wireless-evil-twin
Stand up a rogue/evil-twin access point to harvest credentials — WPA2-Enterprise PEAP-MSCHAPv2 challenge/response and captive-portal capture. Load on an authorized wireless engagement targeting WPA-Enterprise (802.1X) or a portal-based network. Signals: PEAP/EAP/802.1X, RADIUS, "enterprise Wi-Fi", e
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa
Installa
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$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/wireless-evil-twinScrive in ~/.notholy/skills dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.
FirmaFirmato, ed25519
Pacchettoc244ffd0…97be7e85
c244ffd020c2…80c997be7e851 file · 1.7 KBScansioneBassonessuna segnalazione
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/wireless/wireless-evil-twin@ee0e0c5
Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.
In questa pagina
When it applies
An authorized assessment of a WPA2-Enterprise (802.1X) network, or a captive-portal Wi-Fi, where
clients can be lured to a look-alike AP. pentest-only, in-scope SSIDs recorded in scope.txt, and
coordinated so you only capture test/consenting users' credentials per RoE.
Why it works
WPA2-Enterprise authenticates users to a RADIUS server, but many clients don't properly validate the RADIUS server's certificate. A rogue AP advertising the same SSID can complete enough of the PEAP-MSCHAPv2 exchange to capture each user's username + MSCHAPv2 challenge/response, which cracks offline to the domain password. Captive portals simply hand you the credentials the user types.
Method
- Profile the target (
wireless-wpa2-attacksrecon): SSID, the EAP type (PEAP/EAP-TTLS), and whether clients validate the server cert (they often don't). - Stand up the evil twin.
eaphammer(orhostapd-wpe):eaphammer --cert-wizardtheneaphammer -i wlan0 --essid <SSID> --creds— advertises the SSID and runs a rogue RADIUS that logs credentials. - Lure clients — same SSID (and, per RoE, a stronger signal / brief targeted deauth of the real AP to prompt roaming). Keep disruption minimal and in-scope.
- Capture & crack the PEAP-MSCHAPv2 username + challenge/response:
hashcat -m 5500 netntlm.txt wordlist(orasleap) → domain password. - Captive-portal variant — clone the portal page on the rogue AP to capture typed creds
directly; disclose per the SE guardrails in
social-eng-methodology. - Pivot — validated creds feed
network-password-spraying, VPN/OWA access, and AD work.
Gotchas
- You're capturing real people's credentials — this is human-adjacent: only in-scope SSIDs,
coordinate with the client, minimize capture, and protect/destroy what you collect per RoE (treat
like
social-engdata discipline). - Cert validation defeats it — clients that properly pin/validate the RADIUS cert won't leak; that's the positive finding (report "clients validate the server cert").
- Deauth/luring can be disruptive and out of RoE — confirm before forcing roaming.
- MSCHAPv2 capture format must match hashcat
-m 5500exactly — use the tool's emitted format. - Legal line — capturing enterprise creds without explicit authorization is illegal; stop if
scope is unclear (
tradecraft-scope-roe).
Verify success
Captured PEAP-MSCHAPv2 credentials that crack to a working domain password (or portal creds that authenticate) — for in-scope, authorized users only, with a "clients don't validate the RADIUS cert" root cause for the report.
References
eaphammer / hostapd-wpe docs; hashcat mode 5500; PEAP-MSCHAPv2 weaknesses. Data discipline:
social-eng-methodology; follow-on: network-password-spraying.
File di questa versione
- SKILL.md3.5 KB
Permessi
| Permesso | Dichiarato | Trovato dalla scansione |
|---|---|---|
| Legge file | No | No |
| Scrive file | No | No |
| Esegue comandi shell | No | No |
| Usa la rete | No | No |
| Usa i connettori | No | No |
| Controlla un browser | No | No |
Segnalazioni della scansione
Rivisto il 13 nov 2026
La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.
Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.
| Versione | Pubblicata | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio di permessi |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | c244ffd0 | Firmata | – |
Altro da NoorQureshi
Tutto da questo editoreAltro in Rete, wireless e telecomunicazioni
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