detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk
Detect adversary lateral movement across networks using Splunk SPL queries
v1.03 установки+3 за 7 дней36,3 тыс. ЗвездыApache-2.0синхронизировано 12 часов назад
Установка
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install mukul975/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunkПишет в ~/.notholy/skills после проверки подписи и SHA-256.
ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
Пакет29e610af…a56f5b2c
29e610afe9ca…886ea56f5b2c8 файлов · 13.4 KBПроверкаСредний3 замечания
- Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
- Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/process.py
- Ссылки на внешние домены
Источникgithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk@54a7988
Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.
На странице
When to Use
- When hunting for adversary movement between compromised systems
- After detecting credential theft to trace subsequent lateral activity
- When investigating unusual authentication patterns across the network
- During incident response to scope the breadth of compromise
- When proactively hunting for TA0008 (Lateral Movement) techniques
Prerequisites
- Splunk Enterprise or Splunk Cloud with Windows event data ingested
- Windows Security Event Logs forwarded (4624, 4625, 4648, 4672, 4768, 4769)
- Sysmon deployed for process creation and network connection data
- Network flow data or firewall logs for SMB/RDP/WinRM correlation
- Active Directory user and group membership reference data
Workflow
- Define Lateral Movement Scope: Identify which lateral movement techniques to hunt (RDP, SMB/Admin Shares, WinRM, PsExec, WMI, DCOM, SSH).
- Query Authentication Events: Use SPL to search for Type 3 (Network) and Type 10 (RemoteInteractive) logons across the environment.
- Build Authentication Graphs: Map source-to-destination authentication relationships to identify unusual connection patterns.
- Detect First-Time Relationships: Identify new source-destination pairs that have not been seen in the historical baseline.
- Correlate with Process Activity: Link authentication events to subsequent process creation on destination hosts.
- Identify Anomalous Patterns: Flag lateral movement to sensitive servers, unusual hours, service account misuse, or rapid multi-host access.
- Report and Contain: Document lateral movement path, affected systems, and coordinate containment response.
Key Concepts
| Concept | Description |
|---|---|
| T1021 | Remote Services (parent technique) |
| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) |
| T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares |
| T1021.003 | Distributed COM (DCOM) |
| T1021.004 | SSH |
| T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management (WinRM) |
| T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer |
| T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation |
| T1569.002 | Service Execution (PsExec) |
| Logon Type 3 | Network logon (SMB, WinRM, mapped drives) |
| Logon Type 10 | Remote Interactive (RDP) |
| Event ID 4624 | Successful logon |
| Event ID 4648 | Explicit credential logon (runas, PsExec) |
Tools & Systems
| Tool | Purpose |
|---|---|
| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM for log aggregation and SPL queries |
| Splunk Enterprise Security | Threat detection and notable events |
| Windows Event Forwarding | Centralize Windows logs |
| Sysmon | Detailed process and network telemetry |
| BloodHound | AD attack path analysis |
| PingCastle | AD security assessment |
Common Scenarios
- PsExec Lateral Movement: Adversary uses PsExec to execute commands on remote systems via SMB, generating Type 3 logon with ADMIN$ share access.
- RDP Pivoting: Attacker RDPs to internal systems using stolen credentials, creating Type 10 logon events.
- WMI Remote Execution: Adversary uses WMIC process call create to spawn processes on remote hosts.
- WinRM PowerShell Remoting: Attacker uses Enter-PSSession or Invoke-Command to execute code on remote systems.
- Pass-the-Hash via SMB: Compromised NTLM hashes used to authenticate to remote systems without knowing the plaintext password.
Output Format
Hunt ID: TH-LATMOV-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Movement Type: [RDP/SMB/WinRM/WMI/DCOM/PsExec]
Source Host: [Hostname/IP]
Destination Host: [Hostname/IP]
Account Used: [Username]
Logon Type: [3/10/other]
First Seen: [Timestamp]
Event Count: [Number of events]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Lateral Movement Path: [A -> B -> C -> D]Файлы этой версии
assets/11.2 KB
- template.md1.2 KB
references/38.7 KB
- api-reference.md1.5 KB
- standards.md2.6 KB
- workflows.md4.6 KB
scripts/217.4 KB
- agent.py4.9 KB
- process.py12.5 KB
- LICENSE11.0 KB
- SKILL.md4.5 KB
Права
| Право | Заявлено | Найдено проверкой |
|---|---|---|
| Читает файлы | Нет | Нет |
| Пишет файлы | Да | Да |
| Выполняет команды shell | Да | Да |
| Ходит в сеть | Да | Да |
| Использует коннекторы | Нет | Нет |
| Управляет браузером | Нет | Нет |
Замечания проверки
Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.
- СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/agent.py
- СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/process.py
- ИнфоСсылка · Ссылки на внешние домены
Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.
| Версия | Опубликована | Коммит | SHA-256 | Подпись | Изменение прав |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v1.0 | 13 нояб. 2026 г. | 54a7988 | 29e610af | Подписана | – |
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