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Cómo funciona
noorqureshi/reverse-eng-macosIngeniería inversa y fuzzing

reverse-eng-macos

⁨Reverse macOS Mach-O binaries and .app bundles — codesign/notarization state, entitlements, Objective-C/Swift symbol recovery, and lldb/Frida dynamic analysis. Load when the target is a Mach-O executable/dylib/framework, an .app bundle, a LaunchAgent/Daemon plist, or Apple-platform malware. Signals:⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas

Instalar

¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/reverse-eng-macos

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

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AUvCGOJGnG…G7qD7UBw==La CLI comprueba el SHA-256 y la firma antes de escribir cualquier archivo.
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EscaneoBajo1 hallazgo
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Ver el escaneo completo
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/reverse-engineering/reverse-eng-macos@ee0e0c5

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

When it applies

The target is a Mach-O binary, dylib, framework, or .app bundle on macOS (or a sample you can read offline), and it is in scope (tradecraft-scope-roe, scope.txt). iOS IPAs are a different surface — treat them with the iOS assessment flow (mobile-ios-assessment). Typical jobs: understand a thick client, audit a persistence item (LaunchAgent/Daemon), or analyze Apple-platform malware.

Why it works

Mach-O carries its trust model in-band: the code signature, entitlements, and load commands say what the binary may do before you read a single instruction. Objective-C keeps class and selector names in __objc_* sections and Swift symbols demangle to full signatures, so static recovery is cheap — and Apple's own tools (codesign, otool, lldb, log) cover most of the workflow.

Method

  1. Trust posture first.
    bash
    file target.app/Contents/MacOS/target
    codesign -dv --verbose=4 target.app          # signer, team ID, hardened-runtime flags
    codesign -d --entitlements :- target.app     # com.apple.security.* capabilities
    spctl -a -vv target.app 2>&1                 # Gatekeeper/notarization verdict
    otool -L target                              # linked dylibs + rpath entries
    Record: signed vs ad-hoc, notarized or not, hardened runtime, library validation, and any powerful entitlements (get-task-allow, disable-library-validation, TCC-related).
  2. Static. class-dump/dsdump for Objective-C headers, swift-demangle for Swift symbols, then Hopper/Ghidra/IDA (jtool2 for deep Mach-O structure). Grep strings for XPC service names, TCC-sensitive APIs, URLs, and keys. Objective-C calls go through objc_msgSend — follow selector cross-references, not direct calls.
  3. Dependencies. Audit LC_LOAD_DYLIB and @rpath entries — a writable rpath search dir is a dylib-hijack primitive; note it for privesc/attack-path mapping.
  4. Dynamic. lldb for debugging, Frida for instrumentation. Watch behavior with fs_usage -w -f filesystem <pid> and log stream --predicate 'process == "target"' — file, network, and XPC activity show up without a single breakpoint. Proxy or hook for the network side.
  5. Persistence & malware checks. For a suspicious sample: enumerate its LaunchAgents/Daemons plist, install receipts, and AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges / SMJobBless usage, then confirm the behavior dynamically before calling it malicious.

Gotchas

  • Universal (fat) binaries carry arm64 + x86_64 slices — lipo -info, and analyze the slice matching your analysis host.
  • Hardened runtime + library validation blocks dylib injection and Frida — you need a copy re-signed (or the target built) with com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation / get-task-allow. SIP-protected platform binaries can't be attached at all.
  • Ad-hoc or revoked signatures change the verdict — spctl failing doesn't mean malicious; correlate with entitlements and behavior.
  • Swift UI/AppKit binaries look sparse statically — the real flow lives in closures and protocol witnesses; dynamic observation beats static here.
  • objc_msgSend hides call graphs in decompilers — resolve selectors via the __objc_selrefs / __objc_msgrefs sections.

Verify success

You can state the signature/notarization/entitlement posture, name the entry points and the interesting logic at symbol or address level, and back the claim with a dynamic observation (debugger state, fs_usage/log stream trace).

References

Apple codesign/entitlement documentation; otool/jtool2 Mach-O references; Hopper & Ghidra docs.


Portions adapted from reverse-skill by zhaoxuya520, MIT License.

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

PermisoDeclaradoHallado en el escaneo
Lee archivosNoNo
Escribe archivosNoNo
Ejecuta comandos de shellSíSí
Usa la redSíSí
Usa conectoresNoNo
Controla un navegadorNoNo

Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. InfoEnlace · Enlaces a dominios externos

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c582ee3c54Firmada–

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