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How it works
noorqureshi/reporting-triage-validationReport e compliance

reporting-triage-validation

⁨Validate a finding BEFORE you write it up — kill false positives, confirm real impact, check scope, and deduplicate. Load after a candidate bug and before reporting-bug-bounty-writeup or reporting-pentest-report. Signals: "I think I found", "is this reportable", a scanner hit, a reflected value, a 5⁩

v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installazioni+3 in 7 giorni27 StelleMITsincronizzato 22 ore fa

Installa

Non hai ancora la CLI di NotHoly? Installala prima.

$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh
$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/reporting-triage-validation

Scrive in ⁦~/.notholy/skills⁩ dopo aver controllato la firma e lo SHA-256.

FirmaFirmato, ed25519
t3Mb//Tvxv…AhHqsODg==La CLI controlla lo SHA-256 e la firma prima di scrivere qualsiasi file.
Pacchetto11d4e36b…c6841527
11d4e36b0933…3074c68415271 file · ⁦2.2 KB⁩
ScansioneBassonessuna segnalazione
La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.Vedi la scansione completa
Sorgentegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/reporting/reporting-triage-validation@ee0e0c5

Questa voce non è ancora scritta in italiano, quindi è mostrata in un'altra lingua: English.

When it applies

You have a candidate finding and you are about to spend an hour writing it up. Run this gate first. It applies double on bug bounty (an invalid/duplicate report costs your signal and the triager's time) and still matters on a pentest (a false positive in the report costs your credibility with the client).

Why it works

Most "findings" die on one of a few predictable questions. Asking them up front — cheaply, in order — kills the weak ones before they cost report-writing time, and forces the survivors to carry the evidence a triager actually needs. The rule is simple: one failed gate = stop.

Method — four gates, in order

Gate 0 — Is it real and in scope?

  1. Reproduce it as a raw HTTP request (or exact steps) from a clean session — not from your proxy's replay of a stateful flow. If you can't write the request that proves it, it isn't a finding yet.
  2. Confirm the vulnerable asset is in scope.txt and the vuln class is one the program accepts (re-read the policy). Staging, third-party, and internal-only hosts are out.

Gate 1 — Is there real impact? Name what the attacker walks away with. "Technically possible" is not impact. Common kills:

  • XSS with no session/action proof — show cookie theft, an action as the victim, or a sensitive-context payload; a reflected alert(1) on a JSON endpoint that sets Content-Type: application/json usually doesn't execute.
  • SSRF that only resolves DNS — get an HTTP response body or reach an internal service (web-ssrf, web-ssrf-gopher-redis-rce), or it's a blind curiosity.
  • IDOR on your own data, or cross-account with identical data — prove access to another tenant's object (web-idor).
  • CORS wildcard without Allow-Credentials and a credentialed, sensitive response — no exfil path, no bug.
  • Open redirect / self-XSS / missing headers / version banners — N/A alone; only count when chained (open redirect → OAuth token theft, web-oauth; version → a working CVE PoC).

Gate 2 — Is it a duplicate or known behavior? Search the program's disclosed reports, your own past submissions, the changelog, and the web for the same class on the same asset. Confirm it isn't documented intended behavior. Bump the version and retest if a fix may have landed since you found it.

Gate 3 — Is the evidence report-grade?

  • Copy-pasteable reproduction (numbered steps or a single request), no manual proxy state.
  • A severity you can defend: build the CVSS 3.1 vector and sanity-check the score against the impact you actually proved (e.g. cross-tenant read ≈ 6.5; unauthenticated auth bypass ≈ 9.8).
  • Redacted proof only — the minimum data that proves it, never hoarded real PII.

Gotchas

  • Chains need every link proven. "Open redirect + hypothetical token leak" is one proven bug and one guess = still N/A. Prove the leak or don't claim the chain.
  • Two or more preconditions that must all hold (victim must be admin and click a link and be on an old client) usually means low/again-N/A — say so honestly.
  • Scanner output is a lead, not a finding. Every automated hit re-enters at Gate 0.
  • Don't let sunk cost carry a dead finding forward — a fast N/A you never submit beats a slow one the triager closes.

Verify success

Every gate passes and you can state, in one sentence, the concrete impact and who is affected — then hand off to reporting-bug-bounty-writeup or reporting-pentest-report.

References

CVSS 3.1 specification; program policy and disclosed reports; HackerOne/Bugcrowd triage guidance.

File di questa versione

Permessi

PermessoDichiaratoTrovato dalla scansione
Legge fileNoNo
Scrive fileNoNo
Esegue comandi shellNoNo
Usa la reteNoNo
Usa i connettoriNoNo
Controlla un browserNoNo

Segnalazioni della scansione

Rivisto il 13 nov 2026

La scansione non ha trovato nulla da segnalare in questa versione.

Una scansione pulita abbassa il rischio, ma non prova che il pacchetto sia sicuro. Leggi quello che installi.

VersionePubblicataCommitSHA-256FirmaCambio di permessi
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c513 nov 2026ee0e0c511d4e36bFirmata–

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