Pular para o conteúdo
Novo

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash grátis por 7 dias: 10M tokens por dia após recarga de $10 ou mais. Até 30/11.

Como funciona
mukul975/hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptionsDFIR e threat hunting

hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions

⁨Hunts for adversary persistence via WMI event subscriptions (MITRE T1546.003)⁩

v1.03 instalações+3 em 7 dias36,3 mil EstrelasApache-2.0sincronizado há 12 horas

Instalar

Ainda não tem a CLI da NotHoly? Instale primeiro.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions

Grava em ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.

AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
J16UzHDQPi…GWSrC7CQ==A CLI confere o SHA-256 e a assinatura antes de gravar qualquer arquivo.
Pacote42a9ee4a…646c2850
42a9ee4ace11…7381646c28508 arquivos · ⁦12.2 KB⁩
VarreduraMédio7 achados
  • injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:136
  • Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
  • command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:32
Ver a varredura completa
Fontegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-for-persistence-via-wmi-subscriptions@54a7988

Este item ainda não foi escrito no seu idioma, então aparece em English.

When to Use

  • When proactively searching for fileless persistence mechanisms in Windows environments
  • After threat intelligence reports indicate WMI-based persistence by APT groups (APT29, APT32, FIN8)
  • When investigating systems where malware persists across reboots despite cleanup attempts
  • During incident response when standard persistence locations (Run keys, scheduled tasks) are clean
  • When WmiPrvSe.exe is observed spawning unexpected child processes

Prerequisites

  • Sysmon Event ID 19, 20, 21 (WMI Event Filter/Consumer/Binding) enabled
  • Windows Event ID 5861 (WMI activity logging) from Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity
  • PowerShell logging enabled (Script Block Logging, Module Logging)
  • WMI repository access for enumeration
  • SIEM platform for event correlation

Workflow

  1. Enumerate Existing WMI Subscriptions: Query all permanent WMI event subscriptions on target systems. A clean system typically has very few or zero permanent subscriptions, making anomalies easy to spot.
  2. Monitor WMI Event Creation (Sysmon 19/20/21): Sysmon Event 19 captures WmiEventFilter activity, Event 20 captures WmiEventConsumer activity, and Event 21 captures WmiEventConsumerToFilter binding.
  3. Analyze Consumer Types: Focus on ActiveScriptEventConsumer (runs VBScript/JScript) and CommandLineEventConsumer (executes commands) -- these are the dangerous types used for persistence.
  4. Check Event Filter Triggers: Examine what triggers the subscription. Common malicious triggers include system startup (Win32_ProcessStartTrace), user logon, or timer-based execution intervals.
  5. Investigate WmiPrvSe.exe Child Processes: When a WMI subscription fires, the action is executed by WmiPrvSe.exe. Hunt for unusual child processes of WmiPrvSe.exe.
  6. Correlate with MOF Compilation: Detect mofcomp.exe usage which compiles MOF files to create WMI subscriptions programmatically.
  7. Validate and Respond: Confirm malicious subscriptions, remove them, and trace back to the initial infection vector.

Key Concepts

Concept Description
T1546.003 Event Triggered Execution: WMI Event Subscription
__EventFilter WMI class defining the trigger condition
__EventConsumer WMI class defining the action to perform
__FilterToConsumerBinding Links a filter to a consumer
ActiveScriptEventConsumer Consumer that runs VBScript or JScript
CommandLineEventConsumer Consumer that executes command lines
WmiPrvSe.exe WMI Provider Host that executes subscription actions
MOF File Managed Object Format used to define WMI objects

Detection Queries

Splunk -- WMI Subscription Creation via Sysmon

spl
index=sysmon (EventCode=19 OR EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21)
| eval event_type=case(EventCode=19, "EventFilter", EventCode=20, "EventConsumer", EventCode=21, "FilterToConsumerBinding")
| table _time Computer User event_type EventNamespace Name Query Destination Operation

Splunk -- WMI Subscription via Windows Event 5861

spl
index=wineventlog source="Microsoft-Windows-WMI-Activity/Operational" EventCode=5861
| table _time Computer NamespaceName Operation PossibleCause

PowerShell -- Enumerate WMI Subscriptions

powershell
Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventFilter
Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __EventConsumer
Get-WmiObject -Namespace root\subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding

KQL -- WmiPrvSe.exe Spawning Suspicious Children

kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "wmiprvse.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe", "powershell.exe", "wscript.exe", "cscript.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine

Sigma Rule

yaml
title: WMI Event Subscription Persistence
status: stable
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: wmi_event
detection:
    selection_consumer:
        EventID: 20
        Destination|contains:
            - 'ActiveScriptEventConsumer'
            - 'CommandLineEventConsumer'
    condition: selection_consumer
level: high
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1546.003

Common Scenarios

  1. APT29 WMI Persistence: Creates an ActiveScriptEventConsumer that executes a VBScript backdoor on system startup, surviving reboots and credential resets.
  2. Turla WMI Backdoor: Uses Win32_ProcessStartTrace filter combined with CommandLineEventConsumer for covert command execution.
  3. FIN8 WMI Timer: Interval-based __IntervalTimerEvent triggering encoded PowerShell downloads every 30 minutes.
  4. MOF-Based Installation: Adversary drops a .mof file and compiles it with mofcomp.exe to silently create persistent subscriptions.

Output Format

text
Hunt ID: TH-WMI-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
Subscription Name: [Filter/Consumer name]
Filter Query: [WQL trigger condition]
Consumer Type: [ActiveScript/CommandLine]
Consumer Action: [Script content or command]
Binding: [Filter-to-Consumer link]
Created: [Timestamp]
User Context: [SYSTEM/User]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]

Arquivos desta versão

Permissões

PermissãoDeclaradaEncontrada na varredura
Lê arquivosNãoNão
Grava arquivosNãoNão
Roda comandos no shellSimSim
Usa a redeSimSim
Usa conectoresNãoNão
Controla um navegadorNãoNão

Achados da varredura

Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026

  1. MédiaPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:136
  2. MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
  3. MédiaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:32
  4. MédiaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:33
  5. MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/process.py
  6. MédiaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/process.py:31
  7. InfoLink · Links para domínios externos

Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.

VersãoPublicada emCommitSHA-256AssinaturaMudança de permissão
v1.013 de nov. de 202654a798842a9ee4aAssinada–

Pergunte tudo o que o seu escopo permite.

Crie a conta, adicione créditos e faça a primeira pergunta no chat ou no terminal.

  1. 1/3

    Crie a conta

    Individual ou empresa. Dá para virar empresa depois sem perder saldo nem chaves.

    Pessoa físicaEmpresa
  2. 2/3

    Adicione créditos

    No cartão. Você paga por token, sem assinatura.

    $5.00recarga mínima
  3. 3/3

    Pergunte

    No chat, ou instale o CLI e rode notholy login no terminal.

    $ notholy login