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mukul975/securing-github-actions-workflowsОтчеты и соответствие требованиям

securing-github-actions-workflows

⁨Hardens GitHub Actions workflows against supply chain attacks, credential⁩

v1.0.03 установки+3 за 7 дней36,3 тыс. ЗвездыApache-2.0синхронизировано 11 часов назад

Установка

Ещё нет NotHoly CLI? Сначала установите её.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/securing-github-actions-workflows

Пишет в ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ после проверки подписи и SHA-256.

ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
Gi3MZkOdxz…5mOoKQBg==CLI проверяет SHA-256 и подпись, прежде чем записать хоть один файл.
Пакет7a69d3aa…14a4f7dd
7a69d3aa3f36…d7bb14a4f7dd8 файлов · ⁦12.5 KB⁩
ПроверкаСредний3 замечания
  • Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
  • Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/process.py
  • Ссылки на внешние домены
Вся проверка
Источникgithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/securing-github-actions-workflows@54a7988

Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.

When to Use

  • When GitHub Actions is the CI/CD platform and workflows need hardening against supply chain attacks
  • When workflows handle secrets, deploy to production, or have elevated permissions
  • When preventing script injection via untrusted PR titles, branch names, or commit messages
  • When requiring audit trails and approval gates for workflow modifications
  • When third-party actions pose supply chain risk through mutable version tags

Do not use for securing other CI/CD platforms (see platform-specific hardening guides), for application vulnerability scanning (use SAST/DAST), or for secret detection in code (use Gitleaks).

Prerequisites

  • GitHub repository with GitHub Actions enabled
  • GitHub organization admin access for organization-level settings
  • Understanding of GitHub Actions workflow syntax and events

Workflow

Step 1: Pin Actions to SHA Digests

yaml
# INSECURE: Mutable tag can be overwritten by attacker
- uses: actions/checkout@v4

# SECURE: Pinned to immutable SHA digest
- uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11  # v4.1.1

# Use Dependabot to auto-update pinned SHAs
# .github/dependabot.yml
version: 2
updates:
  - package-ecosystem: "github-actions"
    directory: "/"
    schedule:
      interval: "weekly"
    commit-message:
      prefix: "ci"

Step 2: Minimize GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions

yaml
# Set restrictive default permissions at workflow level
name: CI Pipeline
permissions: {}  # Start with no permissions

on: [push, pull_request]

jobs:
  build:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: read  # Only what's needed
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11

  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    needs: build
    if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
    permissions:
      contents: read
      deployments: write
      id-token: write  # For OIDC-based cloud auth
    steps:
      - name: Deploy
        run: echo "deploying"

Step 3: Prevent Script Injection

yaml
# VULNERABLE: User-controlled input in run step
- run: echo "PR title is ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"

# SECURE: Use environment variable (properly escaped by shell)
- name: Process PR
  env:
    PR_TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
    PR_BODY: ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}
  run: |
    echo "PR title is ${PR_TITLE}"
    echo "PR body is ${PR_BODY}"

# SECURE: Use actions/github-script for complex operations
- uses: actions/github-script@60a0d83039c74a4aee543508d2ffcb1c3799cdea
  with:
    script: |
      const title = context.payload.pull_request.title;
      console.log(`PR title: ${title}`);

Step 4: Secure Fork Pull Request Handling

yaml
# DANGEROUS: pull_request_target runs with base repo permissions
# on: pull_request_target  # AVOID unless absolutely necessary

# SAFE: pull_request runs in fork context with limited permissions
on:
  pull_request:
    branches: [main]

# If pull_request_target is required, never checkout PR code:
on:
  pull_request_target:
    types: [labeled]

jobs:
  safe-job:
    if: contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'safe-to-test')
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    permissions:
      contents: read
    steps:
      # NEVER do: actions/checkout with ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
      - uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11
        # This checks out the BASE branch, not the PR

Step 5: Protect Secrets and Environment Variables

yaml
jobs:
  deploy:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    environment: production  # Requires approval
    steps:
      - name: Deploy with secret
        env:
          # Secrets are masked in logs automatically
          DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}
        run: |
          # Never echo secrets
          # echo "$DEPLOY_KEY"  # BAD
          deploy-tool --key-file <(echo "$DEPLOY_KEY")

      - name: Audit secret access
        run: |
          # Log that secret was used without exposing it
          echo "::notice::Deploy key accessed for production deployment"

Step 6: Implement Workflow Change Controls

yaml
# Require CODEOWNERS approval for workflow changes
# .github/CODEOWNERS
.github/workflows/ @security-team @platform-team
.github/actions/ @security-team @platform-team

# Organization settings:
# 1. Settings > Actions > General > Fork PR policies
#    - Require approval for first-time contributors
#    - Require approval for all outside collaborators
# 2. Settings > Actions > General > Workflow permissions
#    - Read repository contents and packages permissions
#    - Do NOT allow GitHub Actions to create and approve PRs

Key Concepts

Term Definition
SHA Pinning Referencing GitHub Actions by their immutable commit SHA instead of mutable version tags
Script Injection Attack where untrusted input (PR title, branch name) is interpolated into shell commands
GITHUB_TOKEN Automatically generated token with configurable permissions scoped to the current repository
pull_request_target Dangerous event trigger that runs in the base repo context with full permissions on fork PRs
Environment Protection GitHub feature requiring manual approval before jobs accessing an environment can run
CODEOWNERS File defining required reviewers for specific paths including workflow files
OIDC Federation Using GitHub's OIDC token to authenticate to cloud providers without storing long-lived credentials

Tools & Systems

  • Dependabot: Automated dependency updater that keeps pinned action SHAs current
  • StepSecurity Harden Runner: GitHub Action that monitors and restricts outbound network calls from workflows
  • actionlint: Linter for GitHub Actions workflow files that detects security issues
  • allstar: GitHub App by OpenSSF that enforces security policies on repositories
  • scorecard: OpenSSF tool that evaluates supply chain security practices including CI/CD

Common Scenarios

Scenario: Preventing Supply Chain Attack via Compromised Third-Party Action

Context: A widely-used GitHub Action is compromised and its v3 tag is updated to include credential-stealing code. Repositories using @v3 automatically pull the malicious version.

Approach:

  1. Pin all actions to SHA digests immediately across all repositories
  2. Configure Dependabot for github-actions ecosystem to manage SHA updates
  3. Restrict GITHUB_TOKEN permissions so even compromised actions have minimal access
  4. Add StepSecurity harden-runner to detect anomalous outbound network calls
  5. Review all third-party actions and replace unnecessary ones with inline scripts
  6. Require CODEOWNERS approval for any changes to .github/workflows/

Pitfalls: SHA pinning without Dependabot means missing legitimate security updates to actions. Overly restrictive permissions can break legitimate workflows. Using pull_request_target for label-based gating still exposes secrets if the workflow checks out PR code.

Output Format

text
GitHub Actions Security Audit
================================
Repository: org/web-application
Date: 2026-02-23

WORKFLOW ANALYSIS:
  Total workflows: 8
  Total action references: 34

SHA PINNING:
  [FAIL] 12/34 actions use mutable tags instead of SHA digests
  - .github/workflows/ci.yml: actions/setup-node@v4
  - .github/workflows/deploy.yml: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4

PERMISSIONS:
  [FAIL] 3/8 workflows have no explicit permissions (inherit default)
  [WARN] 1/8 workflows request write-all permissions

SCRIPT INJECTION:
  [FAIL] 2 workflow steps interpolate user input directly
  - .github/workflows/pr-check.yml:23: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}

SECRETS:
  [PASS] No secrets exposed in workflow logs
  [PASS] All production deployments use environment protection

SCORE: 6/10 (Remediate 5 HIGH findings)

Файлы этой версии

Права

ПравоЗаявленоНайдено проверкой
Читает файлыДаДа
Пишет файлыДаДа
Выполняет команды shellДаДа
Ходит в сетьДаДа
Использует коннекторыНетНет
Управляет браузеромНетНет

Замечания проверки

Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.

  1. СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
  2. СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/process.py
  3. ИнфоСсылка · Ссылки на внешние домены

Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.

ВерсияОпубликованаКоммитSHA-256ПодписьИзменение прав
v1.0.013 нояб. 2026 г.54a79887a69d3aaПодписана–

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