web-python-sandbox-escape
Escape a Python sandbox / eval jail to reach code execution — defeat keyword blocklists and restricted eval/exec by reaching objects through the class hierarchy. Load when user input hits eval/exec/a "safe" expression evaluator, a Python REPL/calculator feature, a template that runs Python, or a fil
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/web-python-sandbox-escapeWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Packageab283950…de79ac32
ab2839505dd1…1144de79ac321 file · 1.8 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/web/web-python-sandbox-escape@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
User input reaches eval(), exec(), a "safe expression" evaluator, a template engine that runs
Python, or a feature that runs user formulas — and a blocklist tries to make it safe by banning
words like import, os, or system. If you can evaluate Python at all, the blocklist is almost
always bypassable.
Why it works
String-based keyword filters remove names, but the objects they'd name are still reachable through
Python's object graph. From any object you can walk __class__ → __base__ → __subclasses__() to
find a class whose module gives you code execution (subprocess.Popen, os.system, builtins),
without ever typing a banned identifier literally.
Method
- Confirm evaluation. Send an arithmetic probe (
7*7→49) or a type leak (().__class__) to prove Python is evaluating your input. - Reach the class tree. From a literal you're allowed:
().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()— enumerate to find a useful class (look forsubprocess.Popen,os._wrap_close,warnings.catch_warnings→builtins). Index into the list once you know the position. - Execute via the found class, e.g. (index varies per build):
().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()[N]('id',shell=True,stdout=-1).communicate(). - Defeat banned identifiers without typing them:
- Attribute by string:
getattr(obj,'sys'+'tem'). - Build names from chars:
"__imp"+"ort__",chr(...), or index into strings. - Reach builtins:
().__class__.__base__.__subclasses__()[i].__init__.__globals__['__builtins__'].
- Attribute by string:
- Alternate sinks — if the input is YAML/pickle rather than eval: unsafe
yaml.loadandpickle.loadsexecute__reduce__;str.format/f-string on attacker templates can read object internals ({0.__class__}) → info leak → escalate.
Gotchas
__subclasses__()ordering is not stable across Python versions/builds — enumerate at runtime to find your target's index, don't hardcode it.- Blocklist vs allowlist — a true AST allowlist (only permitted nodes) is far harder; test whether attribute access / subscripting is even parsed before going deep.
evalwith restricted__builtins__still leaks via the class tree — that's the whole point.- This overlaps
web-ssti(Jinja uses the same gadget) — if it's a template, start there.
Verify success
Command output from the host (e.g. id, a file read) returned through the evaluator, proving code
execution past the sandbox — not just a leaked class name.
References
"Python jail escape" / pyjail write-ups; PayloadsAllTheThings (Python sandbox); CWE-94/95.
Files in this version
- SKILL.md3.3 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | Yes | Yes |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | ab283950 | Signed | – |
More from NoorQureshi
All from this publisherMore in Web and bug bounty
See the category- src-hunterzhaoxuya520/src-hunter5
- owasp-top10-analysissecurityskills/owasp-top10-analysis5
- testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilitiesmukul975/testing-for-xml-injection-vulnerabilities5
- offensive-xsssnailsploit/offensive-xss5
- offensive-rcesnailsploit/offensive-rce5
- source-review-techniqueaeondave/source-review-technique5
Ask anything your scope allows.
Create an account, add credits and ask the first question in the chat or the terminal.
- 1/3
Create the account
Individual or company. You can switch to a company later without losing balance or keys.
IndividualCompany - 2/3
Add credits
By card. Pay per token, no subscription.
$5.00minimum deposit - 3/3
Ask
In the chat, or install the CLI and run notholy login in your terminal.
$ notholy login