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How it works
noorqureshi/social-eng-vishing-pretextIngegneria sociale e sicurezza fisica

social-eng-vishing-pretext

⁨Run authorized voice-phishing (vishing) and pretext-based scenarios that test whether staff and help desks follow verification procedures — safely and by consent. Load after social-eng-methodology when the objective is phone/live-interaction based (help-desk password reset, MFA-reset abuse, pretext ⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa

Installa

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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/social-eng-vishing-pretext

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
buoV/KCXxp…IBrzN8DQ==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchetto2b60a27f…217932f2
2b60a27f0b4e…104d217932f21 file · ⁦1.9 KB⁩
ScansioneBassonessuna segnalazione
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Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/social-eng/social-eng-vishing-pretext@ee0e0c5

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When it applies

The engagement authorizes live-interaction testing (cleared via social-eng-methodology) and the objective is a process test: will the help desk reset a password or MFA without proper verification? Will an employee act on a convincing caller? This targets procedure adherence, which phishing email can't measure. Help-desk MFA-reset abuse is a leading real-world initial-access vector, so testing it is high-value.

Why it works

Voice adds urgency, authority, and social pressure that written channels lack — a confident caller with a few true details (from recon-osint) and a plausible reason routinely gets a human to skip a verification step. The finding is the gap in the verification procedure, not the individual who answered.

Method

  1. Define the process under test and the pass/fail line with the client: e.g. "help desk must require callback-to-known-number + a second factor before any reset." The test measures whether that line holds.
  2. Build a proportionate pretext within allowed themes — a plausible role (a named-role, not a real named person, unless consented), a believable reason, and only the OSINT detail needed for credibility.
  3. Prepare a call plan and an immediate stand-down. Script the ask, the escalation, and the point at which you disclose. Keep the authorization/emergency contact ready if challenged.
  4. Execute a bounded number of attempts per RoE, tracking each: target, request, which verification steps were performed vs. skipped, and the outcome.
  5. Stop at the objective. Once a step is bypassed (or correctly refused), you have the result — do not proceed to actually reset/log in or take any real account action beyond proving the procedure gap; disclose per plan.
  6. Debrief. Capture where the procedure failed and why; hand it to the awareness/report step.

Gotchas

  • Prove the gap, don't exploit it. A help desk agreeing to reset MFA is the finding — you do not complete a real takeover; stop and record it.
  • De-escalate distress. If a target becomes anxious or suspicious, disclose the assessment and reassure them; their cooperation isn't the point, the procedure is.
  • No coercion or protected topics — the excluded-theme and no-harm rules from social-eng-methodology apply in full over the phone.
  • Attribute cleanly — use test lines/tokens so a call can be confirmed as the assessment, and coordinate so it isn't mistaken for a real fraud attempt.
  • Recording laws vary — only record calls where lawful and agreed in the RoE.

Verify success

A documented result per attempt — which verification steps held or failed and the outcome — with no real account actions taken and every target debriefed, feeding a procedure-focused report and remediation (stronger help-desk verification, callback policy, MFA-reset controls).

References

MITRE ATT&CK T1598.004 (phishing for information via voice), T1656 (impersonation); help-desk verification / MFA-reset hardening guidance.

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellNoNo
Usa la reteNoNo
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c52b60a27fFirmata–

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