detecting-azure-service-principal-abuse
Detect Azure service principal abuse in Microsoft Entra ID using KQL detection
v1.03 установки+3 за 7 дней36,3 тыс. ЗвездыApache-2.0синхронизировано 12 часов назад
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ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
Пакетd7365cd7…2abae4e2
d7365cd7a8cb…95a92abae4e28 файлов · 11.9 KBПроверкаВысокий5 замечаний
- injection.system_promptscripts/process.py:30
- injection.system_promptscripts/process.py:78
- Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
Источникgithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-azure-service-principal-abuse@54a7988
Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.
На странице
Overview
Azure service principals are identity objects used by applications, services, and automation tools to access Azure resources. Attackers exploit service principals for privilege escalation, lateral movement, and persistent access. Key abuse patterns include: adding credentials to existing principals, assigning privileged roles, bypassing admin consent, and enumerating service principals for attack paths. Application ownership grants the ability to manage credentials and configure permissions, creating hidden privilege escalation paths.
When to Use
- When investigating security incidents that require detecting azure service principal abuse
- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain
- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type
- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques
Prerequisites
- Azure subscription with Microsoft Entra ID P2 license
- Access to Azure AD Audit Logs and Sign-in Logs
- Microsoft Sentinel or Splunk for SIEM-based detection
- Microsoft Graph API permissions for investigation
- Global Reader or Security Reader role minimum
Key Abuse Patterns
1. New Credentials Added to Service Principal
Attackers add new client secrets or certificates to gain persistent access:
Detection Query (KQL - Sentinel):
AuditLogs
| where OperationName has "Add service principal credentials"
or OperationName has "Update application - Certificates and secrets management"
| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| extend TargetSP = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend TargetSPId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, OperationName, TargetSP, TargetSPId
| sort by TimeGenerated descDetection Query (SPL - Splunk):
index=azure sourcetype="azure:aad:audit"
operationName="Add service principal credentials"
OR operationName="Update application*Certificates and secrets*"
| stats count by initiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName, targetResources{}.displayName, _time
| sort -_time2. Privileged Role Assignment to Service Principal
AuditLogs
| where OperationName == "Add member to role"
| extend RoleName = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[1].newValue)
| where RoleName has_any ("Global Administrator", "Application Administrator",
"Privileged Role Administrator", "Cloud Application Administrator")
| extend TargetSP = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, TargetSP, RoleName, OperationName3. Service Principal Enumeration Detection
MicrosoftGraphActivityLogs
| where RequestMethod == "GET"
| where RequestUri has "/servicePrincipals"
| summarize RequestCount = count() by UserAgent, IPAddress, bin(TimeGenerated, 1h)
| where RequestCount > 10
| sort by RequestCount desc4. Admin Consent Bypass
AuditLogs
| where OperationName == "Consent to application"
| extend ConsentType = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[4].newValue)
| where ConsentType has "AllPrincipals"
| extend AppName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| extend InitiatedBy = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
| project TimeGenerated, InitiatedBy, AppName, ConsentType5. OAuth App Permissions Escalation
AuditLogs
| where OperationName == "Add app role assignment to service principal"
| extend AppRoleValue = tostring(TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties[1].newValue)
| where AppRoleValue has_any ("RoleManagement.ReadWrite.Directory",
"Application.ReadWrite.All", "AppRoleAssignment.ReadWrite.All",
"Directory.ReadWrite.All", "Mail.ReadWrite")
| extend TargetApp = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
| project TimeGenerated, TargetApp, AppRoleValue, CorrelationIdInvestigation Procedures
Step 1: Identify compromised service principal
# List service principals with recently added credentials
Connect-MgGraph -Scopes "Application.Read.All"
$suspiciousSPs = Get-MgServicePrincipal -All | ForEach-Object {
$sp = $_
$creds = Get-MgServicePrincipalPasswordCredential -ServicePrincipalId $sp.Id
$recentCreds = $creds | Where-Object { $_.StartDateTime -gt (Get-Date).AddDays(-7) }
if ($recentCreds) {
[PSCustomObject]@{
DisplayName = $sp.DisplayName
AppId = $sp.AppId
ObjectId = $sp.Id
NewCredsCount = $recentCreds.Count
LatestCredAdded = ($recentCreds | Sort-Object StartDateTime -Descending | Select-Object -First 1).StartDateTime
}
}
}
$suspiciousSPs | Sort-Object LatestCredAdded -DescendingStep 2: Review service principal role assignments
# Check role assignments for a specific service principal
$spId = "<service-principal-object-id>"
Get-MgServicePrincipalAppRoleAssignment -ServicePrincipalId $spId | ForEach-Object {
$resource = Get-MgServicePrincipal -ServicePrincipalId $_.ResourceId
[PSCustomObject]@{
AppRoleId = $_.AppRoleId
ResourceDisplayName = $resource.DisplayName
CreatedDateTime = $_.CreatedDateTime
}
}Step 3: Check application ownership
# List owners of all applications (ownership = credential control)
Get-MgApplication -All | ForEach-Object {
$app = $_
$owners = Get-MgApplicationOwner -ApplicationId $app.Id
foreach ($owner in $owners) {
[PSCustomObject]@{
AppName = $app.DisplayName
AppId = $app.AppId
OwnerUPN = $owner.AdditionalProperties.userPrincipalName
OwnerType = $owner.AdditionalProperties.'@odata.type'
}
}
} | Where-Object { $_.OwnerUPN -ne $null }Step 4: Review sign-in activity
AADServicePrincipalSignInLogs
| where ServicePrincipalId == "<target-sp-id>"
| project TimeGenerated, ServicePrincipalName, IPAddress, Location,
ResourceDisplayName, Status.errorCode
| sort by TimeGenerated descPreventive Controls
Restrict application registration
# Disable user ability to register applications
Update-MgPolicyAuthorizationPolicy -DefaultUserRolePermissions @{
AllowedToCreateApps = $false
}Configure app consent policies
# Require admin approval for all app consent requests
New-MgPolicyPermissionGrantPolicy -Id "admin-only-consent" `
-DisplayName "Admin Only Consent" `
-Description "Only admins can consent to applications"Monitor with Microsoft Sentinel Analytics Rules
Create analytics rules for:
- New service principal credential additions
- Privileged role assignments to service principals
- Bulk service principal enumeration
- Admin consent grants to unknown applications
- Service principal sign-ins from unusual locations
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping
| Technique | ID | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials | T1098.001 | Adding credentials to service principal |
| Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | T1078.004 | Using compromised service principal |
| Account Discovery: Cloud Account | T1087.004 | Enumerating service principals |
| Steal Application Access Token | T1528 | OAuth token theft via service principal |
References
- Splunk Detection: Azure AD Service Principal Abuse
- Semperis: Service Principal Ownership Abuse in Entra ID
- MITRE ATT&CK Cloud Matrix
- Microsoft: Securing service principals in Entra ID
Файлы этой версии
assets/1929 B
- template.md929 B
references/34.1 KB
- api-reference.md2.4 KB
- standards.md878 B
- workflows.md902 B
scripts/215.2 KB
- agent.py6.7 KB
- process.py8.5 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md8.4 KB
Права
| Право | Заявлено | Найдено проверкой |
|---|---|---|
| Читает файлы | Нет | Нет |
| Пишет файлы | Да | Да |
| Выполняет команды shell | Да | Да |
| Ходит в сеть | Да | Да |
| Использует коннекторы | Нет | Нет |
| Управляет браузером | Нет | Нет |
Замечания проверки
Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.
- ВысокаяPrompt injection · injection.system_promptscripts/process.py:30
- ВысокаяPrompt injection · injection.system_promptscripts/process.py:78
- СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
- СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/process.py
- ИнфоСсылка · Ссылки на внешние домены
Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.
| Версия | Опубликована | Коммит | SHA-256 | Подпись | Изменение прав |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 нояб. 2026 г. | 54a7988 | d7365cd7 | Подписана | – |
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