hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions
Hunts for adversary persistence via WMI event subscriptions (MITRE T1546.003)
v1.03 instalaciones+3 en 7 días36,3 mil EstrellasApache-2.0sincronizado hace 12 horas
Instalar
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptionsEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete42a9ee4a…646c2850
42a9ee4ace11…7381646c28508 archivos · 12.2 KBEscaneoMedio7 hallazgos
- injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:136
- Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
- command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:32
Fuentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions@54a7988
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When to Use
- When proactively searching for fileless persistence mechanisms in Windows environments
- After threat intelligence reports indicate WMI-based persistence by APT groups (APT29, APT32, FIN8)
- When investigating systems where malware persists across reboots despite cleanup attempts
- During incident response when standard persistence locations (Run keys, scheduled tasks) are clean
- When WmiPrvSe.exe is observed spawning unexpected child processes
Prerequisites
- Sysmon Event ID 19, 20, 21 (WMI Event Filter/Consumer/Binding) enabled
- Windows Event ID 5861 (WMI activity logging) from Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity
- PowerShell logging enabled (Script Block Logging, Module Logging)
- WMI repository access for enumeration
- SIEM platform for event correlation
Workflow
- Enumerate Existing WMI Subscriptions: Query all permanent WMI event subscriptions on target systems. A clean system typically has very few or zero permanent subscriptions, making anomalies easy to spot.
- Monitor WMI Event Creation (Sysmon 19/20/21): Sysmon Event 19 captures WmiEventFilter activity, Event 20 captures WmiEventConsumer activity, and Event 21 captures WmiEventConsumerToFilter binding.
- Analyze Consumer Types: Focus on ActiveScriptEventConsumer (runs VBScript/JScript) and CommandLineEventConsumer (executes commands) -- these are the dangerous types used for persistence.
- Check Event Filter Triggers: Examine what triggers the subscription. Common malicious triggers include system startup (Win32_ProcessStartTrace), user logon, or timer-based execution intervals.
- Investigate WmiPrvSe.exe Child Processes: When a WMI subscription fires, the action is executed by WmiPrvSe.exe. Hunt for unusual child processes of WmiPrvSe.exe.
- Correlate with MOF Compilation: Detect
mofcomp.exeusage which compiles MOF files to create WMI subscriptions programmatically. - Validate and Respond: Confirm malicious subscriptions, remove them, and trace back to the initial infection vector.
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1546.003 | Event Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription |
| __EventFilter | WMI class defining the trigger condition |
| __EventConsumer | WMI class defining the action to perform |
| __FilterToConsumerBinding | Links a filter to a consumer |
| ActiveScriptEventConsumer | Consumer that runs VBScript or JScript |
| CommandLineEventConsumer | Consumer that executes command lines |
| WmiPrvSe.exe | WMI Provider Host that executes subscription actions |
| MOF File | Managed Object Format used to define WMI objects |
Detection Queries
Splunk -- WMI Subscription Creation via Sysmon
index=sysmon (EventCode=19 OR EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21)
| eval event_type=case(EventCode=19, "EventFilter", EventCode=20, "EventConsumer", EventCode=21, "FilterToConsumerBinding")
| table _time Computer User event_type EventNamespace Name Query Destination OperationSplunk -- WMI Subscription via Windows Event 5861
index=wineventlog source="Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational" EventCode=5861
| table _time Computer NamespaceName Operation PossibleCausePowerShell -- Enumerate WMI Subscriptions
Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventFilter
Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventConsumer
Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBindingKQL -- WmiPrvSe.exe Spawning Suspicious Children
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "wmiprvse.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLineSigma Rule
title: WMI Event Subscription Persistence
status: stable
logsource:
product: windows
category: wmi_event
detection:
selection_consumer:
EventID: 20
Destination|contains:
- 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'
- 'CommandLineEventConsumer'
condition: selection_consumer
level: high
tags:
- attack.persistence
- attack.t1546.003Common Scenarios
- APT29 WMI Persistence: Creates an ActiveScriptEventConsumer that executes a VBScript backdoor on system startup, surviving reboots and credential resets.
- Turla WMI Backdoor: Uses Win32_ProcessStartTrace filter combined with CommandLineEventConsumer for covert command execution.
- FIN8 WMI Timer: Interval-based __IntervalTimerEvent triggering encoded PowerShell downloads every 30 minutes.
- MOF-Based Installation: Adversary drops a .mof file and compiles it with
mofcomp.exeto silently create persistent subscriptions.
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-WMI-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Subscription Name: [Filter/Consumer name]
Filter Query: [WQL trigger condition]
Consumer Type: [ActiveScript/CommandLine]
Consumer Action: [Script content or command]
Binding: [Filter-to-Consumer link]
Created: [Timestamp]
User Context: [SYSTEM/User]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]Archivos de esta versión
assets/11016 B
- template.md1016 B
references/37.5 KB
- api-reference.md1.9 KB
- standards.md2.6 KB
- workflows.md3.1 KB
scripts/213.0 KB
- agent.py6.3 KB
- process.py6.7 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md6.0 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | No | No |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | Sí | Sí |
| Usa la red | Sí | Sí |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
- MediaPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:136
- MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
- MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:32
- MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:33
- MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
- MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/process.py:31
- InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 nov 2026 | 54a7988 | 42a9ee4a | Firmada | – |
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