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How it works
noorqureshi/social-eng-vishing-pretextСоциальная инженерия и физическая безопасность

social-eng-vishing-pretext

⁨Run authorized voice-phishing (vishing) and pretext-based scenarios that test whether staff and help desks follow verification procedures — safely and by consent. Load after social-eng-methodology when the objective is phone/live-interaction based (help-desk password reset, MFA-reset abuse, pretext ⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 установки+3 за 7 дней27 ЗвездыMITсинхронизировано 22 часа назад

Установка

Ещё нет NotHoly CLI? Сначала установите её.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/social-eng-vishing-pretext

Пишет в ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ после проверки подписи и SHA-256.

ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
buoV/KCXxp…IBrzN8DQ==CLI проверяет SHA-256 и подпись, прежде чем записать хоть один файл.
Пакет2b60a27f…217932f2
2b60a27f0b4e…104d217932f21 файл · ⁦1.9 KB⁩
ПроверкаНизкийзамечаний нет
Проверка не нашла в этой версии ничего подозрительного.Вся проверка
Источникgithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/social-eng/social-eng-vishing-pretext@ee0e0c5

Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.

When it applies

The engagement authorizes live-interaction testing (cleared via social-eng-methodology) and the objective is a process test: will the help desk reset a password or MFA without proper verification? Will an employee act on a convincing caller? This targets procedure adherence, which phishing email can't measure. Help-desk MFA-reset abuse is a leading real-world initial-access vector, so testing it is high-value.

Why it works

Voice adds urgency, authority, and social pressure that written channels lack — a confident caller with a few true details (from recon-osint) and a plausible reason routinely gets a human to skip a verification step. The finding is the gap in the verification procedure, not the individual who answered.

Method

  1. Define the process under test and the pass/fail line with the client: e.g. "help desk must require callback-to-known-number + a second factor before any reset." The test measures whether that line holds.
  2. Build a proportionate pretext within allowed themes — a plausible role (a named-role, not a real named person, unless consented), a believable reason, and only the OSINT detail needed for credibility.
  3. Prepare a call plan and an immediate stand-down. Script the ask, the escalation, and the point at which you disclose. Keep the authorization/emergency contact ready if challenged.
  4. Execute a bounded number of attempts per RoE, tracking each: target, request, which verification steps were performed vs. skipped, and the outcome.
  5. Stop at the objective. Once a step is bypassed (or correctly refused), you have the result — do not proceed to actually reset/log in or take any real account action beyond proving the procedure gap; disclose per plan.
  6. Debrief. Capture where the procedure failed and why; hand it to the awareness/report step.

Gotchas

  • Prove the gap, don't exploit it. A help desk agreeing to reset MFA is the finding — you do not complete a real takeover; stop and record it.
  • De-escalate distress. If a target becomes anxious or suspicious, disclose the assessment and reassure them; their cooperation isn't the point, the procedure is.
  • No coercion or protected topics — the excluded-theme and no-harm rules from social-eng-methodology apply in full over the phone.
  • Attribute cleanly — use test lines/tokens so a call can be confirmed as the assessment, and coordinate so it isn't mistaken for a real fraud attempt.
  • Recording laws vary — only record calls where lawful and agreed in the RoE.

Verify success

A documented result per attempt — which verification steps held or failed and the outcome — with no real account actions taken and every target debriefed, feeding a procedure-focused report and remediation (stronger help-desk verification, callback policy, MFA-reset controls).

References

MITRE ATT&CK T1598.004 (phishing for information via voice), T1656 (impersonation); help-desk verification / MFA-reset hardening guidance.

Файлы этой версии

Права

ПравоЗаявленоНайдено проверкой
Читает файлыНетНет
Пишет файлыНетНет
Выполняет команды shellНетНет
Ходит в сетьНетНет
Использует коннекторыНетНет
Управляет браузеромНетНет

Замечания проверки

Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.

Проверка не нашла в этой версии ничего подозрительного.

Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.

ВерсияОпубликованаКоммитSHA-256ПодписьИзменение прав
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 нояб. 2026 г.ee0e0c52b60a27fПодписана–

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