network-appliance-attacks
Offensively test perimeter appliances and VPN crypto — IKE/IPsec aggressive mode, transform/DH enumeration, safe firmware/version inference for FortiGate / PAN-OS / Cisco ASA / Citrix feeding CVE applicability, TLS-version posture, and NTLM Type-2 info leaks. Load when an edge firewall, VPN, or load
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 установки+3 за 7 дней27 ЗвездыMITсинхронизировано 22 часа назад
Установка
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/network-appliance-attacksПишет в ~/.notholy/skills после проверки подписи и SHA-256.
ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
Пакет9193fd19…76c471cb
9193fd19477e…0e3d76c471cb1 файл · 2.4 KBПроверкаНизкийзамечаний нет
Источникgithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/network/network-appliance-attacks@ee0e0c5
Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.
На странице
When it applies
An internet-facing appliance is in scope — a firewall/SSL-VPN (FortiGate, PAN-OS/GlobalProtect,
Cisco ASA, Citrix NetScaler, Ivanti/Pulse), a Check Point gateway, or a load balancer — and you
must test the live device, not just audit its config (network-service-attacks covers generic
ports/SMB; defense-hardening-baseline is the config-audit counterpart). Edge appliances are today's number-one
initial-access vector, so a version→CVE call has to be precise.
Why it works
Appliances expose crypto and management surfaces that leak more than they should: IKE aggressive mode hands out a crackable PSK hash, unauthenticated NTLM challenges leak internal host/domain names, and login pages/certs disclose enough to pin a firmware version. The trick is discipline: infer, don't assume — a version banner alone never proves a CVE, because banners are backported and spoofable. Every CVE call is a precondition check, not a blind "vulnerable."
Method
- Fingerprint the appliance. From the port set, banners, login markers, and cert CN/serial,
pin vendor + firmware version with a confidence level. Low confidence stays
undetermined— do not score CVEs against a guess. - VPN crypto (UDP 500/4500). Enumerate IKE:
ike-scan -A -M <ip>(-A= aggressive mode). Aggressive mode responding with a hash payload is the finding (offline PSK crack needs explicit authorization — flagging the exposure is enough). Enumerate accepted transforms and weak DH groups (1/2/5); decode NAT-T/NOTIFY. - TLS posture. Report only TLS versions that complete a handshake
(
openssl s_client -connect host:443 -tls1_1) — a non-zeroopensslexit or SECLEVEL block is not proof the version is unsupported. TLS 1.0/1.1 completing is the weak-protocol finding. - Info leaks. Decode any NTLM Type-2 (CHALLENGE) from an unauthenticated management endpoint for NetBIOS/DNS host, domain, forest, and OS build — report as information disclosure; no auth attempted.
- CVE applicability (precondition-gated). For each candidate appliance CVE, combine the
vendor+version (step 1) with the required precondition (e.g. a CVE needing IKEv1 aggressive
mode is
not_applicableon an IKEv2-only responder; a Check Point RA CVE applies only if the Remote-Access/Mobile-Access marker is present). Markapplicable/undetermined/not_applicable; enrich against the NVD. Reportundeterminedas such — never inflate it.
Gotchas
- Non-destructive by default. These are observe/decode/infer steps; do not fire an appliance exploit or a DoS-prone probe without explicit written authorization — many edge CVEs are memory-corruption and crash the device.
- Banners lie — backported patches keep an old version string on a fixed build, and versions are spoofable. Gate on the precondition, not the banner.
- A firewall forges RSTs — don't assert "live internal host behind the firewall" from a RST
alone; you need an open-service TTL baseline to discriminate, else it's
undetermined. - IKE PSK cracking is out-of-band and needs authorization; capturing the aggressive-mode exposure is the in-scope finding.
Verify success
A concrete, precondition-backed statement: e.g. "IKEv1 aggressive mode enabled on UDP 500, PSK
hash returned" or "FortiOS 7.0.x pinned from the login marker + cert serial; CVE-XXXX-YYYY
applicable" — with the observation that supports it, not a bare version guess.
References
ike-scan docs; vendor PSIRT advisories; NIST NVD; MITRE ATT&CK T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing
Application), T1133 (External Remote Services). Config-audit counterpart: defense-hardening-baseline.
Файлы этой версии
- SKILL.md4.5 KB
Права
| Право | Заявлено | Найдено проверкой |
|---|---|---|
| Читает файлы | Нет | Нет |
| Пишет файлы | Нет | Нет |
| Выполняет команды shell | Нет | Нет |
| Ходит в сеть | Нет | Нет |
| Использует коннекторы | Нет | Нет |
| Управляет браузером | Нет | Нет |
Замечания проверки
Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.
Проверка не нашла в этой версии ничего подозрительного.
Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.
| Версия | Опубликована | Коммит | SHA-256 | Подпись | Изменение прав |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 нояб. 2026 г. | ee0e0c5 | 9193fd19 | Подписана | – |
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