hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks
Hunts for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks (T1053.005) by analyzing Security Event ID 4698 task-creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns from schtasks.exe/at.exe. Use after detecting schtasks or at.exe in process creation logs, during
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AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
Pacote79bbc47b…212a2a0b
79bbc47b552d…eb56212a2a0b8 arquivos · 10.8 KBVarreduraMédio4 achados
- command.persistenceSKILL.md:92
- Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
- Script executável junto com a skillscripts/process.py
Fontegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks@54a7988
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When to Use
- When proactively hunting for persistence mechanisms in Windows environments
- After detecting schtasks.exe or at.exe usage in process creation logs
- When investigating malware that survives reboots and user logoffs
- During incident response to enumerate all persistence on compromised systems
- When Windows Security Event ID 4698 (Scheduled Task Created) fires for unusual tasks
Prerequisites
- Windows Security Event ID 4698/4699/4702 (Task Created/Deleted/Updated)
- Sysmon Event ID 1 for schtasks.exe process creation with command lines
- Windows Task Scheduler operational log (Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational)
- PowerShell logging for Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet usage
- Access to Task Scheduler XML definitions on endpoints
Workflow
- Enumerate All Scheduled Tasks: Collect complete task inventory from target systems using
schtasks /query /fo CSV /vorGet-ScheduledTaskPowerShell cmdlet. - Monitor Task Creation Events: Track Event ID 4698 for new task creation, correlating with the creating process and user account context.
- Analyze Task Actions: Examine what each task executes. Flag tasks running scripts (PowerShell, cmd, wscript), binaries from user-writable paths (TEMP, AppData, Downloads), or encoded/obfuscated commands.
- Check Task Triggers: Review trigger conditions. Tasks triggered by system startup, user logon, or short intervals (1-5 minutes) warrant investigation.
- Identify Hidden or Disguised Tasks: Hunt for tasks with names mimicking legitimate Windows tasks, tasks with Security Descriptor modifications hiding them from standard enumeration, or tasks stored in non-standard registry locations.
- Correlate with Process Execution: Match scheduled task execution events with process creation logs to confirm what actually runs.
- Baseline and Diff: Compare current task inventory against known-good baselines to identify new, modified, or unexpected tasks.
Detection Queries
Splunk -- Scheduled Task Creation
index=wineventlog EventCode=4698
| spath output=TaskName path=EventData.TaskName
| spath output=TaskContent path=EventData.TaskContent
| where NOT match(TaskName, "(?i)(\\\\Microsoft\\\\|\\\\Windows\\\\)")
| table _time Computer SubjectUserName TaskName TaskContentSplunk -- Schtasks.exe Suspicious Usage
index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\schtasks.exe"
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)/create")
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(powershell|cmd|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|http|https|\\\\temp\\\\|\\\\appdata\\\\)")
| table _time Computer User CommandLine ParentImageKQL -- Microsoft Sentinel
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4698
| extend TaskName = tostring(EventData.TaskName)
| extend TaskContent = tostring(EventData.TaskContent)
| where TaskContent has_any ("powershell", "cmd.exe", "wscript", "http://", "https://", "\\Temp\\", "\\AppData\\")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, TaskName, TaskContentCommon Scenarios
- Cobalt Strike Persistence: Creates scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe to execute PowerShell download cradles at user logon intervals.
- Ransomware Staging: Task created to run encryption payload at a future time, often during off-hours for maximum impact.
- Hidden Task via SD Modification: Attacker modifies Security Descriptor of scheduled task to hide it from normal enumeration while maintaining execution.
- COM Handler Abuse: Task uses COM handler rather than direct executable path, making action inspection more complex.
- Lateral Movement via Tasks: Remote scheduled task creation using
schtasks /create /s REMOTE_HOSTfor execution on other systems.
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-SCHTASK-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Task Name: [Full task path]
Action: [Command/Script executed]
Trigger: [Startup/Logon/Timer/Event]
Created By: [User account]
Created From: [Local/Remote]
Creation Time: [Timestamp]
Run As: [Execution account]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]Arquivos desta versão
assets/1786 B
- template.md786 B
references/34.5 KB
- api-reference.md1.9 KB
- standards.md1.4 KB
- workflows.md1.2 KB
scripts/211.5 KB
- agent.py6.8 KB
- process.py4.7 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md4.8 KB
Permissões
| Permissão | Declarada | Encontrada na varredura |
|---|---|---|
| Lê arquivos | Não | Não |
| Grava arquivos | Não | Não |
| Roda comandos no shell | Sim | Sim |
| Usa a rede | Sim | Sim |
| Usa conectores | Não | Não |
| Controla um navegador | Não | Não |
Achados da varredura
Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026
- MédiaComando · command.persistenceSKILL.md:92
- MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
- MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/process.py
- InfoLink · Links para domínios externos
Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.
| Versão | Publicada em | Commit | SHA-256 | Assinatura | Mudança de permissão |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 de nov. de 2026 | 54a7988 | 79bbc47b | Assinada | – |
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