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How it works
noorqureshi/network-appliance-attacksRete, wireless e telecomunicazioni

network-appliance-attacks

⁨Offensively test perimeter appliances and VPN crypto — IKE/IPsec aggressive mode, transform/DH enumeration, safe firmware/version inference for FortiGate / PAN-OS / Cisco ASA / Citrix feeding CVE applicability, TLS-version posture, and NTLM Type-2 info leaks. Load when an edge firewall, VPN, or load⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa

Installa

Non hai ancora la CLI di NotHoly? Installala prima.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/network-appliance-attacks

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
EXFlvE6F9p…eUrPa+Cw==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchetto9193fd19…76c471cb
9193fd19477e…0e3d76c471cb1 file · ⁦2.4 KB⁩
ScansioneBassonessuna segnalazione
La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.Vedi la scansione completa
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/network/network-appliance-attacks@ee0e0c5

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When it applies

An internet-facing appliance is in scope — a firewall/SSL-VPN (FortiGate, PAN-OS/GlobalProtect, Cisco ASA, Citrix NetScaler, Ivanti/Pulse), a Check Point gateway, or a load balancer — and you must test the live device, not just audit its config (network-service-attacks covers generic ports/SMB; defense-hardening-baseline is the config-audit counterpart). Edge appliances are today's number-one initial-access vector, so a version→CVE call has to be precise.

Why it works

Appliances expose crypto and management surfaces that leak more than they should: IKE aggressive mode hands out a crackable PSK hash, unauthenticated NTLM challenges leak internal host/domain names, and login pages/certs disclose enough to pin a firmware version. The trick is discipline: infer, don't assume — a version banner alone never proves a CVE, because banners are backported and spoofable. Every CVE call is a precondition check, not a blind "vulnerable."

Method

  1. Fingerprint the appliance. From the port set, banners, login markers, and cert CN/serial, pin vendor + firmware version with a confidence level. Low confidence stays undetermined — do not score CVEs against a guess.
  2. VPN crypto (UDP 500/4500). Enumerate IKE: ike-scan -A -M <ip> (-A = aggressive mode). Aggressive mode responding with a hash payload is the finding (offline PSK crack needs explicit authorization — flagging the exposure is enough). Enumerate accepted transforms and weak DH groups (1/2/5); decode NAT-T/NOTIFY.
  3. TLS posture. Report only TLS versions that complete a handshake (openssl s_client -connect host:443 -tls1_1) — a non-zero openssl exit or SECLEVEL block is not proof the version is unsupported. TLS 1.0/1.1 completing is the weak-protocol finding.
  4. Info leaks. Decode any NTLM Type-2 (CHALLENGE) from an unauthenticated management endpoint for NetBIOS/DNS host, domain, forest, and OS build — report as information disclosure; no auth attempted.
  5. CVE applicability (precondition-gated). For each candidate appliance CVE, combine the vendor+version (step 1) with the required precondition (e.g. a CVE needing IKEv1 aggressive mode is not_applicable on an IKEv2-only responder; a Check Point RA CVE applies only if the Remote-Access/Mobile-Access marker is present). Mark applicable / undetermined / not_applicable; enrich against the NVD. Report undetermined as such — never inflate it.

Gotchas

  • Non-destructive by default. These are observe/decode/infer steps; do not fire an appliance exploit or a DoS-prone probe without explicit written authorization — many edge CVEs are memory-corruption and crash the device.
  • Banners lie — backported patches keep an old version string on a fixed build, and versions are spoofable. Gate on the precondition, not the banner.
  • A firewall forges RSTs — don't assert "live internal host behind the firewall" from a RST alone; you need an open-service TTL baseline to discriminate, else it's undetermined.
  • IKE PSK cracking is out-of-band and needs authorization; capturing the aggressive-mode exposure is the in-scope finding.

Verify success

A concrete, precondition-backed statement: e.g. "IKEv1 aggressive mode enabled on UDP 500, PSK hash returned" or "FortiOS 7.0.x pinned from the login marker + cert serial; CVE-XXXX-YYYY applicable" — with the observation that supports it, not a bare version guess.

References

ike-scan docs; vendor PSIRT advisories; NIST NVD; MITRE ATT&CK T1190 (Exploit Public-Facing Application), T1133 (External Remote Services). Config-audit counterpart: defense-hardening-baseline.

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellNoNo
Usa la reteNoNo
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c59193fd19Firmata–

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