Vai al contenuto
New

DeepSeek V4.1 Flash free for 7 days: 10M tokens a day after a top-up of $10 or more. Until Nov 30.

How it works
noorqureshi/web-python-sandbox-escapeWeb e bug bounty

web-python-sandbox-escape

⁨Escape a Python sandbox / eval jail to reach code execution — defeat keyword blocklists and restricted eval/exec by reaching objects through the class hierarchy. Load when user input hits eval/exec/a "safe" expression evaluator, a Python REPL/calculator feature, a template that runs Python, or a fil⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa

Installa

Non hai ancora la CLI di NotHoly? Installala prima.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-python-sandbox-escape

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
zYiIN/55xC…9QxgkHCw==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchettoab283950…de79ac32
ab2839505dd1…1144de79ac321 file · ⁦1.8 KB⁩
ScansioneBassonessuna segnalazione
La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.Vedi la scansione completa
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-python-sandbox-escape@ee0e0c5

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When it applies

User input reaches eval(), exec(), a "safe expression" evaluator, a template engine that runs Python, or a feature that runs user formulas — and a blocklist tries to make it safe by banning words like import, os, or system. If you can evaluate Python at all, the blocklist is almost always bypassable.

Why it works

String-based keyword filters remove names, but the objects they'd name are still reachable through Python's object graph. From any object you can walk __class__ → __base__ → __subclasses__() to find a class whose module gives you code execution (subprocess.Popen, os.system, builtins), without ever typing a banned identifier literally.

Method

  1. Confirm evaluation. Send an arithmetic probe (7*7 → 49) or a type leak (().__class__) to prove Python is evaluating your input.
  2. Reach the class tree. From a literal you're allowed: ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__() — enumerate to find a useful class (look for subprocess.Popen, os._wrap_close, warnings.catch_warnings → builtins). Index into the list once you know the position.
  3. Execute via the found class, e.g. (index varies per build): ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()[N]('id',shell=True,stdout=-1).communicate().
  4. Defeat banned identifiers without typing them:
    • Attribute by string: getattr(obj,'sys'+'tem').
    • Build names from chars: "__imp"+"ort__", chr(...), or index into strings.
    • Reach builtins: ().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()[i].__init__.__globals__['__builtins__'].
  5. Alternate sinks — if the input is YAML/pickle rather than eval: unsafe yaml.load and pickle.loads execute __reduce__; str.format/f-string on attacker templates can read object internals ({0.__class__}) → info leak → escalate.

Gotchas

  • __subclasses__() ordering is not stable across Python versions/builds — enumerate at runtime to find your target's index, don't hardcode it.
  • Blocklist vs allowlist — a true AST allowlist (only permitted nodes) is far harder; test whether attribute access / subscripting is even parsed before going deep.
  • eval with restricted __builtins__ still leaks via the class tree — that's the whole point.
  • This overlaps web-ssti (Jinja uses the same gadget) — if it's a template, start there.

Verify success

Command output from the host (e.g. id, a file read) returned through the evaluator, proving code execution past the sandbox — not just a leaked class name.

References

"Python jail escape" / pyjail write-ups; PayloadsAllTheThings (Python sandbox); CWE-94/95.

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellSìSì
Usa la reteNoNo
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c5ab283950Firmata–

Chiedi tutto quello che il tuo perimetro consente.

Crea un account, aggiungi crediti e fai la prima domanda in chat o nel terminale.

  1. 1/3

    Crea l'account

    Privato o azienda. Puoi passare ad azienda in seguito senza perdere saldo o chiavi.

    PrivatoAzienda
  2. 2/3

    Aggiungi crediti

    Con carta. Paghi a token, senza abbonamento.

    $5.00ricarica minima
  3. 3/3

    Chiedi

    In chat, oppure installa la CLI ed esegui notholy login nel terminale.

    $ notholy login