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mukul975/hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptionsDFIR e threat hunting

hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions

⁨Hunts for adversary persistence via WMI event subscriptions (MITRE T1546.003)⁩

v1.03 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni36,3K StelleApache-2.0sincronizzato 12 ore fa

Installa

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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
J16UzHDQPi…GWSrC7CQ==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchetto42a9ee4a…646c2850
42a9ee4ace11…7381646c28508 file · ⁦12.2 KB⁩
ScansioneMedio7 segnalazioni
  • injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:136
  • Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/agent.py
  • command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:32
Vedi la scansione completa
Sorgentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions@54a7988

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When to Use

  • When proactively searching for fileless persistence mechanisms in Windows environments
  • After threat intelligence reports indicate WMI-based persistence by APT groups (APT29, APT32, FIN8)
  • When investigating systems where malware persists across reboots despite cleanup attempts
  • During incident response when standard persistence locations (Run keys, scheduled tasks) are clean
  • When WmiPrvSe.exe is observed spawning unexpected child processes

Prerequisites

  • Sysmon Event ID 19, 20, 21 (WMI Event Filter/Consumer/Binding) enabled
  • Windows Event ID 5861 (WMI activity logging) from Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity
  • PowerShell logging enabled (Script Block Logging, Module Logging)
  • WMI repository access for enumeration
  • SIEM platform for event correlation

Workflow

  1. Enumerate Existing WMI Subscriptions: Query all permanent WMI event subscriptions on target systems. A clean system typically has very few or zero permanent subscriptions, making anomalies easy to spot.
  2. Monitor WMI Event Creation (Sysmon 19/20/21): Sysmon Event 19 captures WmiEventFilter activity, Event 20 captures WmiEventConsumer activity, and Event 21 captures WmiEventConsumerToFilter binding.
  3. Analyze Consumer Types: Focus on ActiveScriptEventConsumer (runs VBScript/JScript) and CommandLineEventConsumer (executes commands) -- these are the dangerous types used for persistence.
  4. Check Event Filter Triggers: Examine what triggers the subscription. Common malicious triggers include system startup (Win32_ProcessStartTrace), user logon, or timer-based execution intervals.
  5. Investigate WmiPrvSe.exe Child Processes: When a WMI subscription fires, the action is executed by WmiPrvSe.exe. Hunt for unusual child processes of WmiPrvSe.exe.
  6. Correlate with MOF Compilation: Detect mofcomp.exe usage which compiles MOF files to create WMI subscriptions programmatically.
  7. Validate and Respond: Confirm malicious subscriptions, remove them, and trace back to the initial infection vector.

Key Concepts

Concept Description
T1546.003 Event Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription
__EventFilter WMI class defining the trigger condition
__EventConsumer WMI class defining the action to perform
__FilterToConsumerBinding Links a filter to a consumer
ActiveScriptEventConsumer Consumer that runs VBScript or JScript
CommandLineEventConsumer Consumer that executes command lines
WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host that executes subscription actions
MOF File Managed Object Format used to define WMI objects

Detection Queries

Splunk -- WMI Subscription Creation via Sysmon

spl
index=sysmon (EventCode=19 OR EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21)
| eval event_type=case(EventCode=19, "EventFilter", EventCode=20, "EventConsumer", EventCode=21, "FilterToConsumerBinding")
| table _time Computer User event_type EventNamespace Name Query Destination Operation

Splunk -- WMI Subscription via Windows Event 5861

spl
index=wineventlog source="Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational" EventCode=5861
| table _time Computer NamespaceName Operation PossibleCause

PowerShell -- Enumerate WMI Subscriptions

powershell
Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventFilter
Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventConsumer
Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding

KQL -- WmiPrvSe.exe Spawning Suspicious Children

kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "wmiprvse.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine

Sigma Rule

yaml
title: WMI Event Subscription Persistence
status: stable
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: wmi_event
detection:
    selection_consumer:
        EventID: 20
        Destination|contains:
            - 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'
            - 'CommandLineEventConsumer'
    condition: selection_consumer
level: high
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.003

Common Scenarios

  1. APT29 WMI Persistence: Creates an ActiveScriptEventConsumer that executes a VBScript backdoor on system startup, surviving reboots and credential resets.
  2. Turla WMI Backdoor: Uses Win32_ProcessStartTrace filter combined with CommandLineEventConsumer for covert command execution.
  3. FIN8 WMI Timer: Interval-based __IntervalTimerEvent triggering encoded PowerShell downloads every 30 minutes.
  4. MOF-Based Installation: Adversary drops a .mof file and compiles it with mofcomp.exe to silently create persistent subscriptions.

Output Format

text
Hunt ID: TH-WMI-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Subscription Name: [Filter/Consumer name]
Filter Query: [WQL trigger condition]
Consumer Type: [ActiveScript/CommandLine]
Consumer Action: [Script content or command]
Binding: [Filter-to-Consumer link]
Created: [Timestamp]
User Context: [SYSTEM/User]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellSìSì
Usa la reteSìSì
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:136
  2. MediaFile · Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/agent.py
  3. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:32
  4. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:33
  5. MediaFile · Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/process.py
  6. MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/process.py:31
  7. InfoLink · Link a domini esterni

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v1.013 nov 202654a798842a9ee4aFirmata–

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