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Cómo funciona
noorqureshi/reverse-eng-firmwareMóvil, firmware y hardware

reverse-eng-firmware

⁨Extract and analyze device firmware to find hardcoded secrets, backdoors, vulnerable services, and the real version behind an appliance. Load when you have a firmware image or can pull one. Signals: a .bin/.img firmware download, a router/IoT/appliance in scope, an OTA update file, a flash dump, "an⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 instalaciones+3 en 7 días27 EstrellasMITsincronizado hace 22 horas

Instalar

¿Aún no tienes la CLI de NotHoly? Instálala primero.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/reverse-eng-firmware

Escribe en ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ después de comprobar la firma y el SHA-256.

FirmaFirmado, ed25519
BdEhudfsGS…qfoWiiAg==La CLI comprueba el SHA-256 y la firma antes de escribir cualquier archivo.
Paquete5e0222e5…418ec0fe
5e0222e5ef7d…bb75418ec0fe1 archivo · ⁦1.9 KB⁩
EscaneoMedio1 hallazgo
  • injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:52
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Fuentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/reverse-engineering/reverse-eng-firmware@ee0e0c5

Esta entrada todavía no está escrita en tu idioma, así que aparece en English.

When it applies

You have a firmware image — a vendor download, an OTA update, or a flash dump — for a router, IoT device, or network appliance in scope. Offline firmware analysis is the static counterpart to network-appliance-attacks: it explains why a device is vulnerable and often yields the exact version, hardcoded creds, or patched-function diff behind an edge CVE.

Why it works

Firmware ships the whole system: a packed filesystem, config, keys, and binaries. Vendors routinely leave hardcoded credentials, private keys, debug/backdoor accounts, and old vulnerable services in the image — all readable offline, with no traffic to the live device, once you carve the filesystem out of the container.

Method

  1. Recognize and carve. binwalk <image> to identify the container and offsets (U-Boot header, compression, one or more filesystems). Extract with binwalk -e (or unsquashfs / firmware-mod-kit for SquashFS/JFFS2/CramFS). Encrypted images → find the bootloader/update routine that decrypts (often in a prior version's cleartext image).
  2. Inventory the filesystem. Identify the OS/libc, the init scripts, the web root, and the service binaries. emba automates a first-pass audit if you want breadth fast.
  3. Hunt secrets & accounts. /etc/passwd+/etc/shadow (crack weak hashes offline), hardcoded API keys/private keys/certs, backdoor accounts, and secrets in config and startup scripts (CWE-798, CWE-912).
  4. Pin the version and diff. Read the real build/version from the filesystem (not a spoofable banner) to drive CVE applicability. Diff the pre/post-patch image of a known CVE to locate the vulnerable function, then analyze it with reverse-eng-binary-triage.
  5. Find the reachable attack surface. Network-listening binaries (the web UI CGI, telnet/SSH, custom daemons) are the ones that matter live — triage those for injection/overflow and map them back to a remote path on the running device.

Gotchas

  • binwalk -e can fail silently on nested/obscure formats — check offsets manually and try unsquashfs/sasquatch for non-standard SquashFS; a partial carve looks like "nothing there".
  • Vendor keys are shared across a product line — a key in one image often unlocks the whole fleet; that's the finding, but handle it responsibly per RoE.
  • Version from the filesystem, not the banner — appliances backport patches and keep old strings; the image is ground truth.
  • Only analyze firmware you're authorized to — redistribution of vendor firmware may itself be restricted; keep it in the git-ignored engagements/ tree.

Verify success

A concrete offline finding: a hardcoded credential/key, a backdoor account, the pinned build version, or a vulnerable network-facing binary and its remote entry point — each traceable to a file in the extracted image.

References

binwalk & firmware-mod-kit docs; emba firmware analyzer; OWASP IoT / firmware testing guidance; CWE-798/912.

Archivos de esta versión

Permisos

PermisoDeclaradoHallado en el escaneo
Lee archivosNoNo
Escribe archivosNoNo
Ejecuta comandos de shellNoNo
Usa la redNoNo
Usa conectoresNoNo
Controla un navegadorNoNo

Hallazgos del escaneo

Revisado el 13 nov 2026

  1. MediaPrompt injection · injection.no_confirmationSKILL.md:52

Un escaneo limpio baja el riesgo, pero no prueba que el paquete sea seguro. Lee lo que instalas.

VersiónPublicadaCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio de permisos
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c55e0222e5Firmada–

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