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How it works
noorqureshi/network-appliance-attacksNetwork, wireless and telecom

network-appliance-attacks

⁨Offensively test perimeter appliances and VPN crypto — IKE/IPsec aggressive mode, transform/DH enumeration, safe firmware/version inference for FortiGate / PAN-OS / Cisco ASA / Citrix feeding CVE applicability, TLS-version posture, and NTLM Type-2 info leaks. Load when an edge firewall, VPN, or load⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/network-appliance-attacks

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
EXFlvE6F9p…eUrPa+Cw==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package9193fd19…76c471cb
9193fd19477e…0e3d76c471cb1 file · ⁦2.4 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/network/network-appliance-attacks@ee0e0c5

When it applies

An internet-facing appliance is in scope — a firewall/SSL-VPN (FortiGate, PAN-OS/GlobalProtect, Cisco ASA, Citrix NetScaler, Ivanti/Pulse), a Check Point gateway, or a load balancer — and you must test the live device, not just audit its config (network-service-attacks covers generic ports/SMB; defense-hardening-baseline is the config-audit counterpart). Edge appliances are today's number-one initial-access vector, so a version→CVE call has to be precise.

Why it works

Appliances expose crypto and management surfaces that leak more than they should: IKE aggressive mode hands out a crackable PSK hash, unauthenticated NTLM challenges leak internal host/domain names, and login pages/certs disclose enough to pin a firmware version. The trick is discipline: infer, don't assume — a version banner alone never proves a CVE, because banners are backported and spoofable. Every CVE call is a precondition check, not a blind "vulnerable."

Method

  1. Fingerprint the appliance. From the port set, banners, login markers, and cert CN/serial, pin vendor + firmware version with a confidence level. Low confidence stays undetermined — do not score CVEs against a guess.
  2. VPN crypto (UDP 500/4500). Enumerate IKE: ike-scan -A -M <ip> (-A = aggressive mode). Aggressive mode responding with a hash payload is the finding (offline PSK crack needs explicit authorization — flagging the exposure is enough). Enumerate accepted transforms and weak DH groups (1/2/5); decode NAT-T/NOTIFY.
  3. TLS posture. Report only TLS versions that complete a handshake (openssl s_client -connect host:443 -tls1_1) — a non-zero openssl exit or SECLEVEL block is not proof the version is unsupported. TLS 1.0/1.1 completing is the weak-protocol finding.
  4. Info leaks. Decode any NTLM Type-2 (CHALLENGE) from an unauthenticated management endpoint for NetBIOS/DNS host, domain, forest, and OS build — report as information disclosure; no auth attempted.
  5. CVE applicability (precondition-gated). For each candidate appliance CVE, combine the vendor+version (step 1) with the required precondition (e.g. a CVE needing IKEv1 aggressive mode is not_applicable on an IKEv2-only responder; a Check Point RA CVE applies only if the Remote-Access/Mobile-Access marker is present). Mark applicable / undetermined / not_applicable; enrich against the NVD. Report undetermined as such — never inflate it.

Gotchas

  • Non-destructive by default. These are observe/decode/infer steps; do not fire an appliance exploit or a DoS-prone probe without explicit written authorization — many edge CVEs are memory-corruption and crash the device.
  • Banners lie — backported patches keep an old version string on a fixed build, and versions are spoofable. Gate on the precondition, not the banner.
  • A firewall forges RSTs — don't assert "live internal host behind the firewall" from a RST alone; you need an open-service TTL baseline to discriminate, else it's undetermined.
  • IKE PSK cracking is out-of-band and needs authorization; capturing the aggressive-mode exposure is the in-scope finding.

Verify success

A concrete, precondition-backed statement: e.g. "IKEv1 aggressive mode enabled on UDP 500, PSK hash returned" or "FortiOS 7.0.x pinned from the login marker + cert serial; CVE-XXXX-YYYY applicable" — with the observation that supports it, not a bare version guess.

References

ike-scan docs; vendor PSIRT advisories; NIST NVD; MITRE ATT&CK T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application), T1133 (External Remote Services). Config-audit counterpart: defense-hardening-baseline.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c59193fd19Signed–

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