linux-internals-dev
Auth/lab dev: Linux internals; ELF loading and program startup, procfs, namespaces/caps, eBPF verifier/maps, LSM hooks for tooling/telemetry design.
v2026.11.13-21cd5683 установки+3 за 7 дней39 ЗвездыMITсинхронизировано 10 часов назад
Установка
Ещё нет NotHoly CLI? Сначала установите её.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install aeondave/linux-internals-devПишет в ~/.notholy/skills после проверки подписи и SHA-256.
ПодписьПодписано, ed25519
Пакет41fefbd6…3f4f7f25
41fefbd6ef79…a5443f4f7f258 файлов · 22.6 KBПроверкаСредний3 замечания
- injection.no_confirmationreferences/syscall-dispatch-linux.md:226
- Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/vdso_gadget_extract.py
- Ссылки на внешние домены
Источникgithub.com/AeonDave/malskill/tree/main/offensive-coding/linux-internals-dev@21cd568
Эта запись еще не переведена на русский, поэтому показан текст на другом языке: English.
На странице
Deep Linux internals for practitioners who need to reason below libc and framework abstractions.
This skill is for structural mechanics: what the kernel and loader actually do, what invariants hold, what breaks across versions, and where detection surfaces appear.
When to activate
- You are writing or reviewing custom ELF loaders, in-memory execution, or reflective mapping logic
- You are diagnosing execution before
mainor checking an old startup diagram against the target libc and toolchain - You are parsing
/procfor process, memory, mount, or namespace intelligence and need race-safe interpretation - You are building namespace or container boundary logic with
clone,unshare,setns, or pidfd flows - You are loading eBPF programs and debugging verifier failures, helper constraints, map lifetime, or attach semantics
- You are reasoning about LSM policy behavior, hook order, and process security attribute surfaces
- You need to explain detection and hardening implications of low-level Linux behavior
If the task is ordinary userland API usage, this skill is overkill. If the task is ABI and kernel boundary mechanics, use this skill first.
Territory map
| Domain | File | Covers |
|---|---|---|
| ELF and dynamic linking | references/elf-format.md |
Load when parsing ELF or tracing interpreter entry, executable entry, libc startup, initializers, and termination |
| procfs semantics | references/procfs.md |
/proc layout, ptrace-gated visibility, maps and smaps races, hidepid, mountinfo and pidns interactions |
| Namespaces and isolation | references/namespaces.md |
namespace APIs, ownership and capability checks, pid and user namespace rules, lifetime pinning |
| Syscall dispatch internals | references/syscall-dispatch-linux.md |
x86-64/aarch64 syscall ABI, vDSO gadget extraction (mseal/getrandom changes), dispatch modes (indirect/direct/seccomp-notify/memfd), hooking landscape (LD_PRELOAD/seccomp/eBPF/io_uring with per-version LSM timeline), eBPF rootkit variants (LinkPro/VoidLink/SPiCa/BPFDoor), .eh_frame stack spoofing (open field), kernel hardening per-version table, Landlock progression |
| eBPF architecture | references/ebpf.md |
bpf() command families, map and program lifecycle, verifier model, helper constraints, attach and pin patterns |
| LSM model | references/lsm.md |
LSM stacking and ordering, active module discovery, process attr interfaces, hook surfaces and development implications |
Quick invariants
| Area | Invariant |
|---|---|
| ELF | Runtime loading is driven by program headers, not section headers |
| ELF | PT_LOAD: p_filesz <= p_memsz; trailing bytes are zero-filled in memory |
| procfs | Access to many /proc/pid/* files for other processes is ptrace capability gated |
| procfs | Reading maps and smaps is inherently racy except single-read snapshots |
| namespaces | Joining namespaces requires capability checks in both current and owning user namespaces |
| pid namespaces | A process cannot move to an ancestor PID namespace |
| syscalls (x86-64) | Arg4 is in r10, not rcx; syscall clobbers rcx and r11 |
| eBPF | Verifier must prove termination, type safety, bounds safety, and reference release on all paths |
| eBPF | Helper calls can invalidate packet pointer proofs; bounds checks often must be redone |
| LSM | Active LSM order matters; checks run in configured order, capability module first |
| LSM | /sys/kernel/security/lsm reflects the active stack and check order |
Decision flow: choose the right subsystem lens
Issue is binary load or symbol resolution behavior
- Start in
elf-format.md - Validate
PT_INTERP,DT_NEEDED,DT_RPATHandDT_RUNPATH, then relocation type flow
- Start in
Issue is process or memory inspection mismatch
- Start in
procfs.md - Validate ptrace permission model,
hidepidmode, and map-read race conditions
- Start in
Issue is container boundary or namespace transition
- Start in
namespaces.md - Validate ownership user namespace, capability context, and one-way PID namespace movement
- Start in
Issue is syscall origin, anti-hooking, or low-level ABI behavior
- Start in
syscall-dispatch-linux.md - Validate calling convention (
r10/rcx), dispatch source (vDSO vs libc vs direct), and fallback implications
Issue is eBPF load rejection or runtime attach surprises
- Start in
ebpf.md - Read verifier error class first, then map/program refs and attach target constraints
- Start in
Issue is policy enforcement or security hook behavior
- Start in
lsm.md - Confirm active stack and hook order before attributing allow or deny outcomes
- Start in
Detection and hardening surface checklist
Use this whenever implementing a low-level technique.
- ELF path
- Does behavior depend on dynamic linker search path state such as RUNPATH, cache, preload, or secure-exec stripping?
- procfs path
- Are you assuming stable snapshots from files documented as racy?
- Are you accidentally leaking sensitive args or env due to permissive proc mount options?
- namespace path
- Are capability checks evaluated in the expected owning user namespace?
- Could namespace lifetime be pinned by open descriptors or bind mounts?
- syscall path
- Is the syscall instruction sourced from the location you think it is (vDSO/libc/direct asm), and does that match your telemetry assumptions?
- Are x86-64 register conventions respected for 4-6 argument syscalls?
- eBPF path
- Are helper or map choices constrained by program type and privilege model?
- Are verifier assumptions broken by helper-induced packet buffer changes?
- LSM path
- Is behavior due to stacked module ordering rather than a single policy engine?
- Are process attrs read from module-specific paths versus legacy aggregate paths?
Pitfalls
- Treating section headers as mandatory at runtime for execution behavior
- Assuming
DT_RPATHandDT_RUNPATHare equivalent in dependency traversal - Assuming
/proc/pid/mapspartial reads are stable under concurrent VMA changes - Forgetting
hidepidand ptrace gating when process inventory appears incomplete - Expecting
setnsto move the caller itself into a new PID namespace instead of affecting future children - Trying to reenter same user namespace to regain dropped capabilities
- Passing syscall arg4 in
rcxinstead ofr10on x86-64 and then debugging phantom failures - Assuming all direct-syscall approaches have the same observable syscall origin in kernel telemetry
- Ignoring eBPF reference-release paths after socket lookup helpers
- Debugging eBPF without verifier logs, then guessing blindly
- Attributing policy outcomes to one LSM without checking active stack order
Resources
references/elf-format.mdfor loader/relocation mechanics and a reproducible pre-mainstartup tracereferences/procfs.mdfor process and memory introspection semanticsreferences/namespaces.mdfor isolation model and transition constraintsreferences/syscall-dispatch-linux.mdfor syscall ABI, dispatch-source tradeoffs, hooking landscape (LD_PRELOAD / seccomp / eBPF / io_uring), vDSO gadget extraction, .eh_frame comparison with Windows .pdata, and fallback designreferences/ebpf.mdfor verifier and syscall-level eBPF operationsreferences/lsm.mdfor LSM architecture and policy interaction modelscripts/vdso_gadget_extract.pyfor enumerating syscall gadgets from vDSO and libc on a running Linux system (Linux only)
Файлы этой версии
references/641.7 KB
- ebpf.md4.0 KB
- elf-format.md9.4 KB
- lsm.md2.8 KB
- namespaces.md3.7 KB
- procfs.md3.7 KB
- syscall-dispatch-linux.md18.2 KB
scripts/111.6 KB
- vdso_gadget_extract.py11.6 KB
- SKILL.md7.8 KB
Права
| Право | Заявлено | Найдено проверкой |
|---|---|---|
| Читает файлы | Да | Да |
| Пишет файлы | Да | Да |
| Выполняет команды shell | Да | Да |
| Ходит в сеть | Да | Да |
| Использует коннекторы | Нет | Нет |
| Управляет браузером | Нет | Нет |
Замечания проверки
Проверено 13 нояб. 2026 г.
- СредняяPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationreferences/syscall-dispatch-linux.md:226
- СредняяФайл · Исполняемый скрипт в составе навыкаscripts/vdso_gadget_extract.py
- ИнфоСсылка · Ссылки на внешние домены
Чистая проверка снижает риск, но не доказывает, что пакет безопасен. Читайте то, что ставите.
| Версия | Опубликована | Коммит | SHA-256 | Подпись | Изменение прав |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.11.13-21cd568 | 13 нояб. 2026 г. | 21cd568 | 41fefbd6 | Подписана | – |
Ещё от AeonDave
Всё от этого издателяЕще в категории «Linux, облака и контейнеры»
Вся категория- detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehogmukul975/detecting-aws-credential-exposure-with-trufflehog5
- cloud-gcpnoorqureshi/cloud-gcp4
- container-image-hardeningsecurityskills/container-image-hardening3
- performing-cloud-incident-containment-proceduresmukul975/performing-cloud-incident-containment-procedures3
- implementing-taxii-server-with-opentaxiimukul975/implementing-taxii-server-with-opentaxii3
- detecting-cryptomining-in-cloudmukul975/detecting-cryptomining-in-cloud3
Спрашивайте обо всём, что позволяет ваш скоуп.
Создайте аккаунт, пополните баланс и задайте первый вопрос в чате или в терминале.
- 1/3
Создайте аккаунт
Личный или для компании. Позже можно перейти на аккаунт компании без потери баланса и ключей.
ЛичныйКомпания - 2/3
Пополните баланс
Картой. Оплата за токены, без подписки.
$5.00минимальное пополнение - 3/3
Спрашивайте
В чате, или установите CLI и выполните notholy login в терминале.
$ notholy login