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How it works
noorqureshi/reverse-eng-firmwareMobile, firmware e hardware

reverse-eng-firmware

⁨Extract and analyze device firmware to find hardcoded secrets, backdoors, vulnerable services, and the real version behind an appliance. Load when you have a firmware image or can pull one. Signals: a .bin/.img firmware download, a router/IoT/appliance in scope, an OTA update file, a flash dump, "an⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa

Installa

Non hai ancora la CLI di NotHoly? Installala prima.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/reverse-eng-firmware

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
BdEhudfsGS…qfoWiiAg==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchetto5e0222e5…418ec0fe
5e0222e5ef7d…bb75418ec0fe1 file · ⁦1.9 KB⁩
ScansioneMedio1 segnalazione
  • injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:52
Vedi la scansione completa
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/reverse-engineering/reverse-eng-firmware@ee0e0c5

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When it applies

You have a firmware image — a vendor download, an OTA update, or a flash dump — for a router, IoT device, or network appliance in scope. Offline firmware analysis is the static counterpart to network-appliance-attacks: it explains why a device is vulnerable and often yields the exact version, hardcoded creds, or patched-function diff behind an edge CVE.

Why it works

Firmware ships the whole system: a packed filesystem, config, keys, and binaries. Vendors routinely leave hardcoded credentials, private keys, debug/backdoor accounts, and old vulnerable services in the image — all readable offline, with no traffic to the live device, once you carve the filesystem out of the container.

Method

  1. Recognize and carve. binwalk <image> to identify the container and offsets (U-Boot header, compression, one or more filesystems). Extract with binwalk -e (or unsquashfs / firmware-mod-kit for SquashFS/JFFS2/CramFS). Encrypted images → find the bootloader/update routine that decrypts (often in a prior version's cleartext image).
  2. Inventory the filesystem. Identify the OS/libc, the init scripts, the web root, and the service binaries. emba automates a first-pass audit if you want breadth fast.
  3. Hunt secrets & accounts. /etc/passwd+/etc/shadow (crack weak hashes offline), hardcoded API keys/private keys/certs, backdoor accounts, and secrets in config and startup scripts (CWE-798, CWE-912).
  4. Pin the version and diff. Read the real build/version from the filesystem (not a spoofable banner) to drive CVE applicability. Diff the pre/post-patch image of a known CVE to locate the vulnerable function, then analyze it with reverse-eng-binary-triage.
  5. Find the reachable attack surface. Network-listening binaries (the web UI CGI, telnet/SSH, custom daemons) are the ones that matter live — triage those for injection/overflow and map them back to a remote path on the running device.

Gotchas

  • binwalk -e can fail silently on nested/obscure formats — check offsets manually and try unsquashfs/sasquatch for non-standard SquashFS; a partial carve looks like "nothing there".
  • Vendor keys are shared across a product line — a key in one image often unlocks the whole fleet; that's the finding, but handle it responsibly per RoE.
  • Version from the filesystem, not the banner — appliances backport patches and keep old strings; the image is ground truth.
  • Only analyze firmware you're authorized to — redistribution of vendor firmware may itself be restricted; keep it in the git-ignored engagements/ tree.

Verify success

A concrete offline finding: a hardcoded credential/key, a backdoor account, the pinned build version, or a vulnerable network-facing binary and its remote entry point — each traceable to a file in the extracted image.

References

binwalk & firmware-mod-kit docs; emba firmware analyzer; OWASP IoT / firmware testing guidance; CWE-798/912.

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellNoNo
Usa la reteNoNo
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:52

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c55e0222e5Firmata–

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