social-eng-vishing-pretext
Run authorized voice-phishing (vishing) and pretext-based scenarios that test whether staff and help desks follow verification procedures — safely and by consent. Load after social-eng-methodology when the objective is phone/live-interaction based (help-desk password reset, MFA-reset abuse, pretext
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/social-eng-vishing-pretextScrive in ~/.notholy/skills dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.
FirmaFirmato, ed25519
Pacchetto2b60a27f…217932f2
2b60a27f0b4e…104d217932f21 file · 1.9 KBScansioneBassonessuna segnalazione
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/social-eng/social-eng-vishing-pretext@ee0e0c5
Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.
In questa pagina
When it applies
The engagement authorizes live-interaction testing (cleared via social-eng-methodology) and the
objective is a process test: will the help desk reset a password or MFA without proper verification?
Will an employee act on a convincing caller? This targets procedure adherence, which phishing
email can't measure. Help-desk MFA-reset abuse is a leading real-world initial-access vector, so
testing it is high-value.
Why it works
Voice adds urgency, authority, and social pressure that written channels lack — a confident caller
with a few true details (from recon-osint) and a plausible reason routinely gets a human to skip a
verification step. The finding is the gap in the verification procedure, not the individual who
answered.
Method
- Define the process under test and the pass/fail line with the client: e.g. "help desk must require callback-to-known-number + a second factor before any reset." The test measures whether that line holds.
- Build a proportionate pretext within allowed themes — a plausible role (a named-role, not a real named person, unless consented), a believable reason, and only the OSINT detail needed for credibility.
- Prepare a call plan and an immediate stand-down. Script the ask, the escalation, and the point at which you disclose. Keep the authorization/emergency contact ready if challenged.
- Execute a bounded number of attempts per RoE, tracking each: target, request, which verification steps were performed vs. skipped, and the outcome.
- Stop at the objective. Once a step is bypassed (or correctly refused), you have the result — do not proceed to actually reset/log in or take any real account action beyond proving the procedure gap; disclose per plan.
- Debrief. Capture where the procedure failed and why; hand it to the awareness/report step.
Gotchas
- Prove the gap, don't exploit it. A help desk agreeing to reset MFA is the finding — you do not complete a real takeover; stop and record it.
- De-escalate distress. If a target becomes anxious or suspicious, disclose the assessment and reassure them; their cooperation isn't the point, the procedure is.
- No coercion or protected topics — the excluded-theme and no-harm rules from
social-eng-methodologyapply in full over the phone. - Attribute cleanly — use test lines/tokens so a call can be confirmed as the assessment, and coordinate so it isn't mistaken for a real fraud attempt.
- Recording laws vary — only record calls where lawful and agreed in the RoE.
Verify success
A documented result per attempt — which verification steps held or failed and the outcome — with no real account actions taken and every target debriefed, feeding a procedure-focused report and remediation (stronger help-desk verification, callback policy, MFA-reset controls).
References
MITRE ATT&CK T1598.004 (phishing for information via voice), T1656 (impersonation); help-desk verification / MFA-reset hardening guidance.
File di questa versione
- SKILL.md3.6 KB
Permessi
| Permesso | Dichiarato | Trovato dalla scansione |
|---|---|---|
| Legge file | No | No |
| Scrive file | No | No |
| Esegue comandi shell | No | No |
| Usa la rete | No | No |
| Usa i connettori | No | No |
| Controlla un browser | No | No |
Segnalazioni della scansione
Rivisto il 13 nov 2026
La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.
Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.
| Versione | Pubblicata | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio di permessi |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 2b60a27f | Firmata | – |
Altro da NoorQureshi
Tutto da questo editoreAltro in Ingegneria sociale e sicurezza fisica
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