Saltar al contenido
Nuevo

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash gratis por 7 días: 10M tokens al día tras una recarga de $10 o más. Hasta el 30/11.

Cómo funciona
noorqureshi/reverse-eng-patch-diffIngeniería inversa y fuzzing

reverse-eng-patch-diff

⁨Turn a vendor security patch into a working N-day: diff the patched and unpatched binaries, read the newly added safety checks back to a bug class, then write a PoC that crashes the unpatched build. Load for a CVE with a patch but no public PoC, Patch Tuesday triage (ntoskrnl / win32k / afd.sys / cl⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas

Instalar

¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/reverse-eng-patch-diff

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

FirmaFirmado, ed25519
CqhXnqpohp…7UoTszCw==La CLI comprueba el SHA-256 y la firma antes de escribir cualquier archivo.
Paquete4171a760…ca4a170d
4171a760d5e1…19d4ca4a170d2 archivos · ⁦7.3 KB⁩
EscaneoBajo1 hallazgo
  • Enlaces a dominios externos
Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/reverse-engineering/reverse-eng-patch-diff@ee0e0c5

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

When it applies

A vendor shipped a fix but no details: a CVE advisory says "out-of-bounds write in component X" with no PoC, a Patch Tuesday drop needs triage, or a Linux distro backport may be incomplete on some branch. The goal is to recover what the patch fixed and prove the bug against the unpatched build. Weaponizing an N-day is only legitimate against in-scope, authorized targets (a program that accepts it, an engagement, your own lab) — confirm with tradecraft-scope-roe and record it in scope.txt.

Why it works

A security patch is a confession. The added bounds check, lock, zeroing, or refcount tells you exactly which invariant the old code violated — and the unpatched binary still violates it. Diff the two builds, filter to functions that changed moderately (identical = untouched, completely different = new feature), and the fix pattern maps almost one-to-one onto a bug class you can then trigger.

The patch adds... Likely bug class
if (a + b < a) / __builtin_add_overflow integer overflow
KeAcquireSpinLock / mutex_lock race condition (TOCTOU / double-free)
if (idx >= MAX) / if (len > buf_size) OOB read / write
RtlZeroMemory / memset(struct, 0, ...) uninitialized-memory info leak
InterlockedDecrement + refcount check UAF / refcount error
ProbeForRead / ProbeForWrite / access_ok unvalidated user-mode pointer
SeAccessCheck / capability check missing authorization
removed / tightened IOCTL codes attack-surface reduction — study the old interface

Method

  1. Get the before/after binaries. Windows: download the MSU for build N (patched) and N-1 from the Microsoft Update Catalog, unpack with expand.exe. Linux: apt download the two kernel/package versions and dpkg-deb -x / rpm2cpio them. Third-party software: grab the N-1 and N installers. Exact commands per platform in cheatsheet.md.
  2. Align symbols. Windows: pull PDBs from the Microsoft symbol server with symchk. Linux: matching dbgsym / debuginfo, and extract-vmlinux to turn vmlinuz back into an ELF. No symbols for one side → migrate them from the nearest version before diffing.
  3. Diff. Feed both binaries to BinDiff, ghidriff, or Diaphora:
    bash
    ghidriff ntoskrnl_old.exe ntoskrnl_new.exe -o diff_out/
    bindiff --primary=old.BinExport --secondary=new.BinExport --output_dir=./bindiff_out/
  4. Locate the change. Filter to functions with similarity ≈ 0.5–0.95. Read what was added: new if guards, new loop bounds, new locks — and what was deleted (removed code is a clue too). Map the pattern through the table above to a bug class; before/after pseudocode pairs are ideal LLM input for a root-cause hypothesis (patterns in cheatsheet.md).
  5. Write and verify the PoC against the unpatched build:
    • integer overflow → boundary values (0xFFFFFFF0 + 0x100) so the wrap yields a small allocation but a large copy;
    • race → threads hammering two syscalls on one object (close + IOCTL concurrently);
    • UAF → spray → free → reclaim → use;
    • OOB → drive length/index just past the boundary the new check now guards. Success criteria are symmetric: the PoC crashes the unpatched build reliably and runs clean on the patched one.

Gotchas

  • Mitigation ≠ fix. Added CFG/XFG instrumentation (_guard_xfg_dispatch_icall_fptr) is hardening, not the bug fix — keep looking.
  • Compiler noise fakes changes. Inlining decisions, switch-table reordering, and PGO make unchanged source look different — diff N against N-1 (same toolchain), never across major versions, and read control/data flow rather than token-level diffs.
  • Alignment failure. If overall matched ratio < ~90%, stop: wrong pairing, different compiler, or rebase mismatch — fix the inputs before reading results.
  • A patch may shrink the blast radius, not fix the bug — the same root cause may still be reachable via another path (one bug, multiple harvests).
  • A crash on the unpatched build alone proves nothing — environment faults look identical; you need the patched build clean and a stated root cause before claiming the CVE (reporting-triage-validation).
  • Redact in write-ups — target hostnames, internal IPs, usernames become placeholders.

Verify success

You can name the function, the added check, and the violated invariant; your PoC crashes the unpatched build (BSOD/panic/KASAN naming the expected class) within a predictable window and exits cleanly on the patched build. That pairing — plus the root cause — is the reproducible N-day.

References

Microsoft Update Catalog & MSRC CVRF API; BinDiff / ghidriff / Diaphora docs; reverse-eng-binary-triage, exploit-poc-development in this library.


Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

PermisoDeclaradoHallado en el escaneo
Lee archivosNoNo
Escribe archivosSíSí
Ejecuta comandos de shellSíSí
Usa la redSíSí
Usa conectoresNoNo
Controla un navegadorNoNo

Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c54171a760Firmada–

Pregunta todo lo que tu alcance permite.

Crea la cuenta, añade créditos y haz la primera pregunta en el chat o en la terminal.

  1. 1/3

    Crea la cuenta

    Individual o empresa. Puedes pasar a empresa después sin perder saldo ni claves.

    IndividualEmpresa
  2. 2/3

    Añade créditos

    Con tarjeta. Pagas por token, sin suscripción.

    $5.00recarga mínima
  3. 3/3

    Pregunta

    En el chat, o instala el CLI y ejecuta notholy login en tu terminal.

    $ notholy login