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How it works
noorqureshi/code-review-solidityCryptography and Web3

code-review-solidity

⁨Security review of Solidity / EVM smart contracts — reentrancy, access control, arithmetic, and DeFi economic bugs. Load when reviewing a smart contract / web3 codebase or PR, on .sol source in scope, or "audit this contract". Signals: *.sol, foundry/hardhat, ERC-20/721, external calls, delegatecall⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/code-review-solidity

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
Ypz7Q/5FOM…bV9z3QCA==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package50f14305…b9bd8b08
50f1430552cb…fd3db9bd8b081 file · ⁦1.8 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/code-review/code-review-solidity@ee0e0c5

When it applies

Reviewing on-chain code (a protocol, a token, a bridge). Smart-contract bugs are usually irreversible and directly financial, so the review bar is high and the classic patterns are well known — start there, then look for economic/logic flaws unique to the protocol.

Why it works

The EVM executes exactly as written with real money at stake: an external call can re-enter before state updates, arithmetic wraps, and a missing modifier means anyone can call a privileged function. Most losses trace to a small set of patterns a careful read (plus Slither/Mythril) will surface.

Sinks & patterns (read, then reason about ordering and trust)

  • Reentrancy: state changed after an external call/.call{value:}/token callback (ERC-777/721 hooks). Enforce checks-effects-interactions or a nonReentrant guard.
  • Access control: privileged functions missing onlyOwner/role modifiers; tx.origin used for auth (phishable); unprotected initialize() on upgradeable proxies.
  • Arithmetic: unchecked math (pre-0.8, or inside unchecked{}) → over/underflow; precision loss from divide-before-multiply; rounding that favors the attacker.
  • Unchecked calls: ignoring call/send return values; assuming an external call succeeded.
  • delegatecall: to attacker-influenced targets → storage/logic hijack; storage-layout mismatch in proxies.
  • Oracle / economics: spot-price from a manipulable AMM (flash-loan price manipulation), missing slippage/deadline, MEV/front-running of state-changing txs, first-depositor share inflation.
  • Other: selfdestruct/force-fed ether assumptions, weak randomness (block.timestamp/ blockhash), signature replay (missing nonce/chainId in EIP-712), DoS via unbounded loops.

Method

  1. Run slither (fast, high-signal) and mythril; triage findings.
  2. Read every external call and check state-update ordering (reentrancy) and return-value handling.
  3. Map roles/modifiers to every state-changing and fund-moving function.
  4. Model the economics: how does price/valuation get set, and can a flash loan move it within one tx?
  5. Property-test invariants with echidna/Foundry fuzzing where feasible.

Gotchas

  • Solidity ≥0.8 checks arithmetic by default — the risk moves into unchecked{} blocks and casts.
  • A "reentrancy guard" doesn't help cross-function or cross-contract reentrancy — check the whole path.
  • Upgradeable proxies add initializer, storage-collision, and delegatecall risks absent in plain contracts.

References

SWC Registry; Slither/Mythril docs; Trail of Bits & OpenZeppelin audit guidance; rekt.news post-mortems.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c550f14305Signed–

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