code-review-solidity
Security review of Solidity / EVM smart contracts — reentrancy, access control, arithmetic, and DeFi economic bugs. Load when reviewing a smart contract / web3 codebase or PR, on .sol source in scope, or "audit this contract". Signals: *.sol, foundry/hardhat, ERC-20/721, external calls, delegatecall
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas
Instalar
¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/code-review-solidityEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete50f14305…b9bd8b08
50f1430552cb…fd3db9bd8b081 archivo · 1.8 KBEscaneoBajosin hallazgos
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/code-review/code-review-solidity@ee0e0c5
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When it applies
Reviewing on-chain code (a protocol, a token, a bridge). Smart-contract bugs are usually irreversible and directly financial, so the review bar is high and the classic patterns are well known — start there, then look for economic/logic flaws unique to the protocol.
Why it works
The EVM executes exactly as written with real money at stake: an external call can re-enter before state updates, arithmetic wraps, and a missing modifier means anyone can call a privileged function. Most losses trace to a small set of patterns a careful read (plus Slither/Mythril) will surface.
Sinks & patterns (read, then reason about ordering and trust)
- Reentrancy: state changed after an external call/
.call{value:}/token callback (ERC-777/721 hooks). Enforce checks-effects-interactions or anonReentrantguard. - Access control: privileged functions missing
onlyOwner/role modifiers;tx.originused for auth (phishable); unprotectedinitialize()on upgradeable proxies. - Arithmetic: unchecked math (pre-0.8, or inside
unchecked{}) → over/underflow; precision loss from divide-before-multiply; rounding that favors the attacker. - Unchecked calls: ignoring
call/sendreturn values; assuming an external call succeeded. - delegatecall: to attacker-influenced targets → storage/logic hijack; storage-layout mismatch in proxies.
- Oracle / economics: spot-price from a manipulable AMM (flash-loan price manipulation), missing slippage/deadline, MEV/front-running of state-changing txs, first-depositor share inflation.
- Other:
selfdestruct/force-fed ether assumptions, weak randomness (block.timestamp/blockhash), signature replay (missing nonce/chainId in EIP-712), DoS via unbounded loops.
Method
- Run
slither(fast, high-signal) andmythril; triage findings. - Read every external call and check state-update ordering (reentrancy) and return-value handling.
- Map roles/modifiers to every state-changing and fund-moving function.
- Model the economics: how does price/valuation get set, and can a flash loan move it within one tx?
- Property-test invariants with
echidna/Foundry fuzzing where feasible.
Gotchas
- Solidity ≥0.8 checks arithmetic by default — the risk moves into
unchecked{}blocks and casts. - A "reentrancy guard" doesn't help cross-function or cross-contract reentrancy — check the whole path.
- Upgradeable proxies add initializer, storage-collision, and
delegatecallrisks absent in plain contracts.
References
SWC Registry; Slither/Mythril docs; Trail of Bits & OpenZeppelin audit guidance; rekt.news post-mortems.
Archivos de esta versión
- SKILL.md3.2 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | No | No |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | No | No |
| Usa la red | No | No |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
El escaneo no encontró nada que señalar en esta versión.
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 50f14305 | Firmada | – |
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