performing-cloud-incident-containment-procedures
Execute cloud-native incident containment across AWS, Azure, and GCP using platform
v1.03 установки+3 за 7 дней36,3 тыс. ЗвездыApache-2.0синхронизировано 11 часов назад
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ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
Пакетe09579db…e4ed04ef
e09579db53ae…9257e4ed04ef8 файлов · 16.2 KBПроверкаВысокий4 замечания
- injection.system_promptscripts/agent.py:159
- Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
- Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/process.py
Источникgithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/performing-cloud-incident-containment-procedures@54a7988
Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.
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Overview
Cloud incident containment requires cloud-native approaches that differ significantly from traditional on-premises response. Containment procedures must leverage platform-specific controls including security groups, IAM policies, network ACLs, and service-level isolation to restrict compromised resources while preserving forensic evidence. According to the 2025 Unit 42 Global Incident Response Report, responding to cloud incidents requires understanding shared responsibility models, ephemeral infrastructure, and API-driven operations. Effective containment involves credential revocation, resource isolation, evidence snapshot creation, and automated response playbook execution.
When to Use
- When conducting security assessments that involve performing cloud incident containment procedures
- When following incident response procedures for related security events
- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
- When validating security controls through hands-on testing
Prerequisites
- Familiarity with incident response concepts and tools
- Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
- Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
- Appropriate authorization for any testing activities
AWS Containment Procedures
1. Credential Compromise Containment
# Disable compromised IAM user access keys
aws iam update-access-key --user-name compromised-user \
--access-key-id AKIA... --status Inactive
# List and disable all access keys for user
aws iam list-access-keys --user-name compromised-user
aws iam delete-access-key --user-name compromised-user --access-key-id AKIA...
# Attach deny-all policy to compromised user
aws iam put-user-policy --user-name compromised-user \
--policy-name DenyAll \
--policy-document '{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": "*",
"Resource": "*"
}]
}'
# Revoke all active sessions for IAM role
aws iam put-role-policy --role-name compromised-role \
--policy-name RevokeOldSessions \
--policy-document '{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Effect": "Deny",
"Action": "*",
"Resource": "*",
"Condition": {
"DateLessThan": {"aws:TokenIssueTime": "'$(date -u +%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%SZ)'"}
}
}]
}'
# Invalidate temporary credentials by updating role trust policy
aws iam update-assume-role-policy --role-name compromised-role \
--policy-document '{"Version":"2012-10-17","Statement":[]}'2. EC2 Instance Isolation
# Create quarantine security group (no inbound, no outbound)
aws ec2 create-security-group --group-name quarantine-sg \
--description "Quarantine - No traffic allowed" --vpc-id vpc-xxxxx
# Remove all rules from quarantine SG (default allows outbound)
aws ec2 revoke-security-group-egress --group-id sg-quarantine \
--ip-permissions '[{"IpProtocol":"-1","FromPort":-1,"ToPort":-1,"IpRanges":[{"CidrIp":"0.0.0.0/0"}]}]'
# Take forensic snapshot BEFORE containment
aws ec2 create-snapshot --volume-id vol-xxxxx \
--description "Forensic snapshot - IR Case 2025-001" \
--tag-specifications 'ResourceType=snapshot,Tags=[{Key=IR-Case,Value=2025-001}]'
# Apply quarantine security group to compromised instance
aws ec2 modify-instance-attribute --instance-id i-xxxxx \
--groups sg-quarantine
# Tag instance as compromised
aws ec2 create-tags --resources i-xxxxx \
--tags Key=IR-Status,Value=Contained Key=IR-Case,Value=2025-001
# Capture memory (if SSM agent available)
aws ssm send-command --instance-ids i-xxxxx \
--document-name "AWS-RunShellScript" \
--parameters 'commands=["dd if=/dev/mem of=/tmp/memory.dump bs=1M"]'3. S3 Bucket Containment
# Block all public access
aws s3api put-public-access-block --bucket compromised-bucket \
--public-access-block-configuration \
BlockPublicAcls=true,IgnorePublicAcls=true,BlockPublicPolicy=true,RestrictPublicBuckets=true
# Apply deny policy to bucket
aws s3api put-bucket-policy --bucket compromised-bucket \
--policy '{
"Version": "2012-10-17",
"Statement": [{
"Sid": "DenyAllExceptForensics",
"Effect": "Deny",
"NotPrincipal": {"AWS": "arn:aws:iam::ACCOUNT:role/IR-Forensics"},
"Action": "s3:*",
"Resource": ["arn:aws:s3:::compromised-bucket","arn:aws:s3:::compromised-bucket/*"]
}]
}'
# Enable versioning to preserve evidence
aws s3api put-bucket-versioning --bucket compromised-bucket \
--versioning-configuration Status=Enabled
# Enable Object Lock for evidence preservation
aws s3api put-object-lock-configuration --bucket evidence-bucket \
--object-lock-configuration '{
"ObjectLockEnabled": "Enabled",
"Rule": {"DefaultRetention": {"Mode": "COMPLIANCE", "Days": 365}}
}'4. Lambda Function Containment
# Set reserved concurrency to 0 (stops all invocations)
aws lambda put-function-concurrency --function-name compromised-function \
--reserved-concurrent-executions 0
# Remove all event source mappings
aws lambda list-event-source-mappings --function-name compromised-function
aws lambda delete-event-source-mapping --uuid mapping-uuidAzure Containment Procedures
1. Identity Containment
# Revoke all user sessions
Revoke-AzureADUserAllRefreshToken -ObjectId "user-object-id"
# Disable user account
Set-AzureADUser -ObjectId "user-object-id" -AccountEnabled $false
# Reset user password
Set-AzureADUserPassword -ObjectId "user-object-id" -Password (
ConvertTo-SecureString "TempP@ss!" -AsPlainText -Force
) -ForceChangePasswordNextLogin $true
# Block sign-in via Conditional Access (emergency policy)
# Create policy blocking user from all cloud apps
# Revoke Azure AD application consent
Remove-AzureADServiceAppRoleAssignment -ObjectId "sp-object-id" \
-AppRoleAssignmentId "assignment-id"2. VM Isolation
# Create Network Security Group with deny-all rules
$nsg = New-AzNetworkSecurityGroup -ResourceGroupName "rg" -Location "eastus" `
-Name "quarantine-nsg" `
-SecurityRules @(
New-AzNetworkSecurityRuleConfig -Name "DenyAllInbound" -Protocol * `
-Direction Inbound -Priority 100 -SourceAddressPrefix * `
-SourcePortRange * -DestinationAddressPrefix * `
-DestinationPortRange * -Access Deny,
New-AzNetworkSecurityRuleConfig -Name "DenyAllOutbound" -Protocol * `
-Direction Outbound -Priority 100 -SourceAddressPrefix * `
-SourcePortRange * -DestinationAddressPrefix * `
-DestinationPortRange * -Access Deny
)
# Take disk snapshot for forensics
$vm = Get-AzVM -ResourceGroupName "rg" -Name "compromised-vm"
$snapshotConfig = New-AzSnapshotConfig -SourceUri $vm.StorageProfile.OsDisk.ManagedDisk.Id `
-Location "eastus" -CreateOption Copy
New-AzSnapshot -ResourceGroupName "rg" -SnapshotName "forensic-snap" -Snapshot $snapshotConfig
# Apply quarantine NSG to VM NIC
$nic = Get-AzNetworkInterface -ResourceGroupName "rg" -Name "compromised-nic"
$nic.NetworkSecurityGroup = $nsg
Set-AzNetworkInterface -NetworkInterface $nic3. Storage Account Containment
# Remove network access
Update-AzStorageAccountNetworkRuleSet -ResourceGroupName "rg" `
-Name "storageaccount" -DefaultAction Deny
# Regenerate access keys
New-AzStorageAccountKey -ResourceGroupName "rg" -Name "storageaccount" -KeyName key1
New-AzStorageAccountKey -ResourceGroupName "rg" -Name "storageaccount" -KeyName key2
# Revoke all SAS tokens (by rotating keys)
# Enable immutability for evidence preservationGCP Containment Procedures
1. IAM Containment
# Remove all IAM bindings for compromised service account
gcloud projects get-iam-policy PROJECT_ID --format=json > policy.json
# Edit policy.json to remove compromised account bindings
gcloud projects set-iam-policy PROJECT_ID policy.json
# Disable service account
gcloud iam service-accounts disable SA_EMAIL
# Delete service account keys
gcloud iam service-accounts keys list --iam-account SA_EMAIL
gcloud iam service-accounts keys delete KEY_ID --iam-account SA_EMAIL2. Compute Instance Isolation
# Create forensic snapshot
gcloud compute disks snapshot compromised-disk \
--snapshot-names forensic-snap-$(date +%Y%m%d) \
--zone us-central1-a
# Apply firewall rule to deny all traffic
gcloud compute firewall-rules create quarantine-deny-all \
--network default --action DENY --rules all \
--target-tags quarantine --priority 0
# Tag compromised instance
gcloud compute instances add-tags compromised-instance \
--tags quarantine --zone us-central1-a
# Remove external IP
gcloud compute instances delete-access-config compromised-instance \
--access-config-name "External NAT" --zone us-central1-aEvidence Preservation Best Practices
- Always snapshot before containment - Create disk/volume snapshots before network isolation
- Preserve CloudTrail/Activity Logs - Copy logs to write-protected storage
- Document all actions - Timestamp every containment step taken
- Use break-glass procedures - Pre-establish emergency access for IR team
- Maintain forensic chain of custody - Hash all evidence artifacts
MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Techniques
| Technique | Containment Action |
|---|---|
| T1078 - Valid Accounts | Disable accounts, revoke tokens |
| T1530 - Data from Cloud Storage | Lock down bucket/storage policies |
| T1537 - Transfer to Cloud Account | Block cross-account access |
| T1578 - Modify Cloud Compute | Isolate instances, snapshot disks |
| T1552 - Unsecured Credentials | Rotate all access keys and secrets |
References
Файлы этой версии
assets/11.4 KB
- template.md1.4 KB
references/38.9 KB
- api-reference.md5.3 KB
- standards.md1.1 KB
- workflows.md2.5 KB
scripts/224.9 KB
- agent.py12.4 KB
- process.py12.5 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md10.9 KB
Права
| Право | Заявлено | Найдено проверкой |
|---|---|---|
| Читает файлы | Нет | Нет |
| Пишет файлы | Да | Да |
| Выполняет команды shell | Да | Да |
| Ходит в сеть | Да | Да |
| Использует коннекторы | Нет | Нет |
| Управляет браузером | Нет | Нет |
Замечания проверки
Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.
- ВысокаяPrompt injection · injection.system_promptscripts/agent.py:159
- СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
- СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/process.py
- ИнфоСсылка · Ссылки на внешние домены
Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.
| Версия | Опубликована | Коммит | SHA-256 | Подпись | Изменение прав |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 нояб. 2026 г. | 54a7988 | e09579db | Подписана | – |
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