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Cómo funciona
noorqureshi/web-client-side-signing-bypassWeb y bug bounty

web-client-side-signing-bypass

⁨Reverse client-side request signing / obfuscated JS so you can replay and fuzz a protected API outside the browser. Load when requests carry a computed guard you must reproduce: an X-Signature / X-Sign / sign / hmac / _s / token header or body field, a nonce+timestamp, a "signature invalid" 401, enc⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas

Instalar

¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-client-side-signing-bypass

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

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Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-client-side-signing-bypass@ee0e0c5

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

When it applies

An endpoint you want to fuzz (for web-idor, api-bola, api-mass-assignment, or business logic) rejects tampered requests with a signature invalid / 401 because the client computes a guard value in JavaScript — an HMAC over the body, a nonce+timestamp, or an encrypted payload. You need to reproduce one valid signed request outside the browser so you can mutate the parts that matter and re-sign them.

Why it works

The signature is client-side integrity theater: the secret and the algorithm ship to the browser, so anything the browser can compute, you can compute. The signing weakness itself is almost always N/A — the payout is the access-control or logic bug on the endpoint it was "protecting". Reproduce the signer, and that endpoint becomes as fuzzable as an unsigned one.

Method

Step 0 — packet-first: prove you even need to reverse anything. Before reading a line of JS:

  1. Replay the captured request unchanged. 200 → it wasn't signed; stop, just fuzz it.
  2. Replay it a few minutes later. Still 200 → wide/absent replay window (a finding on its own).
  3. Mutate a field you care about (e.g. an object id) but keep the signature. 200 → that field isn't covered by the signature; you can fuzz it directly, no reversing needed.
  4. Only if mutating the target field breaks the signature do you proceed to reverse it.

Step 1 — locate the signer. In DevTools → Sources, set an XHR/fetch breakpoint on the endpoint path; when it hits, walk the Call Stack down to the frame that writes the signature field. Pretty-print ({}) to stabilize line numbers, and global-search (Ctrl+Shift+F) for the header/field name. You are still "locating" until you can point at the exact line that produces the value — the string sign in a function name is not proof.

Step 2 — recover a callable signer. Peel obfuscation only as far as you need:

  • Set a breakpoint on the writer line and read its inputs/output live in the console.
  • Hook it: const _o = obj.sign; obj.sign = (...a)=>{ const r=_o(...a); console.log(a,r); return r; } to log every input → signature pair as you drive the app.
  • If it's webpack, grab the module and call it directly from the console; if WASM/JSVMP, prefer to bridge (drive the real function headless) over fully re-implementing it.

Step 3 — classify every input. Split the signer's inputs so you know what to regenerate vs. pin:

input do this
timestamp regenerate per request; note the validity window
nonce / requestId generate fresh; check the server rejects reuse
deviceId / uuid pin one constant from a real session
body / path / id the prize — mutate, then re-sign
embedded secret key if it's in the JS, forge fully offline

Step 4 — reproduce outside the browser. Rebuild the request in Python requests (or drive the hooked function via a headless bridge), sign it, send it. When it fails, diff the pre-hash message string, not the output hash — JSON key ordering and field concatenation order are the usual culprits.

Step 5 — pivot to the real bug. With one signed request replaying, re-sign mutations and hunt the endpoint: IDOR/BOLA, broken auth, mass assignment, business logic.

Gotchas

  • Key/field ordering breaks validation more than the crypto does — canonicalize exactly like the client (some sign k1=v1&k2=v2 sorted, some sign raw JSON as-typed).
  • Missing browser state (localStorage, cookies, lifecycle vars the signer reads) can make pure offline signing impossible — bridge to the live function instead of re-implementing.
  • Anti-debug branches (debugger; loops, timing checks) can change behavior when DevTools is open; classify that divergence before you start patching the script.
  • Don't report the signing scheme itself as the vulnerability — report the downstream bug it let you reach (validate it with reporting-triage-validation).

Verify success

One request, signed by your own code (or your bridge) and not captured from the browser, returns 200 with a field you mutated — and a re-signed IDOR/auth probe against that endpoint succeeds.

References

Chrome DevTools Sources/breakpoints docs; PortSwigger notes on client-side controls; WASM/JSVMP deobfuscation write-ups.

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Revisado el 13 nov 2026

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VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c5b68acb25Firmada–

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