reverse-eng-firmware
Extract and analyze device firmware to find hardcoded secrets, backdoors, vulnerable services, and the real version behind an appliance. Load when you have a firmware image or can pull one. Signals: a .bin/.img firmware download, a router/IoT/appliance in scope, an OTA update file, a flash dump, "an
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas
Instalar
¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/reverse-eng-firmwareEscribe en ~/.notholy/skills después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.
FirmaFirmado, ed25519
Paquete5e0222e5…418ec0fe
5e0222e5ef7d…bb75418ec0fe1 archivo · 1.9 KBEscaneoMedio1 hallazgo
- injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:52
Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/reverse-engineering/reverse-eng-firmware@ee0e0c5
Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.
En esta página
When it applies
You have a firmware image — a vendor download, an OTA update, or a flash dump — for a router, IoT
device, or network appliance in scope. Offline firmware analysis is the static counterpart to
network-appliance-attacks: it explains why a device is vulnerable and often yields the exact
version, hardcoded creds, or patched-function diff behind an edge CVE.
Why it works
Firmware ships the whole system: a packed filesystem, config, keys, and binaries. Vendors routinely leave hardcoded credentials, private keys, debug/backdoor accounts, and old vulnerable services in the image — all readable offline, with no traffic to the live device, once you carve the filesystem out of the container.
Method
- Recognize and carve.
binwalk <image>to identify the container and offsets (U-Boot header, compression, one or more filesystems). Extract withbinwalk -e(orunsquashfs/ firmware-mod-kit for SquashFS/JFFS2/CramFS). Encrypted images → find the bootloader/update routine that decrypts (often in a prior version's cleartext image). - Inventory the filesystem. Identify the OS/libc, the init scripts, the web root, and the
service binaries.
embaautomates a first-pass audit if you want breadth fast. - Hunt secrets & accounts.
/etc/passwd+/etc/shadow(crack weak hashes offline), hardcoded API keys/private keys/certs, backdoor accounts, and secrets in config and startup scripts (CWE-798,CWE-912). - Pin the version and diff. Read the real build/version from the filesystem (not a spoofable
banner) to drive CVE applicability. Diff the pre/post-patch image of a known CVE to locate the
vulnerable function, then analyze it with
reverse-eng-binary-triage. - Find the reachable attack surface. Network-listening binaries (the web UI CGI, telnet/SSH, custom daemons) are the ones that matter live — triage those for injection/overflow and map them back to a remote path on the running device.
Gotchas
binwalk -ecan fail silently on nested/obscure formats — check offsets manually and tryunsquashfs/sasquatchfor non-standard SquashFS; a partial carve looks like "nothing there".- Vendor keys are shared across a product line — a key in one image often unlocks the whole fleet; that's the finding, but handle it responsibly per RoE.
- Version from the filesystem, not the banner — appliances backport patches and keep old strings; the image is ground truth.
- Only analyze firmware you're authorized to — redistribution of vendor firmware may itself be
restricted; keep it in the git-ignored
engagements/tree.
Verify success
A concrete offline finding: a hardcoded credential/key, a backdoor account, the pinned build version, or a vulnerable network-facing binary and its remote entry point — each traceable to a file in the extracted image.
References
binwalk & firmware-mod-kit docs; emba firmware analyzer; OWASP IoT / firmware testing guidance;
CWE-798/912.
Archivos de esta versión
- SKILL.md3.7 KB
Permisos
| Permiso | Declarado | Hallado en el escaneo |
|---|---|---|
| Lee archivos | No | No |
| Escribe archivos | No | No |
| Ejecuta comandos de shell | No | No |
| Usa la red | No | No |
| Usa conectores | No | No |
| Controla un navegador | No | No |
Hallazgos del escaneo
Revisado el 13 nov 2026
- MediaPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:52
Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.
| Versión | Publicada | Commit | SHA-256 | Firma | Cambio de permisos |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | 13 nov 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 5e0222e5 | Firmada | – |
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