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How it works
noorqureshi/reverse-eng-macosReverse engineering e fuzzing

reverse-eng-macos

⁨Reverse macOS Mach-O binaries and .app bundles — codesign/notarization state, entitlements, Objective-C/Swift symbol recovery, and lldb/Frida dynamic analysis. Load when the target is a Mach-O executable/dylib/framework, an .app bundle, a LaunchAgent/Daemon plist, or Apple-platform malware. Signals:⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa

Installa

Non hai ancora la CLI di NotHoly? Installala prima.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/reverse-eng-macos

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
AUvCGOJGnG…G7qD7UBw==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchetto82ee3c54…421f7973
82ee3c5461a3…46ad421f79731 file · ⁦2.3 KB⁩
ScansioneBasso1 segnalazione
  • Link a domini esterni
Vedi la scansione completa
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/reverse-engineering/reverse-eng-macos@ee0e0c5

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When it applies

The target is a Mach-O binary, dylib, framework, or .app bundle on macOS (or a sample you can read offline), and it is in scope (tradecraft-scope-roe, scope.txt). iOS IPAs are a different surface — treat them with the iOS assessment flow (mobile-ios-assessment). Typical jobs: understand a thick client, audit a persistence item (LaunchAgent/Daemon), or analyze Apple-platform malware.

Why it works

Mach-O carries its trust model in-band: the code signature, entitlements, and load commands say what the binary may do before you read a single instruction. Objective-C keeps class and selector names in __objc_* sections and Swift symbols demangle to full signatures, so static recovery is cheap — and Apple's own tools (codesign, otool, lldb, log) cover most of the workflow.

Method

  1. Trust posture first.
    bash
    file target.app/Contents/MacOS/target
    codesign -dv --verbose=4 target.app          # signer, team ID, hardened-runtime flags
    codesign -d --entitlements :- target.app     # com.apple.security.* capabilities
    spctl -a -vv target.app 2>&1                 # Gatekeeper/notarization verdict
    otool -L target                              # linked dylibs + rpath entries
    Record: signed vs ad-hoc, notarized or not, hardened runtime, library validation, and any powerful entitlements (get-task-allow, disable-library-validation, TCC-related).
  2. Static. class-dump/dsdump for Objective-C headers, swift-demangle for Swift symbols, then Hopper/Ghidra/IDA (jtool2 for deep Mach-O structure). Grep strings for XPC service names, TCC-sensitive APIs, URLs, and keys. Objective-C calls go through objc_msgSend — follow selector cross-references, not direct calls.
  3. Dependencies. Audit LC_LOAD_DYLIB and @rpath entries — a writable rpath search dir is a dylib-hijack primitive; note it for privesc/attack-path mapping.
  4. Dynamic. lldb for debugging, Frida for instrumentation. Watch behavior with fs_usage -w -f filesystem <pid> and log stream --predicate 'process == "target"' — file, network, and XPC activity show up without a single breakpoint. Proxy or hook for the network side.
  5. Persistence & malware checks. For a suspicious sample: enumerate its LaunchAgents/Daemons plist, install receipts, and AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges / SMJobBless usage, then confirm the behavior dynamically before calling it malicious.

Gotchas

  • Universal (fat) binaries carry arm64 + x86_64 slices — lipo -info, and analyze the slice matching your analysis host.
  • Hardened runtime + library validation blocks dylib injection and Frida — you need a copy re-signed (or the target built) with com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation / get-task-allow. SIP-protected platform binaries can't be attached at all.
  • Ad-hoc or revoked signatures change the verdict — spctl failing doesn't mean malicious; correlate with entitlements and behavior.
  • Swift UI/AppKit binaries look sparse statically — the real flow lives in closures and protocol witnesses; dynamic observation beats static here.
  • objc_msgSend hides call graphs in decompilers — resolve selectors via the __objc_selrefs / __objc_msgrefs sections.

Verify success

You can state the signature/notarization/entitlement posture, name the entry points and the interesting logic at symbol or address level, and back the claim with a dynamic observation (debugger state, fs_usage/log stream trace).

References

Apple codesign/entitlement documentation; otool/jtool2 Mach-O references; Hopper & Ghidra docs.


Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellSìSì
Usa la reteSìSì
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

  1. InfoLink · Link a domini esterni

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c582ee3c54Firmata–

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