reporting-triage-validation
Validate a finding BEFORE you write it up — kill false positives, confirm real impact, check scope, and deduplicate. Load after a candidate bug and before reporting-bug-bounty-writeup or reporting-pentest-report. Signals: "I think I found", "is this reportable", a scanner hit, a reflected value, a 5
v2026.10.14-ee0e0c53 installs+3 in 7 days27 StarsMITsynced 22 hours ago
Install
No NotHoly CLI yet? Install it first.
$ curl -fsSL https://notholy.com/install.sh | sh$ notholy skills install noorqureshi/reporting-triage-validationWrites to ~/.notholy/skills after checking the signature and the SHA-256.
SignatureSigned, ed25519
Package11d4e36b…c6841527
11d4e36b0933…3074c68415271 file · 2.2 KBScanLowno findings
Sourcegithub.com/NoorQureshi/security-skills/tree/main/skills/reporting/reporting-triage-validation@ee0e0c5
On this page
When it applies
You have a candidate finding and you are about to spend an hour writing it up. Run this gate first. It applies double on bug bounty (an invalid/duplicate report costs your signal and the triager's time) and still matters on a pentest (a false positive in the report costs your credibility with the client).
Why it works
Most "findings" die on one of a few predictable questions. Asking them up front — cheaply, in order — kills the weak ones before they cost report-writing time, and forces the survivors to carry the evidence a triager actually needs. The rule is simple: one failed gate = stop.
Method — four gates, in order
Gate 0 — Is it real and in scope?
- Reproduce it as a raw HTTP request (or exact steps) from a clean session — not from your proxy's replay of a stateful flow. If you can't write the request that proves it, it isn't a finding yet.
- Confirm the vulnerable asset is in
scope.txtand the vuln class is one the program accepts (re-read the policy). Staging, third-party, and internal-only hosts are out.
Gate 1 — Is there real impact? Name what the attacker walks away with. "Technically possible" is not impact. Common kills:
- XSS with no session/action proof — show cookie theft, an action as the victim, or a
sensitive-context payload; a reflected
alert(1)on a JSON endpoint that setsContent-Type: application/jsonusually doesn't execute. - SSRF that only resolves DNS — get an HTTP response body or reach an internal service
(
web-ssrf,web-ssrf-gopher-redis-rce), or it's a blind curiosity. - IDOR on your own data, or cross-account with identical data — prove access to another
tenant's object (
web-idor). - CORS wildcard without
Allow-Credentialsand a credentialed, sensitive response — no exfil path, no bug. - Open redirect / self-XSS / missing headers / version banners — N/A alone; only count when
chained (open redirect → OAuth token theft,
web-oauth; version → a working CVE PoC).
Gate 2 — Is it a duplicate or known behavior? Search the program's disclosed reports, your own past submissions, the changelog, and the web for the same class on the same asset. Confirm it isn't documented intended behavior. Bump the version and retest if a fix may have landed since you found it.
Gate 3 — Is the evidence report-grade?
- Copy-pasteable reproduction (numbered steps or a single request), no manual proxy state.
- A severity you can defend: build the CVSS 3.1 vector and sanity-check the score against the impact you actually proved (e.g. cross-tenant read ≈ 6.5; unauthenticated auth bypass ≈ 9.8).
- Redacted proof only — the minimum data that proves it, never hoarded real PII.
Gotchas
- Chains need every link proven. "Open redirect + hypothetical token leak" is one proven bug and one guess = still N/A. Prove the leak or don't claim the chain.
- Two or more preconditions that must all hold (victim must be admin and click a link and be on an old client) usually means low/again-N/A — say so honestly.
- Scanner output is a lead, not a finding. Every automated hit re-enters at Gate 0.
- Don't let sunk cost carry a dead finding forward — a fast N/A you never submit beats a slow one the triager closes.
Verify success
Every gate passes and you can state, in one sentence, the concrete impact and who is affected —
then hand off to reporting-bug-bounty-writeup or reporting-pentest-report.
References
CVSS 3.1 specification; program policy and disclosed reports; HackerOne/Bugcrowd triage guidance.
Files in this version
- SKILL.md4.2 KB
Permissions
| Permission | Declared | Found by the scan |
|---|---|---|
| Reads files | No | No |
| Writes files | No | No |
| Runs shell commands | No | No |
| Uses the network | No | No |
| Uses connectors | No | No |
| Drives a browser | No | No |
Scan findings
Reviewed on Nov 13, 2026
The scan found nothing to flag in this version.
A clean scan lowers the risk but does not prove a package is safe. Read what you install.
| Version | Published | Commit | SHA-256 | Signature | Permission change |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| v2026.10.14-ee0e0c5 | Nov 13, 2026 | ee0e0c5 | 11d4e36b | Signed | – |
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