securing-github-actions-workflows
Hardens GitHub Actions workflows against supply chain attacks, credential
v1.0.03 instalaciones+3 en 7 días36,3 mil EstrellasApache-2.0sincronizado hace 11 horas
Instalar
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FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete7a69d3aa…14a4f7dd
7a69d3aa3f36…d7bb14a4f7dd8 archivos · 12.5 KBEscaneoMedio3 hallazgos
- Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
- Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
- Enlaces a dominios externos
Fuentegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/securing-github-actions-workflows@54a7988
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When to Use
- When GitHub Actions is the CI/CD platform and workflows need hardening against supply chain attacks
- When workflows handle secrets, deploy to production, or have elevated permissions
- When preventing script injection via untrusted PR titles, branch names, or commit messages
- When requiring audit trails and approval gates for workflow modifications
- When third-party actions pose supply chain risk through mutable version tags
Do not use for securing other CI/CD platforms (see platform-specific hardening guides), for application vulnerability scanning (use SAST/DAST), or for secret detection in code (use Gitleaks).
Prerequisites
- GitHub repository with GitHub Actions enabled
- GitHub organization admin access for organization-level settings
- Understanding of GitHub Actions workflow syntax and events
Workflow
Step 1: Pin Actions to SHA Digests
# INSECURE: Mutable tag can be overwritten by attacker
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
# SECURE: Pinned to immutable SHA digest
- uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11 # v4.1.1
# Use Dependabot to auto-update pinned SHAs
# .github/dependabot.yml
version: 2
updates:
- package-ecosystem: "github-actions"
directory: "/"
schedule:
interval: "weekly"
commit-message:
prefix: "ci"Step 2: Minimize GITHUB_TOKEN Permissions
# Set restrictive default permissions at workflow level
name: CI Pipeline
permissions: {} # Start with no permissions
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
build:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read # Only what's needed
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11
deploy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
needs: build
if: github.ref == 'refs/heads/main'
permissions:
contents: read
deployments: write
id-token: write # For OIDC-based cloud auth
steps:
- name: Deploy
run: echo "deploying"Step 3: Prevent Script Injection
# VULNERABLE: User-controlled input in run step
- run: echo "PR title is ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}"
# SECURE: Use environment variable (properly escaped by shell)
- name: Process PR
env:
PR_TITLE: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
PR_BODY: ${{ github.event.pull_request.body }}
run: |
echo "PR title is ${PR_TITLE}"
echo "PR body is ${PR_BODY}"
# SECURE: Use actions/github-script for complex operations
- uses: actions/github-script@60a0d83039c74a4aee543508d2ffcb1c3799cdea
with:
script: |
const title = context.payload.pull_request.title;
console.log(`PR title: ${title}`);Step 4: Secure Fork Pull Request Handling
# DANGEROUS: pull_request_target runs with base repo permissions
# on: pull_request_target # AVOID unless absolutely necessary
# SAFE: pull_request runs in fork context with limited permissions
on:
pull_request:
branches: [main]
# If pull_request_target is required, never checkout PR code:
on:
pull_request_target:
types: [labeled]
jobs:
safe-job:
if: contains(github.event.pull_request.labels.*.name, 'safe-to-test')
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
permissions:
contents: read
steps:
# NEVER do: actions/checkout with ref: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
- uses: actions/checkout@b4ffde65f46336ab88eb53be808477a3936bae11
# This checks out the BASE branch, not the PRStep 5: Protect Secrets and Environment Variables
jobs:
deploy:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
environment: production # Requires approval
steps:
- name: Deploy with secret
env:
# Secrets are masked in logs automatically
DEPLOY_KEY: ${{ secrets.DEPLOY_KEY }}
run: |
# Never echo secrets
# echo "$DEPLOY_KEY" # BAD
deploy-tool --key-file <(echo "$DEPLOY_KEY")
- name: Audit secret access
run: |
# Log that secret was used without exposing it
echo "::notice::Deploy key accessed for production deployment"Step 6: Implement Workflow Change Controls
# Require CODEOWNERS approval for workflow changes
# .github/CODEOWNERS
.github/workflows/ @security-team @platform-team
.github/actions/ @security-team @platform-team
# Organization settings:
# 1. Settings > Actions > General > Fork PR policies
# - Require approval for first-time contributors
# - Require approval for all outside collaborators
# 2. Settings > Actions > General > Workflow permissions
# - Read repository contents and packages permissions
# - Do NOT allow GitHub Actions to create and approve PRsKey Concepts
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| SHA Pinning | Referencing GitHub Actions by their immutable commit SHA instead of mutable version tags |
| Script Injection | Attack where untrusted input (PR title, branch name) is interpolated into shell commands |
| GITHUB_TOKEN | Automatically generated token with configurable permissions scoped to the current repository |
| pull_request_target | Dangerous event trigger that runs in the base repo context with full permissions on fork PRs |
| Environment Protection | GitHub feature requiring manual approval before jobs accessing an environment can run |
| CODEOWNERS | File defining required reviewers for specific paths including workflow files |
| OIDC Federation | Using GitHub's OIDC token to authenticate to cloud providers without storing long-lived credentials |
Tools & Systems
- Dependabot: Automated dependency updater that keeps pinned action SHAs current
- StepSecurity Harden Runner: GitHub Action that monitors and restricts outbound network calls from workflows
- actionlint: Linter for GitHub Actions workflow files that detects security issues
- allstar: GitHub App by OpenSSF that enforces security policies on repositories
- scorecard: OpenSSF tool that evaluates supply chain security practices including CI/CD
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Preventing Supply Chain Attack via Compromised Third-Party Action
Context: A widely-used GitHub Action is compromised and its v3 tag is updated to include credential-stealing code. Repositories using @v3 automatically pull the malicious version.
Approach:
- Pin all actions to SHA digests immediately across all repositories
- Configure Dependabot for github-actions ecosystem to manage SHA updates
- Restrict GITHUB_TOKEN permissions so even compromised actions have minimal access
- Add StepSecurity harden-runner to detect anomalous outbound network calls
- Review all third-party actions and replace unnecessary ones with inline scripts
- Require CODEOWNERS approval for any changes to .github/workflows/
Pitfalls: SHA pinning without Dependabot means missing legitimate security updates to actions. Overly restrictive permissions can break legitimate workflows. Using pull_request_target for label-based gating still exposes secrets if the workflow checks out PR code.
Output Format
GitHub Actions Security Audit
================================
Repository: org/web-application
Date: 2026-02-23
WORKFLOW ANALYSIS:
Total workflows: 8
Total action references: 34
SHA PINNING:
[FAIL] 12/34 actions use mutable tags instead of SHA digests
- .github/workflows/ci.yml: actions/setup-node@v4
- .github/workflows/deploy.yml: aws-actions/configure-aws-credentials@v4
PERMISSIONS:
[FAIL] 3/8 workflows have no explicit permissions (inherit default)
[WARN] 1/8 workflows request write-all permissions
SCRIPT INJECTION:
[FAIL] 2 workflow steps interpolate user input directly
- .github/workflows/pr-check.yml:23: ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}
SECRETS:
[PASS] No secrets exposed in workflow logs
[PASS] All production deployments use environment protection
SCORE: 6/10 (Remediate 5 HIGH findings)Archivos de esta versión
assets/11016 B
- template.md1016 B
references/34.1 KB
- api-reference.md1.8 KB
- standards.md1.1 KB
- workflows.md1.2 KB
scripts/215.4 KB
- agent.py8.1 KB
- process.py7.4 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md8.5 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | Sí | Sí |
| Escribe archivos | Sí | Sí |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | Sí | Sí |
| Usa la red | Sí | Sí |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
- MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/agent.py
- MediaArchivo · Script ejecutable incluido con la skillscripts/process.py
- InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0.0 | 13 nov 2026 | 54a7988 | 7a69d3aa | Firmada | – |
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