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mukul975/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunkDFIR and threat hunting

detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk

⁨Detect adversary lateral movement across networks using Splunk SPL queries⁩

v1.03 installs+3 in 7 days36.3K StarsApache-2.0synced 12 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install mukul975/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
5q2GrxyMTY…nB49CnCQ==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Package29e610af…a56f5b2c
29e610afe9ca…886ea56f5b2c8 files · ⁦13.4 KB⁩
ScanMedium3 findings
  • Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
  • Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
  • Links to outside domains
See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/mukul975/Anthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills/tree/main/skills/detecting-lateral-movement-with-splunk@54a7988

When to Use

  • When hunting for adversary movement between compromised systems
  • After detecting credential theft to trace subsequent lateral activity
  • When investigating unusual authentication patterns across the network
  • During incident response to scope the breadth of compromise
  • When proactively hunting for TA0008 (Lateral Movement) techniques

Prerequisites

  • Splunk Enterprise or Splunk Cloud with Windows event data ingested
  • Windows Security Event Logs forwarded (4624, 4625, 4648, 4672, 4768, 4769)
  • Sysmon deployed for process creation and network connection data
  • Network flow data or firewall logs for SMB/RDP/WinRM correlation
  • Active Directory user and group membership reference data

Workflow

  1. Define Lateral Movement Scope: Identify which lateral movement techniques to hunt (RDP, SMB/Admin Shares, WinRM, PsExec, WMI, DCOM, SSH).
  2. Query Authentication Events: Use SPL to search for Type 3 (Network) and Type 10 (RemoteInteractive) logons across the environment.
  3. Build Authentication Graphs: Map source-to-destination authentication relationships to identify unusual connection patterns.
  4. Detect First-Time Relationships: Identify new source-destination pairs that have not been seen in the historical baseline.
  5. Correlate with Process Activity: Link authentication events to subsequent process creation on destination hosts.
  6. Identify Anomalous Patterns: Flag lateral movement to sensitive servers, unusual hours, service account misuse, or rapid multi-host access.
  7. Report and Contain: Document lateral movement path, affected systems, and coordinate containment response.

Key Concepts

Concept Description
T1021 Remote Services (parent technique)
T1021.001 Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP)
T1021.002 SMB/Windows Admin Shares
T1021.003 Distributed COM (DCOM)
T1021.004 SSH
T1021.006 Windows Remote Management (WinRM)
T1570 Lateral Tool Transfer
T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation
T1569.002 Service Execution (PsExec)
Logon Type 3 Network logon (SMB, WinRM, mapped drives)
Logon Type 10 Remote Interactive (RDP)
Event ID 4624 Successful logon
Event ID 4648 Explicit credential logon (runas, PsExec)

Tools & Systems

Tool Purpose
Splunk Enterprise SIEM for log aggregation and SPL queries
Splunk Enterprise Security Threat detection and notable events
Windows Event Forwarding Centralize Windows logs
Sysmon Detailed process and network telemetry
BloodHound AD attack path analysis
PingCastle AD security assessment

Common Scenarios

  1. PsExec Lateral Movement: Adversary uses PsExec to execute commands on remote systems via SMB, generating Type 3 logon with ADMIN$ share access.
  2. RDP Pivoting: Attacker RDPs to internal systems using stolen credentials, creating Type 10 logon events.
  3. WMI Remote Execution: Adversary uses WMIC process call create to spawn processes on remote hosts.
  4. WinRM PowerShell Remoting: Attacker uses Enter-PSSession or Invoke-Command to execute code on remote systems.
  5. Pass-the-Hash via SMB: Compromised NTLM hashes used to authenticate to remote systems without knowing the plaintext password.

Output Format

text
Hunt ID: TH-LATMOV-[DATE]-[SEQ]
Movement Type: [RDP/SMB/WinRM/WMI/DCOM/PsExec]
Source Host: [Hostname/IP]
Destination Host: [Hostname/IP]
Account Used: [Username]
Logon Type: [3/10/other]
First Seen: [Timestamp]
Event Count: [Number of events]
Risk Level: [Critical/High/Medium/Low]
Lateral Movement Path: [A -> B -> C -> D]

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesYesYes
Runs shell commandsYesYes
Uses the networkYesYes
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

  1. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/agent.py
  2. MediumFile · Executable script shipped with the skillscripts/process.py
  3. InfoLink · Links to outside domains

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v1.0Nov 13, 202654a798829e610afSigned–

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