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mukul975/hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasksDFIR e threat hunting

hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks

⁨Hunts for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks (T1053.005) by analyzing Security Event ID 4698 task-creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns from schtasks.exe/at.exe. Use after detecting schtasks or at.exe in process creation logs, during⁩

v1.03 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni36,3K StelleApache-2.0sincronizzato 12 ore fa

Installa

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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
bWe0+8frek…JoCU4QDg==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchetto79bbc47b…212a2a0b
79bbc47b552d…eb56212a2a0b8 file · ⁦10.8 KB⁩
ScansioneMedio4 segnalazioni
  • command.persistenceSKILL.md:92
  • Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/agent.py
  • Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/process.py
Vedi la scansione completa
Sorgentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks@54a7988

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When to Use

  • When proactively hunting for persistence mechanisms in Windows environments
  • After detecting schtasks.exe or at.exe usage in process creation logs
  • When investigating malware that survives reboots and user logoffs
  • During incident response to enumerate all persistence on compromised systems
  • When Windows Security Event ID 4698 (Scheduled Task Created) fires for unusual tasks

Prerequisites

  • Windows Security Event ID 4698/4699/4702 (Task Created/Deleted/Updated)
  • Sysmon Event ID 1 for schtasks.exe process creation with command lines
  • Windows Task Scheduler operational log (Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational)
  • PowerShell logging for Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet usage
  • Access to Task Scheduler XML definitions on endpoints

Workflow

  1. Enumerate All Scheduled Tasks: Collect complete task inventory from target systems using schtasks /query /fo CSV /v or Get-ScheduledTask PowerShell cmdlet.
  2. Monitor Task Creation Events: Track Event ID 4698 for new task creation, correlating with the creating process and user account context.
  3. Analyze Task Actions: Examine what each task executes. Flag tasks running scripts (PowerShell, cmd, wscript), binaries from user-writable paths (TEMP, AppData, Downloads), or encoded/obfuscated commands.
  4. Check Task Triggers: Review trigger conditions. Tasks triggered by system startup, user logon, or short intervals (1-5 minutes) warrant investigation.
  5. Identify Hidden or Disguised Tasks: Hunt for tasks with names mimicking legitimate Windows tasks, tasks with Security Descriptor modifications hiding them from standard enumeration, or tasks stored in non-standard registry locations.
  6. Correlate with Process Execution: Match scheduled task execution events with process creation logs to confirm what actually runs.
  7. Baseline and Diff: Compare current task inventory against known-good baselines to identify new, modified, or unexpected tasks.

Detection Queries

Splunk -- Scheduled Task Creation

spl
index=wineventlog EventCode=4698
| spath output=TaskName path=EventData.TaskName
| spath output=TaskContent path=EventData.TaskContent
| where NOT match(TaskName, "(?i)(\\\\Microsoft\\\\|\\\\Windows\\\\)")
| table _time Computer SubjectUserName TaskName TaskContent

Splunk -- Schtasks.exe Suspicious Usage

spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\schtasks.exe"
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)/create")
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(powershell|cmd|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|http|https|\\\\temp\\\\|\\\\appdata\\\\)")
| table _time Computer User CommandLine ParentImage

KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel

kql
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4698
| extend TaskName = tostring(EventData.TaskName)
| extend TaskContent = tostring(EventData.TaskContent)
| where TaskContent has_any ("powershell", "cmd.exe", "wscript", "http://", "https://", "\\Temp\\", "\\AppData\\")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, TaskName, TaskContent

Common Scenarios

  1. Cobalt Strike Persistence: Creates scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe to execute PowerShell download cradles at user logon intervals.
  2. Ransomware Staging: Task created to run encryption payload at a future time, often during off-hours for maximum impact.
  3. Hidden Task via SD Modification: Attacker modifies Security Descriptor of scheduled task to hide it from normal enumeration while maintaining execution.
  4. COM Handler Abuse: Task uses COM handler rather than direct executable path, making action inspection more complex.
  5. Lateral Movement via Tasks: Remote scheduled task creation using schtasks /create /s REMOTE_HOST for execution on other systems.

Output Format

text
Hunt ID: TH-SCHTASK-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Task Name: [Full task path]
Action: [Command/Script executed]
Trigger: [Startup/Logon/Timer/Event]
Created By: [User account]
Created From: [Local/Remote]
Creation Time: [Timestamp]
Run As: [Execution account]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellSìSì
Usa la reteSìSì
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaComando · command.persistenceSKILL.md:92
  2. MediaFile · Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/agent.py
  3. MediaFile · Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/process.py
  4. InfoLink · Link a domini esterni

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v1.013 nov 202654a798879bbc47bFirmata–

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