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How it works
noorqureshi/web-client-side-signing-bypassWeb e bug bounty

web-client-side-signing-bypass

⁨Reverse client-side request signing / obfuscated JS so you can replay and fuzz a protected API outside the browser. Load when requests carry a computed guard you must reproduce: an X-Signature / X-Sign / sign / hmac / _s / token header or body field, a nonce+timestamp, a "signature invalid" 401, enc⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa

Installa

Non hai ancora la CLI di NotHoly? Installala prima.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-client-side-signing-bypass

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
MdpNmgbZI4…Tto+LEAg==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchettob68acb25…ad5c963d
b68acb25f6bf…79c2ad5c963d1 file · ⁦2.5 KB⁩
ScansioneBassonessuna segnalazione
La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.Vedi la scansione completa
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-client-side-signing-bypass@ee0e0c5

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When it applies

An endpoint you want to fuzz (for web-idor, api-bola, api-mass-assignment, or business logic) rejects tampered requests with a signature invalid / 401 because the client computes a guard value in JavaScript — an HMAC over the body, a nonce+timestamp, or an encrypted payload. You need to reproduce one valid signed request outside the browser so you can mutate the parts that matter and re-sign them.

Why it works

The signature is client-side integrity theater: the secret and the algorithm ship to the browser, so anything the browser can compute, you can compute. The signing weakness itself is almost always N/A — the payout is the access-control or logic bug on the endpoint it was "protecting". Reproduce the signer, and that endpoint becomes as fuzzable as an unsigned one.

Method

Step 0 — packet-first: prove you even need to reverse anything. Before reading a line of JS:

  1. Replay the captured request unchanged. 200 → it wasn't signed; stop, just fuzz it.
  2. Replay it a few minutes later. Still 200 → wide/absent replay window (a finding on its own).
  3. Mutate a field you care about (e.g. an object id) but keep the signature. 200 → that field isn't covered by the signature; you can fuzz it directly, no reversing needed.
  4. Only if mutating the target field breaks the signature do you proceed to reverse it.

Step 1 — locate the signer. In DevTools → Sources, set an XHR/fetch breakpoint on the endpoint path; when it hits, walk the Call Stack down to the frame that writes the signature field. Pretty-print ({}) to stabilize line numbers, and global-search (Ctrl+Shift+F) for the header/field name. You are still "locating" until you can point at the exact line that produces the value — the string sign in a function name is not proof.

Step 2 — recover a callable signer. Peel obfuscation only as far as you need:

  • Set a breakpoint on the writer line and read its inputs/output live in the console.
  • Hook it: const _o = obj.sign; obj.sign = (...a)=>{ const r=_o(...a); console.log(a,r); return r; } to log every input → signature pair as you drive the app.
  • If it's webpack, grab the module and call it directly from the console; if WASM/JSVMP, prefer to bridge (drive the real function headless) over fully re-implementing it.

Step 3 — classify every input. Split the signer's inputs so you know what to regenerate vs. pin:

input do this
timestamp regenerate per request; note the validity window
nonce / requestId generate fresh; check the server rejects reuse
deviceId / uuid pin one constant from a real session
body / path / id the prize — mutate, then re-sign
embedded secret key if it's in the JS, forge fully offline

Step 4 — reproduce outside the browser. Rebuild the request in Python requests (or drive the hooked function via a headless bridge), sign it, send it. When it fails, diff the pre-hash message string, not the output hash — JSON key ordering and field concatenation order are the usual culprits.

Step 5 — pivot to the real bug. With one signed request replaying, re-sign mutations and hunt the endpoint: IDOR/BOLA, broken auth, mass assignment, business logic.

Gotchas

  • Key/field ordering breaks validation more than the crypto does — canonicalize exactly like the client (some sign k1=v1&k2=v2 sorted, some sign raw JSON as-typed).
  • Missing browser state (localStorage, cookies, lifecycle vars the signer reads) can make pure offline signing impossible — bridge to the live function instead of re-implementing.
  • Anti-debug branches (debugger; loops, timing checks) can change behavior when DevTools is open; classify that divergence before you start patching the script.
  • Don't report the signing scheme itself as the vulnerability — report the downstream bug it let you reach (validate it with reporting-triage-validation).

Verify success

One request, signed by your own code (or your bridge) and not captured from the browser, returns 200 with a field you mutated — and a re-signed IDOR/auth probe against that endpoint succeeds.

References

Chrome DevTools Sources/breakpoints docs; PortSwigger notes on client-side controls; WASM/JSVMP deobfuscation write-ups.

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellNoNo
Usa la reteNoNo
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c5b68acb25Firmata–

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