Reverse macOS Mach-O binaries and .app bundles — codesign/notarization state, entitlements, Objective-C/Swift symbol recovery, and lldb/Frida dynamic analysis. Load when the target is a Mach-O executable/dylib/framework, an .app bundle, a LaunchAgent/Daemon plist, or Apple-platform malware. Signals:
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The target is a Mach-O binary, dylib, framework, or .app bundle on macOS (or a sample you can
read offline), and it is in scope (tradecraft-scope-roe, scope.txt). iOS IPAs are a different
surface — treat them with the iOS assessment flow (mobile-ios-assessment). Typical jobs:
understand a thick client, audit a persistence item (LaunchAgent/Daemon), or analyze Apple-platform
malware.
Mach-O carries its trust model in-band: the code signature, entitlements, and load commands say
what the binary may do before you read a single instruction. Objective-C keeps class and selector
names in __objc_* sections and Swift symbols demangle to full signatures, so static recovery is
cheap — and Apple's own tools (codesign, otool, lldb, log) cover most of the workflow.
Record: signed vs ad-hoc, notarized or not, hardened runtime, library validation, and any
powerful entitlements (get-task-allow, disable-library-validation, TCC-related).
Static.class-dump/dsdump for Objective-C headers, swift-demangle for Swift symbols,
then Hopper/Ghidra/IDA (jtool2 for deep Mach-O structure). Grep strings for XPC service names,
TCC-sensitive APIs, URLs, and keys. Objective-C calls go through objc_msgSend — follow
selector cross-references, not direct calls.
Dependencies. Audit LC_LOAD_DYLIB and @rpath entries — a writable rpath search dir is
a dylib-hijack primitive; note it for privesc/attack-path mapping.
Dynamic.lldb for debugging, Frida for instrumentation. Watch behavior with
fs_usage -w -f filesystem <pid> and log stream --predicate 'process == "target"' — file,
network, and XPC activity show up without a single breakpoint. Proxy or hook for the network side.
Persistence & malware checks. For a suspicious sample: enumerate its LaunchAgents/Daemons
plist, install receipts, and AuthorizationExecuteWithPrivileges / SMJobBless usage, then
confirm the behavior dynamically before calling it malicious.
Universal (fat) binaries carry arm64 + x86_64 slices — lipo -info, and analyze the slice
matching your analysis host.
Hardened runtime + library validation blocks dylib injection and Frida — you need a copy
re-signed (or the target built) with com.apple.security.cs.disable-library-validation /
get-task-allow. SIP-protected platform binaries can't be attached at all.
Ad-hoc or revoked signatures change the verdict — spctl failing doesn't mean malicious;
correlate with entitlements and behavior.
Swift UI/AppKit binaries look sparse statically — the real flow lives in closures and
protocol witnesses; dynamic observation beats static here.
objc_msgSend hides call graphs in decompilers — resolve selectors via the __objc_selrefs
/ __objc_msgrefs sections.
You can state the signature/notarization/entitlement posture, name the entry points and the
interesting logic at symbol or address level, and back the claim with a dynamic observation
(debugger state, fs_usage/log stream trace).