web-client-side-signing-bypass
Reverse client-side request signing / obfuscated JS so you can replay and fuzz a protected API outside the browser. Load when requests carry a computed guard you must reproduce: an X-Signature / X-Sign / sign / hmac / _s / token header or body field, a nonce+timestamp, a "signature invalid" 401, enc
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas
Instalar
¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-client-side-signing-bypassEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
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b68acb25f6bf…79c2ad5c963d1 archivo · 2.5 KBEscaneoBajosin hallazgos
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-client-side-signing-bypass@ee0e0c5
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En esta página
When it applies
An endpoint you want to fuzz (for web-idor, api-bola, api-mass-assignment, or business
logic) rejects tampered requests with a signature invalid / 401 because the client computes a
guard value in JavaScript — an HMAC over the body, a nonce+timestamp, or an encrypted payload.
You need to reproduce one valid signed request outside the browser so you can mutate the parts
that matter and re-sign them.
Why it works
The signature is client-side integrity theater: the secret and the algorithm ship to the browser, so anything the browser can compute, you can compute. The signing weakness itself is almost always N/A — the payout is the access-control or logic bug on the endpoint it was "protecting". Reproduce the signer, and that endpoint becomes as fuzzable as an unsigned one.
Method
Step 0 — packet-first: prove you even need to reverse anything. Before reading a line of JS:
- Replay the captured request unchanged. 200 → it wasn't signed; stop, just fuzz it.
- Replay it a few minutes later. Still 200 → wide/absent replay window (a finding on its own).
- Mutate a field you care about (e.g. an object id) but keep the signature. 200 → that field isn't covered by the signature; you can fuzz it directly, no reversing needed.
- Only if mutating the target field breaks the signature do you proceed to reverse it.
Step 1 — locate the signer. In DevTools → Sources, set an XHR/fetch breakpoint on the
endpoint path; when it hits, walk the Call Stack down to the frame that writes the signature
field. Pretty-print ({}) to stabilize line numbers, and global-search (Ctrl+Shift+F) for the
header/field name. You are still "locating" until you can point at the exact line that produces
the value — the string sign in a function name is not proof.
Step 2 — recover a callable signer. Peel obfuscation only as far as you need:
- Set a breakpoint on the writer line and read its inputs/output live in the console.
- Hook it:
const _o = obj.sign; obj.sign = (...a)=>{ const r=_o(...a); console.log(a,r); return r; }to log everyinput → signaturepair as you drive the app. - If it's webpack, grab the module and call it directly from the console; if WASM/JSVMP, prefer to bridge (drive the real function headless) over fully re-implementing it.
Step 3 — classify every input. Split the signer's inputs so you know what to regenerate vs. pin:
| input | do this |
|---|---|
| timestamp | regenerate per request; note the validity window |
| nonce / requestId | generate fresh; check the server rejects reuse |
| deviceId / uuid | pin one constant from a real session |
| body / path / id | the prize — mutate, then re-sign |
| embedded secret key | if it's in the JS, forge fully offline |
Step 4 — reproduce outside the browser. Rebuild the request in Python requests (or drive
the hooked function via a headless bridge), sign it, send it. When it fails, diff the pre-hash
message string, not the output hash — JSON key ordering and field concatenation order are the
usual culprits.
Step 5 — pivot to the real bug. With one signed request replaying, re-sign mutations and hunt the endpoint: IDOR/BOLA, broken auth, mass assignment, business logic.
Gotchas
- Key/field ordering breaks validation more than the crypto does — canonicalize exactly like
the client (some sign
k1=v1&k2=v2sorted, some sign raw JSON as-typed). - Missing browser state (localStorage, cookies, lifecycle vars the signer reads) can make pure offline signing impossible — bridge to the live function instead of re-implementing.
- Anti-debug branches (
debugger;loops, timing checks) can change behavior when DevTools is open; classify that divergence before you start patching the script. - Don't report the signing scheme itself as the vulnerability — report the downstream bug it let
you reach (validate it with
reporting-triage-validation).
Verify success
One request, signed by your own code (or your bridge) and not captured from the browser, returns 200 with a field you mutated — and a re-signed IDOR/auth probe against that endpoint succeeds.
References
Chrome DevTools Sources/breakpoints docs; PortSwigger notes on client-side controls; WASM/JSVMP deobfuscation write-ups.
Archivos de esta versión
- SKILL.md4.9 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | No | No |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | No | No |
| Usa la red | No | No |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
El escaneo no encontró nada que señalar en esta versión.
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | b68acb25 | Firmada | – |
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