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How it works
noorqureshi/reverse-eng-patch-diffРеверс-инжиниринг и фаззинг

reverse-eng-patch-diff

⁨Turn a vendor security patch into a working N-day: diff the patched and unpatched binaries, read the newly added safety checks back to a bug class, then write a PoC that crashes the unpatched build. Load for a CVE with a patch but no public PoC, Patch Tuesday triage (ntoskrnl / win32k / afd.sys / cl⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 установки+3 за 7 дней27 ЗвездыMITсинхронизировано 22 часа назад

Установка

Ещё нет NotHoly CLI? Сначала установите её.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/reverse-eng-patch-diff

Пишет в ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ после проверки подписи и SHA-256.

ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
CqhXnqpohp…7UoTszCw==CLI проверяет SHA-256 и подпись, прежде чем записать хоть один файл.
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Вся проверка
Источникgithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/reverse-engineering/reverse-eng-patch-diff@ee0e0c5

Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.

When it applies

A vendor shipped a fix but no details: a CVE advisory says "out-of-bounds write in component X" with no PoC, a Patch Tuesday drop needs triage, or a Linux distro backport may be incomplete on some branch. The goal is to recover what the patch fixed and prove the bug against the unpatched build. Weaponizing an N-day is only legitimate against in-scope, authorized targets (a program that accepts it, an engagement, your own lab) — confirm with tradecraft-scope-roe and record it in scope.txt.

Why it works

A security patch is a confession. The added bounds check, lock, zeroing, or refcount tells you exactly which invariant the old code violated — and the unpatched binary still violates it. Diff the two builds, filter to functions that changed moderately (identical = untouched, completely different = new feature), and the fix pattern maps almost one-to-one onto a bug class you can then trigger.

The patch adds... Likely bug class
if (a + b < a) / __builtin_add_overflow integer overflow
KeAcquireSpinLock / mutex_lock race condition (TOCTOU / double-free)
if (idx >= MAX) / if (len > buf_size) OOB read / write
RtlZeroMemory / memset(struct, 0, ...) uninitialized-memory info leak
InterlockedDecrement + refcount check UAF / refcount error
ProbeForRead / ProbeForWrite / access_ok unvalidated user-mode pointer
SeAccessCheck / capability check missing authorization
removed / tightened IOCTL codes attack-surface reduction — study the old interface

Method

  1. Get the before/after binaries. Windows: download the MSU for build N (patched) and N-1 from the Microsoft Update Catalog, unpack with expand.exe. Linux: apt download the two kernel/package versions and dpkg-deb -x / rpm2cpio them. Third-party software: grab the N-1 and N installers. Exact commands per platform in cheatsheet.md.
  2. Align symbols. Windows: pull PDBs from the Microsoft symbol server with symchk. Linux: matching dbgsym / debuginfo, and extract-vmlinux to turn vmlinuz back into an ELF. No symbols for one side → migrate them from the nearest version before diffing.
  3. Diff. Feed both binaries to BinDiff, ghidriff, or Diaphora:
    bash
    ghidriff ntoskrnl_old.exe ntoskrnl_new.exe -o diff_out/
    bindiff --primary=old.BinExport --secondary=new.BinExport --output_dir=./bindiff_out/
  4. Locate the change. Filter to functions with similarity ≈ 0.5–0.95. Read what was added: new if guards, new loop bounds, new locks — and what was deleted (removed code is a clue too). Map the pattern through the table above to a bug class; before/after pseudocode pairs are ideal LLM input for a root-cause hypothesis (patterns in cheatsheet.md).
  5. Write and verify the PoC against the unpatched build:
    • integer overflow → boundary values (0xFFFFFFF0 + 0x100) so the wrap yields a small allocation but a large copy;
    • race → threads hammering two syscalls on one object (close + IOCTL concurrently);
    • UAF → spray → free → reclaim → use;
    • OOB → drive length/index just past the boundary the new check now guards. Success criteria are symmetric: the PoC crashes the unpatched build reliably and runs clean on the patched one.

Gotchas

  • Mitigation ≠ fix. Added CFG/XFG instrumentation (_guard_xfg_dispatch_icall_fptr) is hardening, not the bug fix — keep looking.
  • Compiler noise fakes changes. Inlining decisions, switch-table reordering, and PGO make unchanged source look different — diff N against N-1 (same toolchain), never across major versions, and read control/data flow rather than token-level diffs.
  • Alignment failure. If overall matched ratio < ~90%, stop: wrong pairing, different compiler, or rebase mismatch — fix the inputs before reading results.
  • A patch may shrink the blast radius, not fix the bug — the same root cause may still be reachable via another path (one bug, multiple harvests).
  • A crash on the unpatched build alone proves nothing — environment faults look identical; you need the patched build clean and a stated root cause before claiming the CVE (reporting-triage-validation).
  • Redact in write-ups — target hostnames, internal IPs, usernames become placeholders.

Verify success

You can name the function, the added check, and the violated invariant; your PoC crashes the unpatched build (BSOD/panic/KASAN naming the expected class) within a predictable window and exits cleanly on the patched build. That pairing — plus the root cause — is the reproducible N-day.

References

Microsoft Update Catalog & MSRC CVRF API; BinDiff / ghidriff / Diaphora docs; reverse-eng-binary-triage, exploit-poc-development in this library.


Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.

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Замечания проверки

Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.

  1. ИнфоСсылка · Ссылки на внешние домены

Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.

ВерсияОпубликованаКоммитSHA-256ПодписьИзменение прав
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 нояб. 2026 г.ee0e0c54171a760Подписана–

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