web-client-side-signing-bypass
Reverse client-side request signing / obfuscated JS so you can replay and fuzz a protected API outside the browser. Load when requests carry a computed guard you must reproduce: an X-Signature / X-Sign / sign / hmac / _s / token header or body field, a nonce+timestamp, a "signature invalid" 401, enc
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-client-side-signing-bypassWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Packageb68acb25…ad5c963d
b68acb25f6bf…79c2ad5c963d1 file · 2.5 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-client-side-signing-bypass@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
An endpoint you want to fuzz (for web-idor, api-bola, api-mass-assignment, or business
logic) rejects tampered requests with a signature invalid / 401 because the client computes a
guard value in JavaScript — an HMAC over the body, a nonce+timestamp, or an encrypted payload.
You need to reproduce one valid signed request outside the browser so you can mutate the parts
that matter and re-sign them.
Why it works
The signature is client-side integrity theater: the secret and the algorithm ship to the browser, so anything the browser can compute, you can compute. The signing weakness itself is almost always N/A — the payout is the access-control or logic bug on the endpoint it was "protecting". Reproduce the signer, and that endpoint becomes as fuzzable as an unsigned one.
Method
Step 0 — packet-first: prove you even need to reverse anything. Before reading a line of JS:
- Replay the captured request unchanged. 200 → it wasn't signed; stop, just fuzz it.
- Replay it a few minutes later. Still 200 → wide/absent replay window (a finding on its own).
- Mutate a field you care about (e.g. an object id) but keep the signature. 200 → that field isn't covered by the signature; you can fuzz it directly, no reversing needed.
- Only if mutating the target field breaks the signature do you proceed to reverse it.
Step 1 — locate the signer. In DevTools → Sources, set an XHR/fetch breakpoint on the
endpoint path; when it hits, walk the Call Stack down to the frame that writes the signature
field. Pretty-print ({}) to stabilize line numbers, and global-search (Ctrl+Shift+F) for the
header/field name. You are still "locating" until you can point at the exact line that produces
the value — the string sign in a function name is not proof.
Step 2 — recover a callable signer. Peel obfuscation only as far as you need:
- Set a breakpoint on the writer line and read its inputs/output live in the console.
- Hook it:
const _o = obj.sign; obj.sign = (...a)=>{ const r=_o(...a); console.log(a,r); return r; }to log everyinput → signaturepair as you drive the app. - If it's webpack, grab the module and call it directly from the console; if WASM/JSVMP, prefer to bridge (drive the real function headless) over fully re-implementing it.
Step 3 — classify every input. Split the signer's inputs so you know what to regenerate vs. pin:
| input | do this |
|---|---|
| timestamp | regenerate per request; note the validity window |
| nonce / requestId | generate fresh; check the server rejects reuse |
| deviceId / uuid | pin one constant from a real session |
| body / path / id | the prize — mutate, then re-sign |
| embedded secret key | if it's in the JS, forge fully offline |
Step 4 — reproduce outside the browser. Rebuild the request in Python requests (or drive
the hooked function via a headless bridge), sign it, send it. When it fails, diff the pre-hash
message string, not the output hash — JSON key ordering and field concatenation order are the
usual culprits.
Step 5 — pivot to the real bug. With one signed request replaying, re-sign mutations and hunt the endpoint: IDOR/BOLA, broken auth, mass assignment, business logic.
Gotchas
- Key/field ordering breaks validation more than the crypto does — canonicalize exactly like
the client (some sign
k1=v1&k2=v2sorted, some sign raw JSON as-typed). - Missing browser state (localStorage, cookies, lifecycle vars the signer reads) can make pure offline signing impossible — bridge to the live function instead of re-implementing.
- Anti-debug branches (
debugger;loops, timing checks) can change behavior when DevTools is open; classify that divergence before you start patching the script. - Don't report the signing scheme itself as the vulnerability — report the downstream bug it let
you reach (validate it with
reporting-triage-validation).
Verify success
One request, signed by your own code (or your bridge) and not captured from the browser, returns 200 with a field you mutated — and a re-signed IDOR/auth probe against that endpoint succeeds.
References
Chrome DevTools Sources/breakpoints docs; PortSwigger notes on client-side controls; WASM/JSVMP deobfuscation write-ups.
Files in this version
- SKILL.md4.9 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | b68acb25 | Signed | – |
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