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How it works
noorqureshi/code-review-solidityCrittografia e Web3

code-review-solidity

⁨Security review of Solidity / EVM smart contracts — reentrancy, access control, arithmetic, and DeFi economic bugs. Load when reviewing a smart contract / web3 codebase or PR, on .sol source in scope, or "audit this contract". Signals: *.sol, foundry/hardhat, ERC-20/721, external calls, delegatecall⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa

Installa

Non hai ancora la CLI di NotHoly? Installala prima.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/code-review-solidity

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
Ypz7Q/5FOM…bV9z3QCA==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchetto50f14305…b9bd8b08
50f1430552cb…fd3db9bd8b081 file · ⁦1.8 KB⁩
ScansioneBassonessuna segnalazione
La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.Vedi la scansione completa
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/code-review/code-review-solidity@ee0e0c5

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When it applies

Reviewing on-chain code (a protocol, a token, a bridge). Smart-contract bugs are usually irreversible and directly financial, so the review bar is high and the classic patterns are well known — start there, then look for economic/logic flaws unique to the protocol.

Why it works

The EVM executes exactly as written with real money at stake: an external call can re-enter before state updates, arithmetic wraps, and a missing modifier means anyone can call a privileged function. Most losses trace to a small set of patterns a careful read (plus Slither/Mythril) will surface.

Sinks & patterns (read, then reason about ordering and trust)

  • Reentrancy: state changed after an external call/.call{value:}/token callback (ERC-777/721 hooks). Enforce checks-effects-interactions or a nonReentrant guard.
  • Access control: privileged functions missing onlyOwner/role modifiers; tx.origin used for auth (phishable); unprotected initialize() on upgradeable proxies.
  • Arithmetic: unchecked math (pre-0.8, or inside unchecked{}) → over/underflow; precision loss from divide-before-multiply; rounding that favors the attacker.
  • Unchecked calls: ignoring call/send return values; assuming an external call succeeded.
  • delegatecall: to attacker-influenced targets → storage/logic hijack; storage-layout mismatch in proxies.
  • Oracle / economics: spot-price from a manipulable AMM (flash-loan price manipulation), missing slippage/deadline, MEV/front-running of state-changing txs, first-depositor share inflation.
  • Other: selfdestruct/force-fed ether assumptions, weak randomness (block.timestamp/ blockhash), signature replay (missing nonce/chainId in EIP-712), DoS via unbounded loops.

Method

  1. Run slither (fast, high-signal) and mythril; triage findings.
  2. Read every external call and check state-update ordering (reentrancy) and return-value handling.
  3. Map roles/modifiers to every state-changing and fund-moving function.
  4. Model the economics: how does price/valuation get set, and can a flash loan move it within one tx?
  5. Property-test invariants with echidna/Foundry fuzzing where feasible.

Gotchas

  • Solidity ≥0.8 checks arithmetic by default — the risk moves into unchecked{} blocks and casts.
  • A "reentrancy guard" doesn't help cross-function or cross-contract reentrancy — check the whole path.
  • Upgradeable proxies add initializer, storage-collision, and delegatecall risks absent in plain contracts.

References

SWC Registry; Slither/Mythril docs; Trail of Bits & OpenZeppelin audit guidance; rekt.news post-mortems.

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellNoNo
Usa la reteNoNo
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c550f14305Firmata–

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