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Cómo funciona
mukul975/hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasksDFIR y threat hunting

hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks

⁨Hunts for adversary persistence and execution via Windows scheduled tasks (T1053.005) by analyzing Security Event ID 4698 task-creation events, suspicious task properties, and unusual execution patterns from schtasks.exe/at.exe. Use after detecting schtasks or at.exe in process creation logs, during⁩

v1.03 instalaciones+3 en 7 días36,3 mil EstrellasApache-2.0sincronizado hace 12 horas

Instalar

¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

FirmaFirmado, ed25519
bWe0+8frek…JoCU4QDg==La CLI comprueba el SHA-256 y la firma antes de escribir cualquier archivo.
Paquete79bbc47b…212a2a0b
79bbc47b552d…eb56212a2a0b8 archivos · ⁦10.8 KB⁩
EscaneoMedio4 hallazgos
  • command.persistenceSKILL.md:92
  • Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
  • Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-for-suspicious-scheduled-tasks@54a7988

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

When to Use

  • When proactively hunting for persistence mechanisms in Windows environments
  • After detecting schtasks.exe or at.exe usage in process creation logs
  • When investigating malware that survives reboots and user logoffs
  • During incident response to enumerate all persistence on compromised systems
  • When Windows Security Event ID 4698 (Scheduled Task Created) fires for unusual tasks

Prerequisites

  • Windows Security Event ID 4698/4699/4702 (Task Created/Deleted/Updated)
  • Sysmon Event ID 1 for schtasks.exe process creation with command lines
  • Windows Task Scheduler operational log (Microsoft-Windows-TaskScheduler/Operational)
  • PowerShell logging for Register-ScheduledTask cmdlet usage
  • Access to Task Scheduler XML definitions on endpoints

Workflow

  1. Enumerate All Scheduled Tasks: Collect complete task inventory from target systems using schtasks /query /fo CSV /v or Get-ScheduledTask PowerShell cmdlet.
  2. Monitor Task Creation Events: Track Event ID 4698 for new task creation, correlating with the creating process and user account context.
  3. Analyze Task Actions: Examine what each task executes. Flag tasks running scripts (PowerShell, cmd, wscript), binaries from user-writable paths (TEMP, AppData, Downloads), or encoded/obfuscated commands.
  4. Check Task Triggers: Review trigger conditions. Tasks triggered by system startup, user logon, or short intervals (1-5 minutes) warrant investigation.
  5. Identify Hidden or Disguised Tasks: Hunt for tasks with names mimicking legitimate Windows tasks, tasks with Security Descriptor modifications hiding them from standard enumeration, or tasks stored in non-standard registry locations.
  6. Correlate with Process Execution: Match scheduled task execution events with process creation logs to confirm what actually runs.
  7. Baseline and Diff: Compare current task inventory against known-good baselines to identify new, modified, or unexpected tasks.

Detection Queries

Splunk -- Scheduled Task Creation

spl
index=wineventlog EventCode=4698
| spath output=TaskName path=EventData.TaskName
| spath output=TaskContent path=EventData.TaskContent
| where NOT match(TaskName, "(?i)(\\\\Microsoft\\\\|\\\\Windows\\\\)")
| table _time Computer SubjectUserName TaskName TaskContent

Splunk -- Schtasks.exe Suspicious Usage

spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1 Image="*\\schtasks.exe"
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)/create")
| where match(CommandLine, "(?i)(powershell|cmd|wscript|cscript|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|http|https|\\\\temp\\\\|\\\\appdata\\\\)")
| table _time Computer User CommandLine ParentImage

KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel

kql
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4698
| extend TaskName = tostring(EventData.TaskName)
| extend TaskContent = tostring(EventData.TaskContent)
| where TaskContent has_any ("powershell", "cmd.exe", "wscript", "http://", "https://", "\\Temp\\", "\\AppData\\")
| project TimeGenerated, Computer, Account, TaskName, TaskContent

Common Scenarios

  1. Cobalt Strike Persistence: Creates scheduled tasks via schtasks.exe to execute PowerShell download cradles at user logon intervals.
  2. Ransomware Staging: Task created to run encryption payload at a future time, often during off-hours for maximum impact.
  3. Hidden Task via SD Modification: Attacker modifies Security Descriptor of scheduled task to hide it from normal enumeration while maintaining execution.
  4. COM Handler Abuse: Task uses COM handler rather than direct executable path, making action inspection more complex.
  5. Lateral Movement via Tasks: Remote scheduled task creation using schtasks /create /s REMOTE_HOST for execution on other systems.

Output Format

text
Hunt ID: TH-SCHTASK-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Task Name: [Full task path]
Action: [Command/Script executed]
Trigger: [Startup/Logon/Timer/Event]
Created By: [User account]
Created From: [Local/Remote]
Creation Time: [Timestamp]
Run As: [Execution account]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

PermisoDeclaradoHallado en el escaneo
Lee archivosNoNo
Escribe archivosNoNo
Ejecuta comandos de shellSíSí
Usa la redSíSí
Usa conectoresNoNo
Controla un navegadorNoNo

Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaComando · command.persistenceSKILL.md:92
  2. MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
  3. MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
  4. InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v1.013 nov 202654a798879bbc47bFirmada–

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