2
ff86a82abf46…a7012a175ce28 arquivos · 12.5 KBVarreduraMédio3 achados
- Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
- Script executável junto com a skillscripts/process.py
- Links para domínios externos
Fontegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory@54a7988
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When to Use
- When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments
- After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions
- When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump
- During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials
- When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening
Prerequisites
- Windows Security Event Logs with Event ID 4662 (Object Access) enabled
- Advanced Audit Policy: Audit Directory Service Access enabled
- Domain Controller event forwarding to SIEM
- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller hostnames and IPs
- Directory Service Access auditing with SACL on domain object
Workflow
- Identify Legitimate Replication Sources: Document all domain controllers in the environment by hostname, IP, and computer account. Only these should perform directory replication.
- Enable Required Auditing: Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event ID 4662 on domain controllers with specific GUID monitoring for replication rights.
- Monitor Replication Rights Access: Track access to three critical GUIDs -- DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c).
- Detect Non-DC Replication Requests: Alert when any account NOT associated with a domain controller requests replication rights.
- Correlate with Network Traffic: DCSync generates replication traffic (MS-DRSR/RPC) from the attacker's machine to the DC. Monitor for DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC IP addresses.
- Investigate Source Context: Examine the process, user account, and machine originating the replication request.
- Check for Credential Abuse: After DCSync detection, audit for subsequent use of extracted hashes (pass-the-hash, golden ticket creation).
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |
| DCSync | Mimicking domain controller replication to extract credentials |
| DsGetNCChanges | RPC function used to request AD replication data |
| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | AD permission required (GUID: 1131f6aa-...) |
| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | Permission including confidential attributes (GUID: 1131f6ad-...) |
| MS-DRSR | Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol |
| KRBTGT Hash | Key target of DCSync enabling Golden Ticket attacks |
| Event ID 4662 | Directory service object access audit event |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) | Primary DCSync attack tool |
| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |
| DSInternals | PowerShell module for AD replication |
| BloodHound | Map accounts with replication rights |
| Splunk / Elastic | SIEM correlation of 4662 events |
| Microsoft Defender for Identity | Native DCSync detection |
| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR-based DCSync detection |
Detection Queries
Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662
index=wineventlog EventCode=4662
| where Properties IN ("*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*",
"*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*",
"*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*")
| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, ".*\\$$")
| where NOT SubjectUserName IN ("known_svc_account1", "known_svc_account2")
| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer
| where count > 0
| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRightsKQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4662
| where Properties has "1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"
or Properties has "1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2"
| where SubjectUserName !endswith "$"
| where SubjectUserName !in ("AzureADConnect", "MSOL_*")
| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties
| sort by TimeGenerated descSigma Rule -- DCSync Activity
title: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request
status: stable
logsource:
product: windows
service: security
detection:
selection:
EventID: 4662
Properties|contains:
- '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
- '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'
filter_dc:
SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'
condition: selection and not filter_dc
level: critical
tags:
- attack.credential_access
- attack.t1003.006Common Scenarios
- Mimikatz DCSync: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs
lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgtto extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation. - Impacket secretsdump: Remote DCSync via
secretsdump.py domain/user:password@dc-ipextracting all domain hashes. - Delegated Replication Rights: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.
- Azure AD Connect Abuse: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.
- DSInternals PowerShell: Using
Get-ADReplAccountcmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Alert Severity: Critical
Source Account: [Account requesting replication]
Source Machine: [Hostname/IP of requestor]
Target DC: [Domain controller receiving request]
Replication Rights: [GUIDs accessed]
Timestamp: [Event time]
Legitimate DC: [Yes/No]
Known Service Account: [Yes/No]
Risk Assessment: [Critical - non-DC replication detected]Arquivos desta versão
assets/11.6 KB
- template.md1.6 KB
references/37.4 KB
- api-reference.md2.0 KB
- standards.md2.3 KB
- workflows.md3.0 KB
scripts/211.9 KB
- agent.py6.1 KB
- process.py5.8 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md6.6 KB
Permissões
| Permissão | Declarada | Encontrada na varredura |
|---|---|---|
| Lê arquivos | Não | Não |
| Grava arquivos | Sim | Sim |
| Roda comandos no shell | Sim | Sim |
| Usa a rede | Sim | Sim |
| Usa conectores | Não | Não |
| Controla um navegador | Não | Não |
Achados da varredura
Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026
- MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
- MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/process.py
- InfoLink · Links para domínios externos
Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.
| Versão | Publicada em | Commit | SHA-256 | Assinatura | Mudança de permissão |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 de nov. de 2026 | 54a7988 | ff86a82a | Assinada | – |
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