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How it works
noorqureshi/wireless-evil-twinNetwork, wireless and telecom

wireless-evil-twin

⁨Stand up a rogue/evil-twin access point to harvest credentials — WPA2-Enterprise PEAP-MSCHAPv2 challenge/response and captive-portal capture. Load on an authorized wireless engagement targeting WPA-Enterprise (802.1X) or a portal-based network. Signals: PEAP/EAP/802.1X, RADIUS, "enterprise Wi-Fi", e⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago

Install

No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/wireless-evil-twin

Writes to ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ after checking the signature and the SHA-256.

SignatureSigned, ed25519
mndXVd34hu…YxLUJ7CA==The CLI checks the SHA-256 and the signature before it writes a file.
Packagec244ffd0…97be7e85
c244ffd020c2…80c997be7e851 file · ⁦1.7 KB⁩
ScanLowno findings
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.See the full scan
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/wireless/wireless-evil-twin@ee0e0c5

When it applies

An authorized assessment of a WPA2-Enterprise (802.1X) network, or a captive-portal Wi-Fi, where clients can be lured to a look-alike AP. pentest-only, in-scope SSIDs recorded in scope.txt, and coordinated so you only capture test/consenting users' credentials per RoE.

Why it works

WPA2-Enterprise authenticates users to a RADIUS server, but many clients don't properly validate the RADIUS server's certificate. A rogue AP advertising the same SSID can complete enough of the PEAP-MSCHAPv2 exchange to capture each user's username + MSCHAPv2 challenge/response, which cracks offline to the domain password. Captive portals simply hand you the credentials the user types.

Method

  1. Profile the target (wireless-wpa2-attacks recon): SSID, the EAP type (PEAP/EAP-TTLS), and whether clients validate the server cert (they often don't).
  2. Stand up the evil twin. eaphammer (or hostapd-wpe): eaphammer --cert-wizard then eaphammer -i wlan0 --essid <SSID> --creds — advertises the SSID and runs a rogue RADIUS that logs credentials.
  3. Lure clients — same SSID (and, per RoE, a stronger signal / brief targeted deauth of the real AP to prompt roaming). Keep disruption minimal and in-scope.
  4. Capture & crack the PEAP-MSCHAPv2 username + challenge/response: hashcat -m 5500 netntlm.txt wordlist (or asleap) → domain password.
  5. Captive-portal variant — clone the portal page on the rogue AP to capture typed creds directly; disclose per the SE guardrails in social-eng-methodology.
  6. Pivot — validated creds feed network-password-spraying, VPN/OWA access, and AD work.

Gotchas

  • You're capturing real people's credentials — this is human-adjacent: only in-scope SSIDs, coordinate with the client, minimize capture, and protect/destroy what you collect per RoE (treat like social-eng data discipline).
  • Cert validation defeats it — clients that properly pin/validate the RADIUS cert won't leak; that's the positive finding (report "clients validate the server cert").
  • Deauth/luring can be disruptive and out of RoE — confirm before forcing roaming.
  • MSCHAPv2 capture format must match hashcat -m 5500 exactly — use the tool's emitted format.
  • Legal line — capturing enterprise creds without explicit authorization is illegal; stop if scope is unclear (tradecraft-scope-roe).

Verify success

Captured PEAP-MSCHAPv2 credentials that crack to a working domain password (or portal creds that authenticate) — for in-scope, authorized users only, with a "clients don't validate the RADIUS cert" root cause for the report.

References

eaphammer / hostapd-wpe docs; hashcat mode 5500; PEAP-MSCHAPv2 weaknesses. Data discipline: social-eng-methodology; follow-on: network-password-spraying.

Files in this version

Permissions

PermissionDeclaredFound by the scan
Reads filesNoNo
Writes filesNoNo
Runs shell commandsNoNo
Uses the networkNoNo
Uses connectorsNoNo
Drives a browserNoNo

Scan findings

Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026

The scan found nothing to flag in this version.

A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.

VersionPublishedCommitSHA-256SignaturePermission change
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5Nov 13, 2026ee0e0c5c244ffd0Signed–

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