social-eng-vishing-pretext
Run authorized voice-phishing (vishing) and pretext-based scenarios that test whether staff and help desks follow verification procedures — safely and by consent. Load after social-eng-methodology when the objective is phone/live-interaction based (help-desk password reset, MFA-reset abuse, pretext
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalações+3 em 7 dias27 EstrelasMITsincronizado há 22 horas
Instalar
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/social-eng-vishing-pretextGrava em ~/.notholy/skills depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.
AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
Pacote2b60a27f…217932f2
2b60a27f0b4e…104d217932f21 arquivo · 1.9 KBVarreduraBaixonenhum achado
Fontegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/social-eng/social-eng-vishing-pretext@ee0e0c5
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When it applies
The engagement authorizes live-interaction testing (cleared via social-eng-methodology) and the
objective is a process test: will the help desk reset a password or MFA without proper verification?
Will an employee act on a convincing caller? This targets procedure adherence, which phishing
email can't measure. Help-desk MFA-reset abuse is a leading real-world initial-access vector, so
testing it is high-value.
Why it works
Voice adds urgency, authority, and social pressure that written channels lack — a confident caller
with a few true details (from recon-osint) and a plausible reason routinely gets a human to skip a
verification step. The finding is the gap in the verification procedure, not the individual who
answered.
Method
- Define the process under test and the pass/fail line with the client: e.g. "help desk must require callback-to-known-number + a second factor before any reset." The test measures whether that line holds.
- Build a proportionate pretext within allowed themes — a plausible role (a named-role, not a real named person, unless consented), a believable reason, and only the OSINT detail needed for credibility.
- Prepare a call plan and an immediate stand-down. Script the ask, the escalation, and the point at which you disclose. Keep the authorization/emergency contact ready if challenged.
- Execute a bounded number of attempts per RoE, tracking each: target, request, which verification steps were performed vs. skipped, and the outcome.
- Stop at the objective. Once a step is bypassed (or correctly refused), you have the result — do not proceed to actually reset/log in or take any real account action beyond proving the procedure gap; disclose per plan.
- Debrief. Capture where the procedure failed and why; hand it to the awareness/report step.
Gotchas
- Prove the gap, don't exploit it. A help desk agreeing to reset MFA is the finding — you do not complete a real takeover; stop and record it.
- De-escalate distress. If a target becomes anxious or suspicious, disclose the assessment and reassure them; their cooperation isn't the point, the procedure is.
- No coercion or protected topics — the excluded-theme and no-harm rules from
social-eng-methodologyapply in full over the phone. - Attribute cleanly — use test lines/tokens so a call can be confirmed as the assessment, and coordinate so it isn't mistaken for a real fraud attempt.
- Recording laws vary — only record calls where lawful and agreed in the RoE.
Verify success
A documented result per attempt — which verification steps held or failed and the outcome — with no real account actions taken and every target debriefed, feeding a procedure-focused report and remediation (stronger help-desk verification, callback policy, MFA-reset controls).
References
MITRE ATT&CK T1598.004 (phishing for information via voice), T1656 (impersonation); help-desk verification / MFA-reset hardening guidance.
Arquivos desta versão
- SKILL.md3.6 KB
Permissões
| Permissão | Declarada | Encontrada na varredura |
|---|---|---|
| Lê arquivos | Não | Não |
| Grava arquivos | Não | Não |
| Roda comandos no shell | Não | Não |
| Usa a rede | Não | Não |
| Usa conectores | Não | Não |
| Controla um navegador | Não | Não |
Achados da varredura
Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026
A varredura não encontrou nada para apontar nesta versão.
Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.
| Versão | Publicada em | Commit | SHA-256 | Assinatura | Mudança de permissão |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 de nov. de 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 2b60a27f | Assinada | – |
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